A Critical Study
of
Philosophy of Dayānanda
by

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The author has in this book,—which has been brought out on the occasion of the Jubilee felicitations of the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, Rajasthan and Malwa, made a critical study of the Philosophy of Dayānanda, the greatest of the scholars of the nineteenth century. This philosophy has rejuvenated the country in the modern times, and has best interpreted the Vedic Thought.

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PREFACE

WHEN I was asked by the authorities of the Ārya Pratinidhi Sabhā, Rajasthāna, Ajmer, to write something on the occasion of their Jubilee felicitations, I, with great pleasure, acceded to undertake the study of the Philosophy of Dayānanda. Dayānanda occupies a very important place in the galaxy of our Indian philosophers along with Śankara, Rāmānuja and Madhva. Not only over a million of Ārya Samājists are directly influenced with his teachings, his philosophy is inspiring the Modern India as a whole. No other single man in this country for the last hundred years has done so much for the regeneration of our people as this great scholar, philosopher, reformer and saint did.

In the present book, an attempt has been made to interpret the philosophy of Dayānanda as clearly and sincerely as possible. Dayānanda's philosophy is the philosophy of the Vedas, a synthesis of realism and idealism, free from scepticism and full of hope, life and vitality. Unfortunately, Dayānanda has written no book exclusively on philosophy, but on the basis of his two monumental works, the '*Ṛgvedādibhāṣyabhūmikā*' or the 'Introduction to the Ṛg and other Vedas,'

written in Sanskrit and the '*Satyārtha-prakāśa*,' or the 'Light of Truth' written in Hindi, one can easily follow his system To his school, belong such scholars as Swāmī Darśanānanda, Swāmī Nityānanda, Paṇḍits Lekha Rāma, Gurudatta, Tulasi Rāmā, Āryamuni, Rājā Rāma, Śrī Nārāyaṇa Swāmī, Pt. Gangā Prasāda Upādhyāya and others who have expounded the philosophy of the Maharṣi either by writing independent books or by commenting on the Six Darśanas and the Upaniṣads, but unfortunately, most of these writings are in Hindi only and therefore, inaccessible to the public at large. The present book is the philosophy of Dayānanda, only because it is based on his writings alone. A complete philosophy of the Ārya Samāja is yet to be written which would include the advances made by other scholars as mentioned above.

In the end, I express my gratitude to our scholars of the East and the West. whose valuable works I have so often consulted and referred to while writing the present book; for example, Max Müller, Garbé, Thibaut, Keith, Radhakrishnan, Rānāde and host of others. As the book has been written and brought out in hurry, our readers would, it is expected, excuse us for a few of the discrepancies and misprints that have found place in the book.

I thank, again, the authorities of the Ārya Pratinidhi Sabhā, Rajasthāna, for having provided me with an opportunity to bring out this work.

The Jubilee dates being imminent, it was not possible to include index in the book, which, however, will be added in the next edition.

VIJAYĀDAŚAMĪ,
KALĀKUTĪRA,
PRAYĀGA.

SATYA PRAKASH

CONTENTS



SWĀMI DAYĀNANDA SARASWATI

A CRITICAL STUDY

OF

PHILOSOPHY OF DAYĀNANDA

Chapter I

The Back Ground

WHAT Einstein has said about men of science is equally true about men of philosophy. I would say in similar words that many kinds of men devote themselves to philosophy, and not all for the sake of philosophy herself. There are some who come into her temple because it offers them the opportunity to display their particular talents. To this class of men, philosophy is a kind of sport in the practice of which they exult, just as an athlete exults in the exercise of his muscular prowess. There is another class of men who come into the temple to make an offering of their brain-pulp in the hope of securing a profitable return. These men are philosophers only by the chance of some circumstance which offered itself when making a choice of career. If the attending circumstance had been different, they might have become politicians or

captains of business. Should an angel of God, as Einstein puts it, descend and drive from the Temple of Knowledge all those belonging to the above categories, it is feared, the temple would be nearly emptied. But still there are some who have found favour with the angel. What has led them to devote themselves to the pursuit of knowledge, is difficult to say. It may be, perhaps, that they felt an inner urge to flee from everyday life, with its drab and deadly dullness and thus to unshackle the chain of one's own transient desires. We cannot trace in their single span of life all the stages of human evolution through which they must have passed. There is something so unique and distinct in them and they are so much different from others that it is difficult to follow how the machinery of their brain works and how the clock of their heart moves. And when they go away, we realise what dynamic personalities they were; we then find that which they achieved for themselves was, in fact, the achievement for the humanity at large. Amongst these was Dayānanda, the greatest of the personalities of the nineteenth century.

Dayānanda was not an academic philosopher, unlike many of the philosophers of the present day whose philosophy remains

untouched with their life and who have never translated their beliefs and doctrines into actions. A synthetic philosophy compatible with all aspects of life, a complete solution of the problems concerning visible and non-visible, and a perfect picture of the knowable and unknowable can only be given by one who has been sincere and truthful, who has placed himself above the worldly aspirations and who is free from the very many vices of an ordinary life. Philosophy does not believe in the finality of an answer to any of the problems howsoever simple they appear to be. The greatest of the thinkers are the least dogmatic, for to be so is directly against the spirit of philosophy. But in spite of this modesty, a philosopher does not spare anybody from his drastic criticisms, for if he has found out a truth for himself, his sincerity demands that he should give it out with emphasis in face of all opposition. He moves undaunted in the world, for he is confident that the truth that he has found would be his saviour. In matters of truth, a philosopher does not believe in compromises or pacts, truces and treaties and in this respect he differs from other worldly heroes whom we find struggling hard in the domain of politics and whose achievements, probably the human history glorifies the most. But

a great philosopher lives through all times. He becomes a motive force behind all our national actions and aspirations, even when he is not bodily present with us. This lays a much heavier responsibility on the shoulders of a philosopher. This demands in him a crystal clear character free from blemishes and blasphemy. One who satisfies himself with the academical hair-splittings in his writings or sermons, but who is not prepared to live unto his ideas, whose life is contrary to his preachings, or one who believes that philosophy is simply a matter of brain exercise cannot be called a true philosopher. In fact, the truth once realised or attained does not admit duality in matters of life.

A BORN PHILOSOPHER

Dayānanda was a born philosopher, not in the sense that he was moody or gloomy from his early life but on account of the fact that like a potential philosopher, his soul urged from the very beginning of his career to find out a solution for himself regarding some complex problems of life. He wanted not only an intellectual satisfaction on these matters, but he aspired for the realisation of truth concerning them. I would mention two incidents from his life which were responsible for the future turn of his activities.

The first concerns with the festival of Śivarātri. Mūljī, a young lad of thirteen—as he was then known—was asked by his father to observe fast on the occasion of this festival and he was given assurance that at midnight, he would have the favour of seeing Śiva, the great Lord with his famous bull and all the accompaniments; and in fact, he was made to believe that the idol was nothing more than the Śiva Himself. Everybody was expected to wake up throughout the night to have a *darśana* of the Lord in flesh and bones, but to the disappointment of Mūljī, everybody was laid deep into slumber, and what further happened, I shall quote in Dayānanda's own words: "When I was the only man awake, an important incident happened. Several rats came forth and began to dance at the idol of Śiva and often usurped rice and offerings dedicated to the idol. I began to witness all this. An idea entered into my mind. Is this the same God Śiva, about whose strength and valour and his bull which bears him, I had heard in the morning? I was thunderstruck. I thought, how could this idol be that all powerful, and a terror of enemies, who could not even check the tresspass of rats? Thus I became wild with thoughts. I began to question within myself,—this idol riding

on a bull before me, is that of Śiva, who makes tours, enjoys food, and drinks, sleeps, bears the Triśūla, rattles Ḍamaru and shows divine wrath?" This was the line of argument of a boy of thirteen. Perhaps, in a grown-up age, he would have satisfied himself with some matured arguments. Mūljī with his childlike innocence said to his father, "Father, I have been told that Śiva is all-powerful, but look how helpless He is in driving these rats away." The only reply that could be given was, "My son, this is not the real Śiva. This is an image only." Mūljī was anxious to meet real Śiva. How could he be satisfied with an image? This opend his eyes, a vision came into him and he once for all realised that the true Śiva is somewhere else and something else. He must find Him out. Needless to say that he further discovered for himself that the idol in the temple could not even be the image of Śiva, not to say Śiva Himself, for He is without form and image. On this occasion of Śivarātri, Mūljī achieved two things, firstly, a negative that the idols are neither God nor the image of God, and secondly, a positive aspect, a strong urge to meet true God. But Mūljī throughout his life never questioned the existence of God. He axiomatically was confident of the existence.

Another incident revealed to Mūljī a greater problem. I would put it also in his own words: "I was enjoying the festivities at a relative's place one night, when a servant came and communicated a dreadful news. He told me that my sister, who was of fourteen years, fell suddenly ill. In spite of all efforts made, she expired within two hours of my coming here. Sister's death was the first calamity in my life. The sorrow was appalling. At that sad demise, when the bewailing of the relations was tearing the sky asunder, I stood mute like a stone and began to ponder, "Oh, how short is our life! I shall also die some day. But is there no way by which I may be immune of death and may attain salvation? At the same place, I took a vow that I will make an effort to conquer death. At this juncture, I became sure, that outward demonstrations were all a humbug and nothing but the purification of the soul was the way to salvation." This happened when Mūljī was eighteen years of age.

But soon after followed another incident, which he has described thus: "After some time, my uncle died. He was a learned man of divine virtues. He loved me from my very childhood and I was much moved by his separation. I thought that when all things in this world were perishable, why should I

pass my days in their midst."

Mūljī, the budding Buddha, had now clearly three problems before himself,—what life is, what death means, and how to overcome death. Śivarātri had already given him two problems, what true God is and how to meet Him. Dayānanda's whole life is a dedication to these five problems. Buddha was also faced with similar problems. In fact, these problems are eternal, and perhaps, never a final answer will be given, but every great man will make an effort to find out a solution for himself. The solution which Buddha found out for himself may not necessarily be the same which Dayānanda found out. But still the greatness of the two cannot be denied. Both approached truth, both obtained self-satisfaction, and through both of them humanity has been benefitted immensely, and yet the two personalities are different and incomparable.

RENOUNCEMENT

I have no idea of writing full biographical sketch of Dayānanda, but still, I cannot resist myself in giving an account of how Mūljī renounced the world. After all that had happened, it was difficult for Mūljī to remain within the four walls of his house, and his people could realise, not before long, that the young boy was becoming uneasy to chalk out some plan for his future life. Mūljī wanted

to come to Benares for future study, but he was not allowed to do so. Hidden in his heart was kindling a fire for the search of truth. In spite of attempts, it could not be subdued. It is rather difficult to realise the nature of conflict tha was raging in his heart,—the dual conflict,—on one side, love of home, affection of the mother, anger of the father and attachment of the nearest, and on the other hand, the passion for truth, the uncertainty of the future life and the disgust from the world. The one was an easy path of homely life, and the other the path of thorns. His parents were already apprehending, and finally, they thought out of a solution. No fetters are supposed to be stronger than those of matrimony, and therefore, Mūljī's parents decided to get him married. This presented a new difficulty to the young man, and finding no other way out, while prepartions for marriage were brisk, he silently slipped out, bidding farewell to his home. We are told that he was once caught by his father but happily, he managed to escape again.

Mūljī was first enunciated as Brahmachārī, and in course of it, he happened to be at *Chetan Maṭha*, Barodā, where he came in contact with a number of learned Sanyāsins. He writes, "Brahmānanda and other Sanyāsins were successful in explaining to me the philosophy of Vedānta, that I am the

almighty Brahman. Even before this, I had studied the books of Vedānta and understood them a little, but now my doubts were completely removed and I began to consider myself Brahman." Dayānanda then moved to a place Chanaud Karuchi. He further says, "Here I met several Brahmachārīs, Sanyāsins like Chidānanda and several other *yogīs*. I had never before witnessed such people well-versed in *yoga*. After a conversation lasting for some days, one day I went to Paramānanda Paramahaṅsa and requested him to instruct me. For a couple of months, I studied books known as *Vedāntasāra* and *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*."...... "I was a Brahmachārī and as such I had to cook food with my own hands. This was a great hindrance in my studies. I had not given up my original name as yet and, as my father's popularity was well known, I had always a fear lest someone while conversing with me might recognise that I was the son of a particular man. So I was always anxious to have my name changed. By becoming a Sanyāsin, I could avoid the two difficulties mentioned above, and for this reason, I was anxious to take Sanyāsa." But there were difficulties in becoming Sanyāsīn,—ordinarily, a young man is not enunciated as a Sanyāsin at a tender age. "After several months of this incident, two persons, who had given up worldly life came from south

and stayed at a broken hut in the jungle. This place was about two miles from where I resided. One was a Sanyāsin and the other a Brahmachārī. The Dakṣinī Paṇḍita, mentioned above became anxious to see them and he took me also there. We reached the place. My friend had specialised in Vedānta, and now he began to converse with those people on topics concerning Brahma. The discussion that ensued was an ample testimony to me of their being very learned. They told us that they were coming from Śārañgvera Maṭha established by Swāmī Sankarāchārya and were going to Dwārakā. One of them was known as Purṇānand Saraswatī. I asked the Paṇḍita whether he could recommend me to him. The Paṇḍita agreed and he told the Sanyāsin that I was a young Brahmachārī and it was my desire to study Vedānta without any sort of hindrance. Further, the Paṇḍita told him that he could bear testimony to the fact that I was of good temperament and my character was excellent. With these arguments, inspite of my blooming youth, he pleaded for me to be admitted to Sanyāsa. He exhorted Swamī Purṇānanda to enunciate me and further told him that in that way, I would be able to be completely free from worldly life and to study *Brahmavidyā* without any obstacle. On this, Swāmī Purṇānand raised

two difficulties; firstly, that I was of young age, and nextly, that the Swāmī belonged to Mahārāṣtra while I was coming from Gujarāta. He wanted me to go to some Gujarātī Sanyāsin. However, my friend further convinced him and brought him round and he was pleased to admit me to Sanyāsa the third day. 'Dayānanda Saraswatī' was the name he gave to me." Dayānanda was already a Sanyāsin when he left home, so far as the spirit of Sanyāsa was concerned, but now after the due ceremonials, he became a full-fledged Sanyāsin. History has repeated itself, for Śankarācharya was also very young when he took Sanyāsa.

THE FURTHER SEARCH

It is easy for one to be admitted to Sanyāsa. In this country there is no dearth of formal sanyāsins, but Dayānanda could not be satisfied with this much. He had yet to explore for himself the path, the goal of which had already been set up in the early part of his life. For the next many years, we find him enthusiastically and studiously devoting himself in acquiring knowledge, discussing philosophy with some, learning *yogic* practices from the other, and picking up the complexities of the Sanskrit Grammar from the third. He made an extensive tour, right from the Himālayas in the north to Narbadā in the south in the search of some

good preceptor, who could lead him in matters of *yoga*. Once in the course of his search in Himalayan peaks, he writes, "I was anxious to cross these hilly regions which were either snow-clad or full of glaciers, for although I had not witnessed with my eyes, I had heard that some big souls live there in seclusion." Once while crossing Alakhanandā, he had painful experiences. He writes, "I was plainly clad then and the cold was excessive and unbearable. Hunger and thirst had paralysed my body. I tried to swallow one small bit of ice in order to appease my hunger, but it gave no satisfaction. Now I waded through water. The river was deep at certain places and shallow at others, but nowhere less than two feet. The river was about twenty feet broad and its bed was full of small icy bits. These icy pieces were sharp-edged and they pierced through my feet. The blood began to flow profusely from the wounds. The excessive flow of blood on the one hand and the excessive cold all round was taking possession of my heart. My legs were trembling and often I felt, I was falling down. It appeared to me as if I was going to lose my life in the bed of Alakhanandā. My limbs were so much benumbed, that had I once fallen on the ice, it would have been difficult for me to get up. Thus with great

perseverance, I could cross the river, and when I came out, I was almost dead." Dayānanda once thought of ending his life there on the spot, but immediately, Dayānanda writes, "The idea of death horrified me and I began to meditate. Why should I have a liking for death? Was it not worthy of me to end my life in search of knowledge?" Dayānanda had yet to fulfil his mission and he lived for it. Dayānanda went to explore the source of Narbadā river, and there too, he had similar experiences.

In the course of his wanderings, he acquired varied experiences of life. Once he had an opportunity of studying Tāntrika philosophy too and in his disgust, he writes, "My astonishment knew no bounds, when I read with my own eyes in Tāntrika books the sexual intercourse of mother and son, father and daughter, brother and sister or even with women of low castes, worshipping a naked woman, taking flesh, fish, and wine and expecting salvation through all this. I had a firm belief that rascals must have compiled these books to satisfy their own evil propensities and have termed them as religious scriptures."

Dayānanda finally meets a Guru who gave him full satisfaction. Swāmī Virajānanda of Mathurā, the blind saint, was the greatest

grammarian of his times and perhaps, he was the only man like Kumārilbhaṭṭa who was anxious to restore to India her Vedic ideals. Dayānanda not only learnt from him the Vedic grammar, but it appears that most of his ideas were crystallised in his company, and by the time he leaves his preceptor, he finds himself full with the philosophy that he gave out to the world in his latter life. When Dayānanda takes final leave from his great teacher, Virajānanda speaks out, "Dayānanda, your education is complete. Now it is for me to demand a *Gurudakṣinā* from you. But shall I demand money from you? No, that will not be. I will demand from you something that is more precious. I want your life. Just in my presence, take a vow that so long as you live, you will never flinch a little, even at the cost of your life, in dispelling darkness from the world and will establish supremacy of the Vedas." Needless to say that Dayānanda's answer was in affirmative. Uptil now he had been living for himself. The problems of life, death, salvation, and God were his personal but on initiation of his teacher, he now identifies himself with the humanity at large. The truth that he discovered for himself, he feels that the world should derive benefit out of it. He finds all around himself people bound up by superstitions and plunged into

ignorance. He finds that India has lost her ancient heritage. For twenty years now, from 1863 to 1883, we find Dayānanda travelling over the country, holding in his hands the torch of Aryan wisdom, giving the message of one God and Vedic philosophy and regenerating the down-trodden race of the country.

THE SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY

Dayānanda was essentially an Indian philosopher, and his method of treatment of the subject was also Indian. Without discrediting either an eastern or western philosopher, it can be easily seen that the two differ considerably in the mode of handling a common philosophical problem. No Indian philosopher thinks it worthwhile to discuss the scope of philosophy. Vyāsa, the great exponent of the Vedānta starts with the aphorism: "Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman." Kaṇāda of Vaiśeṣika says: "Then therefore Dharma we expound" and so the Pūrva-Mimāṁsākāra, Jaimini, says: "Then therefore the enquiry into Dharma." Pātañjali in his *Yoga* says: "Now the doctrine of *yoga* begins." Kapila in his Sāmkhya says: "Now the ultimate release from the three sorts of pains is the final *Puruṣārtha* (the goal of human life)." Gotama, who is no less an important philosopher, speaks out that salvation is attained by

the thorough knowledge of the sixteen elements of logic: *Pramāṇa*, *Prameya*, *Saṁśaya*, *Prayojana*, *Dṛṣṭānta*, *Siddhānta*, *Avayava*, *Tarka*, *Nirṇaya*, *Vāda*, *Jalpa*, *Vitaṇḍā*, *Hetvābhāsa*, *Chhala*, *Jāti*, and *Nigrahasthāna*." The Vedānta deals with such a Brahman, who is the first cause of the *Janma* etc., and who is the origin of divine knowledge. The Vaiśeṣika speaks of nine substances: earth, water, light, air, *Akāśa*, time, space, *Atman*, and mind and the seventeen qualities: colour, taste, smell, touch, number, size, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort. The Sāmkhya deals with twenty-four principles: *Prakṛti*, *Mahān* or intellect, *Ahamkāra* or self-sense, five *tanmātras*, sound, touch, smell, form and taste, *Manas*, five senses, five organs of action, five gross elements and lastly, *Puruṣa*. In the Yoga, we find eight components of *yoga*, *Yama*, *Niyama*, *Āsana*, *Prāṇāyāma*, *Pratyāhāra*, *Dhāraṇā*, *Dhyāna* and *Samādhi*. The Purvamīmāmsā deals with rituals, formalities and observances.

These subjects enumerated here perhaps leave nothing which may not fall in the domain of philosophy. Then how does philosophy differ from other branches concerning knowledge? It is difficult to say.

Mukti, *mokṣa* or *apavarga* is the final aspiration of a philosopher but it is difficult to reconcile how the subjects of investigation so different would carry one to the same goal. In some cases, I have found that a book on poetics or on physiology or even on astronomy is dedicated to the same cause. When the Sāmkhya says that there is no salvation without knowledge, what scope does it ascribe to knowledge? Is it the detailed knowledge of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*? Does it mean the same thing as we understand of science today? Does it mean the study of those forces which can be profitably employed for running a big factory? Does it mean the study of evolution as an ordinary biologist does? Every time we hear that *avidyā* or ignorance is the cause of bondage, but which ignorance leads to bondage? Will a man who is not conversant with dynamics, calculus or trigonometry or one who has not attended a course of lectures on frog anatomy be debarred from the fruits of salvation? Some of the authors speak of *parā* and *aparā vidyā*, the one concerning knowledge of the world and the other concerning of Brahman. Is it only the Brahmanic knowledge that would lead one to the state of immortality, and does the knowledge of Brahman involve essentially the knowledge of all that is not—Brahman?

A modern metaphysician makes a distinction between the *seeming* world and the *real* world, between substance and show. All of us know that things are not always what they seem to be; what appears to us is, sometimes at any rate, not real, and what really is does not appear. Perhaps philosophy is something which leads us from seeming to real, from apparent to invisible, but this is true with so many other sciences. An interesting argument runs like this: Metaphysics can have no place in the scheme of knowledge, because all intelligible questions which we can ask about reality must fall within the province of science. There are no facts with which some one or other of the sciences does not deal, and there is, therefore, no room for a series of 'metaphysical' enquiries over and above those enquiries which constitute the various sciences. Where there are facts to investigate and, intelligible questions to be put, we are, it is contended, in the domain of science; where there are none, there can be no knowledge. But perhaps, what the metaphysician asserts is not that there are *facts* with which the various special branches of experimental science cannot deal, but there are *questions* which can be and ought to be raised about the facts with which they do deal, other than those which experimental enquiry can solve.

Philosophy is always in search of reality or rather realities, beyond the sphere of appearances. Sometimes in the bewilderment one feels as if he does not find reality anywhere, because perhaps what *appears* to him is not real, and then the real becomes beyond approach. All our knowledge is strictly limited to appearances or as they are often called, *phenomena*. A phenomenalist will argue like this: What lies beyond phenomena is completely inaccessible to us and it is loss of time to speculate about its nature. We must, therefore, content ourselves with the discovery of general laws or uniformities of the inter-connection of phenomena, and dismiss the problem of their real ground as insoluble. But there is no strength in these arguments. The discovery of a general law of uniformity and to utilise it for some benefit does not take us far into the truth. The purpose behind the orderliness, the ultimate nature, the innumerable relationships between knower and the objects known and similar other subtle problems can be answered by a metaphysician only.

Dayānanda's philosophy is not restricted to a particular domain. He stands for complete knowledge. He agrees with Patañjali in defining ignorance and he

explains knowledge in the following terms : "To look upon what is transient as transient, what is permanent as permanent, what is pure as pure, what is impure as impure, what is pain as pain, what is pleasure as pleasure, what is not-soul as not-soul and what is soul as soul is called *vidyā* or knowledge". He further says that by which the true nature of things is known is called *knowledge*, whilst that by which the true nature of things is not revealed and, instead, a false conception of things is formed is called *ignorance*.

Thus from Dayānanda's point of view, the following would be the domain of philosophy:

(*i*) The discussion of *ātma* and *anātma*, say metaphysics.

(*ii*) The discussion of transient and eternal or seeming and real. This is also metaphysics.

(*iii*) The discussion of pure and impure, that is ethical and non-ethical. This is ethics.

(*iv*) The discussion about pleasure and pain. This is psychology in the ordinary sense.

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

It is true that without knowledge, there

can be no freedom from bondage, but Dayānanda always impresses that knowledge, not transformed into actions, can bear no fruit. *Dharma*, the pseudo-synonym of religion, means the transcription of knowledge into actions, living life unto one's beliefs. *Dharma* according to Kaṇāda is something that leads to the attainment of *abhyudaya* or the life of magnanimity and of *Niśreyasa* or the freedom from the wordly bondage. The Veda says[1]: "He who realises the nature of *Vidyā*, the true knowledge and of *Avidyā*, the good moral life and divine contemplation, simultaneously conquers death by virtue of *avidyā* and attains immortality by virtue of *vidyā*". *Vidyā* here refers to philosophy and *avidyā* to religion in the ordinary sense. Virtuous life, the worship of one true God and correct knowledge lead to emancipation, as Dayānanda puts it; whilst an immoral life, the worship of idols (or other things or persons in place of God), and false knowledge are the cause of the bondage of the soul. No man can ever, for a single moment, be free from actions, thoughts and knowledge. The doing of righteous acts as truthfulness in speech, and

1. विद्यां चाऽविद्यां च यस्तद्वेदोभयꣳसह । अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययाऽमृतमश्नुते ॥ (Yv. 40, 14)

the denouncing of sinful acts as untruthfulness alone are means of salvation.

Gilbert Murray in his book on "*Greek Religion*" has given an anthropological exposition of religion. He says, "Religion essentially deals with the uncharted region of human experience. A large part of human life has been thoroughly surveyed and explored; we understand the causes at work and we are not bewildered by the problems. That is the domain of positive knowledge. But all round us on every side, there is an uncharted region, just fragments of the fringe of it explored, and those imperfectly; it is with this that religion deals." But this is merely an anthropological exposition of religion. One who has worked in the domain of science knows to what extent, almost to infinity, there extends the uncharted region in all matters of our knowledge. Compared to what has been not explored, the explored region is insignificant and a scientist, in most of the cases, only speculates and sometimes proceeds on hypotheses. Even then a vast region remains which does not admit of even speculations.

There are so many wrong notions prevalent in the West regarding religion. Perhaps, it has been due to the Church. Whitehead in his "*Science and the Modern World*" has exposed religion in the following

terms: "Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind and within, the passing flux of immediate thing; something which is real, and yet waiting to be realised; something which is a remote possibility, and yet the greatest of the present facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes, and yet eludes apprehension; something whose possession is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach; something which is the ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest." If this is the religion, certainly it is just an antithesis of *Dharma*. *Dharma* is not a thing of remote, it is not such an ideal whose quest would be hopeless, neither it is beyond all reach. *Dharma* is leading life unto knowledge. Prof. Taylor of the University of Edinburgh regards that if reality is a harmonious system, it must somehow make provision for the gratification of our ethical, religious and æsthetic interests. I would say that philosophy is not a mere intellectual satisfaction, the truths discovered by it must be verified or realised through life. Religious life is a verification of these truths. Of what avail metaphysics would be if it does not ascribe some purpose to life. If the world is unreal and illusion, metaphysics should also show some way of getting rid of it. If the world is real, then also, there must be some purpose of life in it, and

metaphysics should bring it out. All philosophical findings should have a bearing on life. These truths when manifested through life become *Dharma.* Swāmí Dayānanda describes Dharma in the following words: "According to me, all that is beyond prejudice, reasonable, truthful, and in accordance to the divine tenets, the Veda is *Dharma.*" *Dharma* does not admit of dogmas or superstitions. According to the Aryan discipline, only that person is entitled to be a seeker after knowledge who possesses a standard of character, whose sincerity and truthfulness are beyond doubt, who is free from prejudices and vices and who can be relied on for what he says. A man who does not follow *Dharma* has no right to study philosophy, for just as with an evil person, a weapon becomes an instrument of destruction, so with a man who has not attained a particular standard of character, the acquired knowledge would become a menace to humanity. And this is why, we find that Dayānanda's great teacher, Virajānanda, demanded from his disciple a high character, and we believe that Dayānanda proved to be one of the worthiest seekers after truth. In subsequent pages, we shall make an attempt to follow Dayānanda as a great philosopher.

Chapter II

The Philosophy of the Vedas

DAYĀNANDA writes at one place: "The universal truths, which have been accepted by all in all times, and which will be acceptable in future too, form the essentials of an eternal *Sanātana* religion, unrefuted by anybody. Those people, who are merged into ignorance, or are deluded by prejudiced people, believe in what is contrary, and the learned or wise never follow them. Whatever is accepted by *āptas*, that is, by those who believe in truth, who speak truth, and who act unto truth, who are selfless and without prejudice is acceptable to all; and whatever is not acceptable to them is not acceptable and cannot be regarded as standard. Now, whatever is in accordance to the Veda and other true *śāstras*, and whatever has been acceptable to seers ranging from Brahmā down to Jaimini is acceptable to me also, and that only I am giving out to learned people. I submit only to those principles which in all three times (past, present and future) have been equally acceptable to all. I am not at all anxious to give out any new speculation or to start a new sect, but my ambition is to believe and make others believe in whatever is truth, and to discard and make others discard whatever is untruth."

Dayānanda at any stage has never claimed that he has given out anything which may be called new. He makes a firm stand on the Vedas, and this too is not new. "Right from Brahmā," as he says, "down to Jaimini, all the great seers have accepted the supreme authority of the Vedas." Even the latter thinkers like Sāyaṇa, Rāmānuja and Madhvāchārya, never questioned the ultimateness of the Vedas in all matters of knowledge and truth. Some of the modern interpreters do not appear to give any importance to this fact that the authority of the Vedas has never been denied by the greatest of the Brahmanical thinkers. I would quote at length Sir S. Radhakrishnan to show how he also misrepresents the ancient seers in matters of their adherence to the Veda. He writes as follows:

"They are the Brahmanical systems, since they all accept the authority of the Vedas. The systems of thought which admit of the validity of the Vedas are called the *āstika* and those which repudiate it *nāstika*. The *āstika* or *nāstika* character of a system does not depend on its positive or negative conclusions regarding the nature of the supreme spirit, but on the acceptance and non-acceptance of the authority of the Vedas. Even the schools of Buddhism have their origin in Upaniṣads; though they are not

regarded as orthodox, since they do not accept the authority of the Vedas."

"The acceptance of the Veda is a practical admission that spiritual experience is a greater light in these matters than intellectual reason. *It does not mean either full agreement with all the doctrines of the Veda or admission of any belief in the existence of God.* It means only a serious attempt to solve the ultimate mystery of existence; for even the infallibility of the Veda is not admitted by the schools in the same sense. As we shall see, the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya accept God as the result of inference. The Sāṁkhya is not a theism. The Yoga is practically independent of the Veda. The two Mīmāṁsās are more directly dependent on the Vedas. The Pūrva-Mimāṁsā derives the general conception of deity from the Vedas, but is not anxious about the supreme spirit. The Uttara-Mīmāṁsā accepts God on the basis of Śruti assisted by inference, while realisation of God can be had through meditation and Jñāna. Theistically minded thinkers of a later day declined to include the Sāmkhya under orthodox *darśanas*."

"The philosophical character of the system is not much compromised by the acceptance of the Veda. The distinction between Śruti and Śmṛti is well-known, and where the two conflict, the former is to

prevail. The Śruti itself is divided into the karmakāṇḍa (the Saṁhitās and the Brāhmaṇas and the Jñānakāṇḍa, the Upaniṣads). The latter is of higher value, though much of it is set aside as mere arthavāda or non-essential statements. *All these distinctions enable one to treat the Vedic testimony in a very liberal spirit.* The interpretations of the Vedic texts depend on the *philosophical predilections* of the authors. *While employing logical methods and arriving at truths agreeable to reason, they were yet anxious to preserve their continuity with the ancient texts. They did not wish it to be thought that they were enunciating something completely new. While this may involve a certain want of frankness with themselves, it helped the spread of what they regarded as truth.*" (*Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, 20, 1927.)

Nothing can be more misrepresented than what has been done here. It is beyond doubt that all the six systems of Brāhmaṇical philosophy believed in the infallibility of the Vedas. It was not with the anxiety to preserve a link with the ancient texts, that they took their stand on the supreme sanction of the Vedas. It was neither that they treated the Vedic testimony in a very liberal spirit, nor was it a fact, that they interpreted the Vedic texts

according to their predilections. To ascribe a certain amount of want of frankness to them will be insinuous and unphilosophical like. Those philosophers who were pledged to be truthful or who were anxious to seek after truth could not have taken it very lightly to accept the supremacy of the Vedas without examining thoroughly. How can it be expected from one who is prepared to argue about even the existence of Brahman and Ātman, who is ever prepared to apply crucial tests to the most of the fundamental problems, who has set up a definite line of approach for all matters of concern, and from one who spares not argument without hair-splitting it to accept the infallibility of the Vedas without pondering over the consequences of it? Was it simply to gain public popularity, or was it simply with the idea that a belief like this will help him in the spread of what he regarded as truth ? It is hard to believe all this. The ancient seers may be wrong in their beliefs, they may be erring in their judgments but they were sincere in their expressions. Is it not a predilection on the part of the modern author to say that the acceptance of the Veda does not mean *full agreement with all the doctrines* of the Veda ? How has this inference been drawn ? Has he found a single

instance in which any of the authors has deliberately and consciously expressed disagreement with the Vedic text? It is another thing that they might have differed amongst themselves regarding a particular interpretation, but so far as the principle of the acceptance of the infallibility of the Vedas is concerned, they have never expressed any disagreement. You will never find anywhere in the Sūtra texts mentioned that the author believes in a particular truth while the Śruti is against it.

We will consider the supreme authority of the Veda in some subsequent chapter. Here we shall say this much that the six Brahmanical systems were one in this respect. The Sāṁkhya has discussed the *Svataḥ-pramāṇatva* of the Veda in its own way. The Pūrva-mīmāṁsā has discussed the *Nittyatva* of *Śabda* in this connection. The Vaiśeṣika mentions the *pramāṇatva* of Āmnāya. The Nyāya has discussed the subject in logical way in details along with *Śabda pramāṇa*. The Vedānta believes in the Veda as revealed knowledge. Even Patañjali when says "स पूर्वेषामपि गुरुः कालेनानवच्छेदात्" (Samādhipāda, 26) he refers to the revelation which took place in the earliest times of the creation.

All the six systems of Indian philosophy

are based on the Upaniṣads. In fact, they are essentially in agreement with all that these Upaniṣads have given out. Simply the form of presentation is different. There is hardly any Upaniṣad which does not believe in the infallibility of the Veda. Īśa, the most famous of the Upaniṣad, is a part and portion of the Yajuḥ. Bṛhadāraṇyaka forms a long chapter of the voluminous work of Yājñavalkya, the Śatapatha, while the work as a whole is the Brahmanic exposition of the Yajurveda. Nobody can have the slightest doubt in Yājñavalkya's strong belief in the supremacy of the Veda. Chhāndogya Upaniṣad is essentially a Sāmavedic Upaniṣad. Taittiriya identifies *Bhūḥ*, *Bhuvaḥ* and *Svaḥ* respectively with the three Vedas, Ṛk, Sāma and Yajuḥ. In fact, nobody can have the slightest doubt that all Upaniṣads agree in the authority of the Vedas. One can easily work it out that all the Upaniṣadic truths are mere poetic or philosophic expositions of the Vedic ideas. Not only an attitude of reverence, these Vedas have enjoyed since times immemorial but they have been looked upon as truths of supreme authority by all the great Brahmanic thinkers.

It is one of the greatest of Dayānanda's contributions to our knowledge to have evolved whole of his philosophy from the

Vedas themselves, especially in times when the Vedas have been very much misrepresented. One may not agree with Dayānanda in his idea of revelation, but at least, it must be accepted that the Vedas which have been held in supreme esteem by so many philosophers and thinkers cannot be mere babblings of an anthropological age. The very fact that attempts have so often been made to distort them, to misinterpret them or to misrepresent them shows what metal they are made of. So often they have been quoted to suit one's interest, sometimes in season and sometimes out of season. In spite of all differences, attempts have been made to adhere to them and this very tendency testifies the high value of these texts. And we shall presently see how Dayānanda has been able to evolve his system of philosophy out of them. The philosophical and logical treatment, we reserve for subsequent chapters. Here we shall give in brief the outline of Dayānanda's philosophy as expounded on the basis of the Vedas.

SPIRIT OF THE VEDIC HYMNS

To Swāmī Dayānanda, the Veda means four Saṁhitās, the Ṛk, the Yajuḥ, the Sāma and the Atharva all of them being the revealed knowledge, given to humanity in the earliest part of the creation through four

personalities, *Agni*, *Vāyu*, *Āditya* and *Angiras*. In this respect, he agrees with Yājñavalkya, the author of the *Śatapātha* Brāhmaṇa, and with commentators like Sāyaṇa. It is not a place here to deal with so many differences of opinions regarding the composition of the Vedas, and the time to which they relate. It is not within the domain of a critical book on philosophy to deal with the oriental, literary or historical aspects. Dayānanda believes that the Vedas, are divine fountain heads of all true knowledge. Even if we consider them not as divine but human, we cannot agree with many of the hypotheses propounded in their connection.

The general tendency of the modern age is to discuss every subject from an evolutionary point of view. Even if it be accepted, we cannot submit to a number of notions which have become current since the western scholarship occupied itself to the Vedic problems. It has been maintained that different portions of the Ṛgvedic hymns were written in different times. It may be so, but uptil now, this view has not been substantiated. The linguistic, the grammatical, the poetic, the anthropological, the socialistic, the astronomical and similar many considerations on the basis of which the hymns could have been classified

time-wise do not corroborate each other. Any inference drawn on only one consideration is faulty and unreliable. As there has never been established a coherence between so diverse points of view, I would say, it still belongs to the category of a mere hypothesis, that hymns of the Ṛgveda were composed at different times and probably at different places.

The Ṛgveda can in no way be regarded as a primeval book of human civilisation. Apart from the subject-matter, the very form of it denies this hypothesis. It was composed at a time when we possessed not only a workable but almost perfect language. In fact, we do not know exactly what perfectness of a language means,—the language was perfect in this respect that all ideas could be beautifully conveyed through it. It possessed much more of the grammatical forms than many of the living European languages possess. The Ṛgveda was composed at a time when people had an idea of prosody too. They knew and appreciated chanting also. The beautiful arrangement of words from a phonetic point speaks very highly of their taste. A human race possessing so complete a language, so advanced a grammar, and so highly developed a taste for rhythm and rhyme cannot be called a primitive race. From the first to the tenth book of the

Ṛgveda, and from the Ṛgveda to the Atharva, if one devotes himself with minuteness, he is sure to be impressed by the advanced nature of those who were responsible for bringing out these hymns to light.

So much linguistic advancement, full of highly evolved taste, could not have been developed in a primæval society. It speaks very high of the organisation of those people who could evolve such a high class literature. The Ṛgveda deals with the perfect form of morality, over which even after the lapse of thousands of years, no improvement could be made. Then who can agree with Pfleiderer who speaks of the "primæval child-like näive prayer of the Ṛgveda". If these prayers were child-like, the vocabulary should have been also of a primæval child consisting of only a few words, and the expressions also of a näive child. But think of the vocabulary of the Ṛgveda; it comprises almost whole of the Vedic language, perhaps it has got the richest vocabulary that any single book of the world can possess. If it is still child-like, it must be a monstrous child.

Bloomfield maintains that the hymns of the Ṛgveda are sacrificial compositions of a primitive race which attached great importance to ceremonial rites. This view

is equally misrepresenting. Firstly, it tentatively starts with the assumption that it is only a primitive race which possesses a vast store of ceremonial rites. This is wrong. At least, the modern Europe is not primitive. If a collection of all the ceremonials concerning coronation, baptism, military ceremonies, state processions and receptions, parliamentary oaths and so many others prevalent in democratic and imperialistic societies be collected, it can very well equal in massiveness the Ṛg-vedic collection. Moreover, it is wrong to suppose that at each and every step, the Ṛg-hymn deals with one or the other ceremony. It is correct that Ṛg-vedic hymns have been used, and Yajuḥ hymns still more, for ceremonial purposes, but it does not mean that they were exclusively meant for it. One has to judge them from other view-points. Think of their sublimity. I have personal experience that in many ceremonies, such hymns are chanted which either consist of very charming prayers, or sometimes convey very deep thoughts. Simply because they have been used in a particular ceremony, it is erroneous to pronounce them as primitive. Dayânanda is very clear on this point and he emphatically contradicts any such notion. The view of Bergaigne is somewhat nearer the truth. He holds that they were all

allegorical. Certainly, in some hymns, there are beautiful allegories too, but generally these allegories are simple and clear.

Dayānanda says that "the Vedas deal with four subjects; *Vijñāna* or the supreme knowledge, *Karma* or duties, *Upāsanā* or worship and *Jñāna* or the empirical knowledge. Of these, the subject of supreme knowledge is the main. It deals with the direct realisation of all ranging from God to the minutest particle. Of this also, main is the knowledge of God."

MONOTHEISM

Dayānanda has at many places in his writings refuted the fact that the Vedic hymns propound either polytheism, henotheism or the so-understood *devatā-vāda*. Radhakrishnan agrees with him when he writes:—

"An important point to be borne in mind in discussion is this that the word *deva* is so very elusive in its nature and is used to indicate many different things. '*Deva* is one who *gives* to man'. God is *Deva* because He gives the whole world. The learned man who imparts knowledge to fellow-man is also a *deva*. The sun, the moon, and the sky are *devas* because they give

light to all creation. Father and mother and spiritual guides are also *devas*. Even a guest is *deva*."

The following extract from Dayānanda's book, the *Satyārtha-prakāśa*, will throw some light on this question. He puts it in the form of questions and answers :—

Q.—There are more gods than one mentioned in the Vedas. Do you believe this or not ?

A.—No, we do not; as nowhere in all the four Vedas, there is written anything that goes to show that there are more gods than one. On the other hand, it is clearly said in many places that there is only one God.

Q.—What is meant by the mention of various *devatās* in the Vedas then ?

A.—Whatsoever or whosoever possesses useful and brilliant qualities is called a *devatā*, as the earth for instance; but it is nowhere said that it is God or is the object of our adoration. ...They are greatly mistaken who take the word *devatā*, to mean God. He is called *devatā* of *devatās*,—greatest of all *devatās*—because He alone is the author of creation, sustenance and dissolution of the Universe, the Great

Judge and Lord of all. The Vedic text[1] "The Lord of all, the ruler of the Universe, the sustainer of all holds all things by means of thirty-three *devatās*" has been explained as follows in the fourteenth chapter of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa: (*i*) Heated cosmic bodies, (*ii*) planets, (*iii*) atmosphere, (*iv*) super-terrestrial space, (*v*) suns, (*vi*) rays of ethereal space, (*vii*) satellites, (*viii*) stars; these eight are called *vasus*, bacause they are the abode of all that lives, moves or exists. The eleven *Rudras* are the ten *prāṇas*-nervauric forces, enlivening the human body and the eleventh is the human spirit. These are called *Rudras*, because when they desert the body, it becomes dead and the relations of the deceased, consequently, begin to weep. The twelve months of a year are called *Ādityas*, as they cause the lapse of the term of existence of each object or being. The all-pervading electricity is called *Indra* as it is productive of great force. *Yajña* is called *Prajāpati* because it benefits mankind by the purification of air, water, rain, and vegetables and

1. त्रयस्त्रिंशता स्तुवत भूतान्यशाम्यन्प्रजापतिः परमेष्ठ्यधि-पतिरासीत् (Yv. 14, 31)

because it aids the development of various arts, and because in it the honour is accorded to the learned and the wise.

These thirty-three aforesaid entities are called *devatās* by virtue of possessing enlightened properties. Being Lord of all and greater than all, the Supreme Being is called the thirty-fourth *devatā* who alone is to be worshipped. The same thing is given in other *śastras*. Had people consulted these works, they would not have fallen into this error, *viz*., the belief that there are more gods than one mentioned in the Vedas.

The Yajurveda says[1] :

By one supreme ruler is this universe pervaded, even every world in the whole circle of nature. He is the true God. Fear him, O man, and covet not unjustly the wealth of any creature existing.

God teaches in the Veda[2] :

I, O men, lived before the whole universe came into being. I am Lord of all, I am the eternal cause of the whole creation. I am the source and giver of all wealth. Let all men look upto me alone

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1. ईशावास्यमिदꣳ सर्वं यत्किञ्च जगत्यां जगत्। तेन त्यक्तेन भुञ्जीथा मा गृधः कस्य स्विद्धनम्॥ (Yv. 40, 1)
2. अहं भुवं वसुनः पूर्व्यस्पतिरहं धनानि सं जयामि शश्वतः। मां हवन्ते पितरं न जन्तवोऽहं दाशुषे विभजामि भोजनम्॥ (Ṛv. X, 48, 1)

as children do to their parents. I have appointed different foods and drinks for all creatures to give them sustenance so that they may live in happiness.

I am God almighty, I am the light of the world like the sun. Neither defeat nor death can ever approach me. I am the controller of the universe; know me alone as the creator of all. Strive ye diligently for the acquisition of power and wealth such as true knowledge. Ask ye of me. May ye never lose my friendship.[1]

Another *mantra* says:[2]

God, O men, existed in the beginning of the creation. He is the creator, support and the sustainer of the sun and other luminous worlds. He was the Lord of the past creation. He is the Lord of the present. He will be the Lord of the yet unborn universe. He created the whole world, and He sustains it. He is eternal bliss. May ye all praise and adore Him as we do.

The Ṛgveda says[3]:

He is one, but the wise call Him by different names; such as Indra, Mittra, Varuna, Agni, Divya, Suparna, Mātriśvā, Yama, and Garutmān.

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1. अहमिन्द्रो न पराजिग्य इद्धनं न मृत्यवेऽव तस्थे कदाचन। सोममिन्मा सुन्वन्तो याचता वसु न मे पूरवः सख्ये रिषाथन ॥ (Ṛv. X, 48, 5)

2. हिरण्यगर्भः समवर्त्तताग्रे भूतस्य जातः पतिरेक आसीत्। स दाधार पृथिवीं द्यामुतेमां कस्मै देवाय हविषा विधेम ॥ (Ṛv. X, 121, 1)

3. इन्द्रं मित्रं वरुणमग्निमाहुरथो दिव्यः स सुपर्णो गरुत्मान्। एकं सद्विप्रा बहुधा वदन्त्यग्निं यमं मातरिश्वानमाहुः ॥ (Ṛv. I, 164, 46)

TheYajuḥ at another place[1] says:

He verily is Agni, the same He is Āditya, the same He is Vāyu, the same He is Chandramā, the same He is Śukra, He is Āpah and He is Prajāpati.

Dayānanda has very clearly elucidated in the first chapter of the *Satyārthaprakāśa* how hundred different terms according to the context can be used to mean God, when taken etymologically. He holds that such terms which apparently mean *devatās* have been sometimes used in the Vedic texts to mean God and sometimes other wordly objects. "A word ought to be taken to mean what fits in with the occasion, circumstances and the subject under discussion."

MONISM *vs.* THREE ETERNALS

Dayānanda believes in monotheism, that is, in the existence of only one God. In fact, the conception of the plurality is against the very idea of God Himself. It appears to be clear that the idea of neo-vedantism is absent in the Veda. Without the help of the indescribable *Māyā*, the neo-vedantic doctrine cannot be substantiated. *Māyā* in the sense of *avidyā* or the cause of illusion has never been used in the Vedas. In this connection. I may refer my readers to the small book, " The Doctrine of

1. तदेवाग्नि० (Yv. 32, 1)

Māyā " by Dr. Prabhudatta Śāstri. The word has occurred about 70 times in Ṛgveda under various forms and at about 27 places in Atharva. At all these places, Yāska, Sāyaṇa and Dayānanda all the three agree that the word means *Prajñā*, *Jñāna-viśeṣa* or specific knowledge. Uvvaṭ has translated the word " *Āsuri-māyā* " at one place in Yajurveda as "*Prāṇa-sambandhinī prajñā*" or the knowledge concerning the vital air. Radhakrishnan writes in connection with hymns of Ṛgveda that " wherever the word *Māyā* occurs it is used only to signify the might or the power."

The Veda believes in the reality of the world. In words of Radhakrishnan again, " We see clearly that there is no basis of any conception of the unreality of the world in the hymns of the Ṛgveda. The world is not a purposeless phantasm, but is just the evolution of God." The relation of lower souls to God is very well described in the following *mantras*:—

The one in whom in the third stage, the elevated ones having obtained immortality lead a free life, that He is our *Bandhu* or friend or brother, the giver of life, the sustainer, and He alone knows all the abodes and worlds.[1]

1. स नो बन्धुर्जनिता स विधाता धामानि वेद भुवनानि विश्वा।
यत्र देवा अमृतमानशानास्तृतीये धामन्नध्यैरयन्त ॥ (Yv. 32, 10)

O Agni, as a father to son, you be to us easily approachable. Take us with you for our prosperity.[1]

He created knowledge for his *ever living* kingdom.[2]

(O Souls !) You know him not, who has created all this, there has ever been a difference between you and Him. You have been ruthlessly indulging in mal-conversations, self-conceit and evil desires.[3] (Yv.17,31)

On this Dayānanda comments; specially on *Yadyuṣmākamantaram babhūva*:—

> " That Brahman and we souls, are these one or not ? The answer is: The indentity of Brahma and *Jiva* can never be established either by reasoning or the Vedic authority, because *Jiva* has been different from Brahman from the very beginning. *Jiva* is full of *avidyā* and other deficiencies, while Brahman is not. Therefore, it is clear, that neither *Jiva* and Brahman were one, nor they are and nor they will ever be. Moreover, the relation between Brahman and *Jiva* is one of the pervading and the

1. स नः पितेव सूनवेऽग्ने सूपायनो भव । सचस्वा नः स्वस्तये ॥ (Ṛv. I, 1, 9)
2. अर्थान् व्यदधाच्छाश्वतीभ्यः समाभ्यः (Yv. 40, 8)
3. न तं विदाथ य इमा जजानान्यद्युष्माकमन्तरं बभूव । नीहारेण प्रावृता जल्प्या चासुतृप उक्थशासश्चरन्ति ॥ (Yv. 17, 31)

pervaded, base and the based, master and the servant, and therefore, it is not proper for anybody to call Brahman and *Jiva* one." (*Āryābhivinaya*, *44*)

Dayānanda believes in three eternals : the God, Souls and the *Prakṛti*. For Dayānanda, Brahman, *Iśvara*, *Parameśvara*, *Paramātman*, and similar words are synonyms, meaning the same God. He does not distinguish between the lower God, *Iśvara* and the Absolute Brahman. We shall take up the discussion on the subject later on.

SCEPTICISM IN THE VEDAS

Evolutionists believe that the earliest Vedic hymns deal with naturalistic and anthropomorphic gods, while the next stage was of *devatās* or Deities with henotheistic notion, if not polytheistic. And finally, by and by, they arrived at the monotheism. Some think that in the Vedic hymns, we do not merely find ' wild imagination and fancy but also earnest thought, and enquiry.' They had already developed a questioning mood. To others, ' the necessity to postulate a number of Gods is due to the impulse of mind which seeks to understand things instead of accepting facts as they are given to it.' A few of the questions which bewildered them were as follows: Where is the sun by night ? Where go the

stars by day? Why does the sun not fall down? Of the two, night and day, which is the earlier and which the later?[1] Radhakrishnan says: "The longing of the human heart could not be satisfied with a pluralistic pantheon. The doubt arose as to which god was real one. *Kasmai devāya haviṣā vidhemā*, "to what god shall we offer our oblation?" All this shows the earnestness of the people to have the understanding of the phenomena within which they have been placed. Some authors point out a few instances of scepticism in the Vedic hymns. For example,: "Who has seen the first-born, when he that had no bones bore him that has bones? Where is the life, the blood, the self of the universe? Who went to ask of any who knew[2]?" (Ṛv. 1. 164, 4)

Dayānanda does not see any scepticism in these passages. In this connection, it may be stated that at many places, where a

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1. कस्य नूनं कतमस्यामृतानां मनामहे चारु देवस्य नाम।
को नो मह्या अदितये पुनर्दात्पितरं च दृशेयं मातरं च॥(Ṛv.
(Ṛv. I, 24, 1)
कतरा पूर्वा कतरापरायोः कथा जाते कवयः को विवेद।
विश्वं त्मना बिभृतो यद्ध नाम वि वर्तेते अहनी चक्रियेव॥
Ṛv. I, 185, 1)
2. को ददर्श प्रथमं जायमानमस्थन्वन्तं यदनस्था बिभर्ति।
भूम्या असुरसृगात्मा क्वस्वित्को विद्वांसमुप गात्प्रष्टुमेतत्॥
(Ṛv. I, 164. 4)

question has been put, the answer of the question also is placed in the proximity. The question, for instance, "*Kasmai devāya haviṣā vidhema*", was not such of which the anwer was not known. The very *mantra* says: "*Ya ātmadā baladā yasya viśva upāsate yasyachchāyāmṛtam yasya mṛtyuḥ*," that is, to what god shall we offer our oblation? —to one who gives spirituality and strength, whose shelter is immortality and otherwise death.[1] At some places, the sceptic question is the answer by itself, for after all, everything in the world is not knowable, and sometimes we can answer only by contradictions. These contradictions imply truth. For example, the following extract from the Nāsadīya hymn:

"Who then knows, who has declared it here, from whence was born this creation? The learned came later than this creation, who then knows whence it arose?" (Ṛv. X, 129, 6)

[1]Another similar instance: *Kāsīt pramā pratimā kiṁ nidānamājyṁa kimāsīt paridhiḥ ka āsīt. Chhandaḥ kimāsīt pra-u-gaṁ kimukthaṁ yaddevā devamayajanta viśve* (Rv. X, 130, 3). Who is *pramā*, which is the *pratimā*—the measure of knowledge, the standard—which is the cause, which is the essence, which is the *paridhi*, the circumscribed, which is *chhanda*, who is adorable? Of these seven questions, the single answer follows: the very Lord whom all the learned adore. Dayānanda writes: "the one whom all the learned adore, have been adoring and will adore, the verily He is *pramā* etc."

Similarly, in the Yajurveda: *Kigvam svidāsīdadhiṣṭhānamārambhaṇaṁ katamatsvit kathāsīt. Yato bhūmiṁ janayan viśvakarmā vidyāmaurṇonmahinā viśvachakṣaḥ* (Yv. 17, 18).

"He from whom this creation arose, whether he made it or did not make it, the highest seer in the highest heaven, he forsooth knows, or does even he not know?" (Ṛv. X, 129, 7).

The answer of all these questions is implied in questions themselves. Where the doubt is expressed, it simply signifies the limitations of humanity regarding the solution of such problems. In a poetic way, one is transcending his limitations on the omniscient Himself. In fact, the words, "*Asyādhyakṣaḥ parame vyoman*" speak of the Lord He with certainty, but to argue further about His ways certainly leads to scepticism. Such scepticism regarding the thorough quest of that He is not scepticism ; it is the real knowledge. The unknowability is His knowledge. Becoming sceptic about Him and His ways after having striven to know Him is the ultimate knowledge,—in the words of the Upaniṣad, "*Yo nastadveda tadveda, no na vedeti veda cha.*" One who knows that he knows knows not, and one who knows that he knows not might be knowing something. We simply know that God is at the basis of all the phenomena but to argue in details is always difficult.

THE WORLD A REALITY YET CHANGEABLE

We have just said that 'there is no basis for any conception of the unreality of the world in the hymns of the Ṛgveda. The world is not a purposeless phantasm.' We reserve the discussion of 'reality' for another chapter. Here we shall only try to impress that all the four Vedas take it for granted that the world is real. It is not a matter of delusion that we actually see, hear, move and talk, and feel pain and pleasure. We are anxious to live happily and live a long life—a life of peace and prosperity. The Veda says: *Paśyema śaradaḥ śatam*; *śṛṇuyāma śaradaḥ śatam; prabrayāma śaradaḥ śatam*; *jīvema śaradaḥ śatam.* Let us live for hundred years, may we see for hundred years, may we hear for hundred years and may we talk for hundred years and even more. This prayer does not imply that what we see with eyes is a delusion, what we hear with our ears is simply an echo in the bewilderment, what we speak with our tongue is not a speech at all, nor the place where we lead our life is simply an enchantment or an empty dream. If our five senses are deceptive or what they receive is not truth, then where was the necessity of praying "*Bhadram Karṇebhiḥ śṛṇuyāma devāḥ, bhadram paśyemakṣbhiḥ yajatraḥ.*

May we hear happy talks through our ears and may we see happy scenes through our eyes."

According to the Vedas, our mortal life has a purpose. The purpose is to attain immortality and to subdue death. Mortality is as good a truth as immortality, truth in the sense that it really exists. Had it not existed, where was the bondage and the question of feedom from bondage would have been futile. The world is unreal only in the sense that it is changing. The Veda says: '*Jagatyām jagat*' that is, the world is changeable. Life in bondage means a change, for otherwise, there would have been no purpose of life in bondage. Life in bondage is not an accident, nor can anybody deny the very existence of bondage. When the Veda says: *Avidyayā mṛtyum tīrtvā vidyayāmṛtam aśnute*, that is, one overcomes death by *Avidyā* or *Karma*, the righteous actions, and attains immortality by *Vidyā* or knowledge, the Veda makes us believe that there is as much a certainty of death as of immortality. So often the *Vedamantras* speak of the Lord as *Janitā* or *Vidhātā*,—the creator or the sustainer, but never with the idea that the Lord is the creator or sustainer of the delusion. When the Veda says about the Lord: "*dhātā yathā pūrvamakalpayat*—the world has been created as before or the Lord

is the creator of the endless cycles, the world has not been supposed to be a phantasm. When the Veda says, "*Kurvanneveh Karmāṇi, jijīviṣet*", aspire for life with activity, how the life be taken as unreal or non-existing?

The reality of life or the purpose of it is very clearly given in the following *mantra* of the Ṛgveda. We shall give it in the words of Dayānanda. Dayānanda begins with a question :

Q.—How many entities are eternal or beginningless ?

A.—Three: God, the Soul and the *Prakṛti*.

Q.—What are your authorities for this statement?

A.—Ṛgveda[1] says, "Both God and Soul are eternal; they are alike in consciousness and such other attributes. They are associated together, God pervading the Soul, and are mutual companions. The *Prakṛti*, which likened to the trunk of a tree whose branches are the multiform universe which is resolved into its elementary condition at the time of dissolution is

1. द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते ।
तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्त्यनश्नन्नन्यो अभिचाकशीति ।।(Rv.I,164,20)

> also eternal. The natures, attributes, and characters of these three are also eternal. Of the two, God and the Soul, the latter alone reaps the fruit of this tree of the universe—good or evil—, whilst the former does not. He is the all-glorious Being who shines within, without and all round. God, the Soul, and the *Prakṛti* all these are distinct from one another, being different in their natures, but they are all eternal.

This *mantra* clearly signifies the relationship of the world with God and the souls; all of them are *sayujā sakhā* the co-mates of the same age, both eternal, attached to the *samāna vṛkṣa*, the tree of the same age, the tree of *prakṛti* which is also eternal. All of them are equally real, so far as their entity is concerned. There is only one who tastes the fruit of this tree; he is the lower soul, while the other keeps a watch over him.

WHENCEFORTH THIS CREATION?

What do we understand by creation? This is a difficult question to answer. The biblical sense of the verb 'to create' would mean 'to produce out of nothing'. What was existing, before this world came into being? Is it stationary, undergoing no change? Is it still in the state of becoming? Are the

processes of destruction also going on? In fact, what do we understand by creation? Unless we follow what creation is, we cannot ask: Whenceforth this creation? We leave many of these questions for future discussion.

In connection with the *Nāsadīya sūkta* of the Ṛgveda, Dayānanda writes as follows in the cosmology-chapter of his book *Ṛgvedādibhaṣyabhūmikā*:

'Whatever in this whole world is visible, it has been orderly created by God. He is the sustainer of it and during *pralaya*—annihilation—He destroys it after decomposition; He then again creates the world in the same way.'

'When this caused cosmos was not born, the *asat* (the void, *ākāśa* before the creation) was also not existing. How? Because at that time, it was not to in use. At that time, *Sat*, the *vyakta* cause of the world, an aspect of the *avyakta prakṛti* was also non-existant. (Dayānanda means that though *prakṛti* was existing in its *avyakta* form, the *sat* of it was not manifested, *cf.*, Sāmkhya.) Nor were the *paramāṇus* (*raja*) were existing. Nor the *vyoma or Virāṭ* (the cosmic form) was existing. But the only thing that existed was that Great Brahmaṇ's the so-called vitality, which is very subtle, and which is the primordial cause.'

'In mornings, during the rainy season, just something resembling smoke with a little rainy water content appears, and just as this much quantity of water is incapable to wrap the earth or to make a river flow, similarly what covered? (all that was existing was insufficient to cover the whole Brahmaṇ ; it was just an insignificant portion). The primordial cause could not cover the whole Brahmaṇ in the same way. How? Because Brahmaṇ is infinite while the world is infinitesimal.'

In the same *sūkta*, other things that are described to be non-existing are death or *Mṛtyu*; and immortality (*amṛta*); and also there was no distinction between night and day.

The thing that existed was: That one which breathed by itself (*svadhayā*) without breath. Other than it, there had been nothing. (This one is the lower soul who being *chetana* was living without a corporeal body, without *prāṇa* or breath).

Now the creation begins: It became all dark. In the beginning, there appeared *apraketa salila* (something fluid which could not be discriminated—a sea without light). That one who was living by itself without breath so far, as if a germ covered by husk, came into life by the *tapas* or heat.

Then came into being love (*kāma*) which was a seed of mind and since then, this creation rolled on.

All this when summed up would mean that there pre-existed three things:

One which supplied power or vitality, which underwent *tapas*.—This is God.

The second though living but breathing without breath or existing without corporeal body.—This is the Soul.

The *third* thing which appeared to be non-existing in its *vyakta* form in the beginning but which finally condensed and which supplied corporeal body to that germ.—This is *Prakṛti*.

These form Dayānanda's three eternals. And now we can answer the question, 'Whenceforth this creation came into being?' From all the three, God, the Soul and the *Prakṛti*. There would have been no creation, had even one non-existed. Had there been no God, *prakṛti* would have remained *avyakta* or unmanifested because who else could have given it the initial motive *tapas*, heat or vitality. Had there been no *prakṛti* whereupon the *tapas* would have acted, and had there been no soul urging for life in a corporeal body, the creation would have been purposeless.

Some interpreters ascribe the statement " That one breathed by itself without breath; other than it, there has been nothing" to Brahman, the Absolute. But it is not so. It stands for lower souls, for whom without creation, death and immortality both would have been meaningless. In their connection, it has been said—"There was no death, and hence was nothing immortal." The same souls were given the corporeal body in which *manas* and *kāma* were provided.

I agree with Radhakrishnan in so far that "We find in this hymn a representation of the most advanced theory of creation. First of all, there was no existent or non-existent. The existent in its manifested aspect was not then. We cannot on that account call it the non-existent, for it is positive being from which the whole existence arrives." I submit that in the detailed interpretation of the hymn, we differ.

It is further said at another place[1] :

Before all, the one who was existing was Hiraṇyagarbha, the only Lord, the sustainer of the earth, the sky and everything. The

1. हिरण्यगर्भः समवर्त्तताग्रे भूतस्य जातः पतिरेक आसीत् ।
स दाधार पृथिवीं द्यामुतेमां कस्मै देवाय हविषा विधेम ॥
(Ṛv. X, 121, 1)

word Hiraṇyagarbha is significant. It is a composite term for God and *Prakṛti*, the one who holds *prakṛti* the gold, in womb or *garbha*. It signifies the simultaneous existence of God and *Prakṛti*.

At another place[1], God has been called Viśvakarmā (Yajuḥ, 31, 17). In the beginning existed Viśvakarmā, who having taken the essence out of water made the earth. He gave form to the world and also body to the mortals so that they may become immortals, or *devas*, through it.

The same God is Prajāpati[2].

(Yajuḥ 31, 19)

The Prajāpati pervades in and out everywhere and gives various forms to this world, though himself remains unborn. The wise see into Him the root cause. In Him alone, different worlds are getting support.

Atharva says[3] that from Prajāpati, are

1. अद्भ्यः संभृतः पृथिव्यै रसाच्च विश्वकर्मणः समवर्त्तताग्रे ।
तस्य त्वष्टा विदधद्रूपमेति तन्मर्त्यस्य देवत्वमाजानमग्रे ॥

2. प्रजापतिश्चरति गर्भे अन्तरजायमानो बहुधा विजायते ।
तस्य योनिं परिपश्यन्ति धीरास्तस्मिन् ह तस्थुर्भुवनानि विश्वा ॥
(Yv. 31, 19)

3. यत्परममवमं यच्च मध्यमं प्रजापतिः ससृजे विश्वरूपम् ।
कियता स्कम्भः प्रविवेश तत्र यन्न प्राविशत् कियत्तद् बभूव ॥ (Av. 10, 7, 8)

born (*i*) *parama*, the highest, the world etc., (*ii*) *avama*, the lowest, straw, small creatures etc., and (*iii*) *madhyama*, the middle, man's body etc., all these forms. In this creation of the three kinds, the Lord is permeating to an indefinite extent. How can there be a measure of it?

Needless to say, that Hiraṇyagarbha, Prajāpati, Viśvakarmā and similar terms have been used in the same sense. All these terms in a way are synonyms, meaning something or the other concerning creation. We cannot agree to the statements as follow:

"In the pluralistic stage, the several gods, Varuṇa, Indra, Agni, Viśvakarman, were looked upon as the authors of the Universe. The method of creation is differently conceived. Some gods are supposed to build the world as the carpenter builds a house. The question is raised as to how the tree or the wood out of which the work was built, was obtained (Ṛv. 10, 31, 7; 10, 81, 4).[1] At a later stage, the answer is given that Brahman is the tree and the wood out of which heaven and earth are made. The

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1. किं स्विद्वनं क उ स वृक्ष आस यतो द्यावापृथिवी निष्टतक्षुः ।
सन्तस्थाने अजरे इत ऊती अहानि पूर्वीरुषसो जरन्त ॥
(Ṛv. X, 31, 7)

conception of organic growth[1] or development is also now and then suggested (Ṛv. 10, 123, 1). Sometimes the gods are said to create the world by the power of sacrifice. This perhaps belongs to a later stage of thought." (Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, I, 99).

An allegorical evolution of the cosmos has been given *Puruṣa-sūkta* of the Yajurveda, which we have no occasion to deal with in details. We shall conclude this account of cosmology after having considered one *mantra*[2] here which involves some controversy. Dayānanda has treated this *sūkta* almost completely in his Ṛgvedādibhaṣyabhūmikā. The fifth *mantra* of this *sūkta* when translated ordinarily would mean :

From that (*puruṣa*) was born *virāṭ* and from *virāṭ* again the *puruṣa*. He having born remains aloof ; having given birth to the earth he sustains it afterwards.

From this passage, some are apt to think that "*Puruṣa* is the begetter as well as the begotten. He is the absolute as well as the

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1. अयं वेनश्चोदयत्पृश्निगर्भा ज्योतिर्जरायू रजसो विमाने ।
 इममपां संगमे सूर्यस्य शिशुं न विप्रा मतिभी रिहन्ति ॥
 (Ṛv. X, 123, 1)
2. ततो विराडजायत विराजो अधि पूरुषः । स जातो अत्यरि-
 च्यत पश्चाद् भूमिमथो पुरः ॥ (Yv. 31, 5)

self-conscious one." In this connection, Dayānanda says : "From O that' (*tataḥ*) means 'from the one with cosmic body whose eyes are the sun and the moon, breath the air, foot the earth and so on, from that *samaṣṭi-deha*.' This Lord of the Cosmic Body gave birth to *virāṭ*. From this *virāṭ* were born other *puruṣas*. "From various elements of *Brahmāṇḍa*, were made different bodies for all souls fit for their use."

Thus we have seen that in matters of cosmology, Dayānanda's contentions are very much different from those of others. The main difference is due to the following reasons: According to Dayānanda, creation cannot arise out of nothing. And secondly, the absolute unchangeable Brahman could not be transformed to this changeable cosmos. Lastly, the world, which starts with one Brahman alone would have been purposeless. Dayānanda presents the realistic picture of the universe, and this also leads to some differences.

VEDIC ESCHATOLOGY

Some orientalists would probably object to my adding the word 'vedic' before eschatology or the doctrine which deals with the life after death or with the plurality of lives. They would say that the Vedic Aryans had no notions of life after death. A great scholar writes as follows: "The Vedic

Aryans entered India in the pride of strength and joy of conquest. They loved life in its fullness. They therefore showed no great interest in the future of the soul. Life to them was bright and joyous, free from all the vexations of a fretful spirit. They were not enamoured of death. They wished for themselves and their posterity a life of a hundred autumns. They had no special doctrines about life after death, though some vague conceptions about heaven and hell could not be avoided by reflective minds. Re-birth is still at a distance. The Vedic Aryans were convinced that death was not the end of things. After night, the day ; after death, life. Beings who once had been, could never cease to be. They must exist somewhere, perhaps in the realm of the setting sun where Yama rules." (Radhakrishnan's, *Indian Philosophy*).

This view is not of Radhakrishnan's originally but has been given by a number of western orientalists. We shall presently see, at least Dayānanda has shown, that like so many other doctrines, the root idea of eschatology is present in the Vedas. From everyday experience, the Vedic Aryans were sure that death is inevitable and one should aspire for a long life, sometimes a life, extending to the span of three ordinary lives :

Tryāyuṣāṁ jamadagneḥ kaśyapasya tryāyuṣam.

Yaddeveṣu tryāyuṣaṁ tanno astu tryāuṣaṁ. (Yajuḥ 3,62)

The ordinary life was supposed to be of one hundred autumns. It was also a contention of the people of the age that the death was not an end of life. They must have equally believed that as souls are eternal, there must be some life before this life. Like semetic religions, they never thought that it was God who breathed his life into the body of mortals. So three things were sure. Firstly, there was life before this life ; secondly, the death is inevitable ; and lastly, the death is not an end of life. The very idea, that there was an existence before this mortal life leads one to the belief that then there would be a similar life after death also.

The Aryans knew that one cannot live for an eternal period. But then what does it mean, '*Mṛtyum tīrtvā, amṛatmaśnute,* having overcome death by one, obtaining immortality by the other. All those who die will not become immortals, only a chosen few being favoured with immortality. Others even after death will remain under the clutches of Death. If there is no

life after death, where is the fear of a second death? The crave for immortality is futile, specially when one is sure that the present life cannot be extended indefinitely. Therefore, the very fact that the Vedic Aryans craved for immortality beyond this death means that they believed in two things: Firstly, under ordinary course, one will be re-born and undergo repeated mortalities. Secondly, with special favour, by leaving the life of righteousness, he can be relieved from further mortalities and be immortal. This is the complete doctrine of eschatology.

When the Veda says: "*Tameva viditvati-mṛtyumeti*" or having known Him, one conquers death (Yajuḥ, 31,18) it clearly means that one is relieved from the cycle of death. Conquering death means conquering subsequent deaths, for the death in the present life is inevitable. Similarly, when one says, "*Yasyacchhāyāmṛtam yasya mṛtyuḥ*" one whose protection leads to immortality, otherwise death, here too immortality means getting relieved from the further cycles of birth and death. It is the same thing that the *Śatapatha* speaks out, "*Mṛtyormāmṛtam gamaya*"—from death lead us to immortality. Had there been no birth after this death, the question of immortality would not have arisen. The crave for immortality for a period after

death necessarily involves many births and deaths under an ordinary course.

Until western scholars pointed it out that the Vedic age had no idea of eschatological doctrine, no Indian ever dreamt that the principle of the transmigration of soul would be foreign to the Vedic thought. Dayānanda has given a number of instances from the Vedas which contain the eschatological principle.

The Ṛgveda says:

O, the Giver of breath, the blissful God, give to us *again* (in the next life) the eyes, *again* the vital *Prāṇa*—the breath, so that we may accomplish our *bhoga* (the fruit of our present actions); may we always see the sun. O *Anumate*, the giver of glory, may we have all the bliss.[1]

Here eyes are the representative of all the five senses and organs of action, and *Prāṇa* of the breath system. Another body is demanded because it is the abode of fruit of our actions or enjoyments "*Bhogāyatanaṁ śarīraṁ*". This *mantra* deals with the *Punarjanma*, the re-birth.

1. असुनीते पुनरस्मासु चक्षुः पुनः प्राणमिह नो धेहि भोगम् ।
ज्योक् पश्येम सूर्यमुच्चरन्तमनुमते मृडया नः स्वस्ति ॥
(Ṛv. X, 59, 6)

The same idea is more vividly exposed in the following *mantra*[1] of the Yajurveda (4, 15):

Again the mind, *again* the full age, *again* the breath, and *again* the self-possession may we obtain. *Again* the eye, *again* the ear may we get. The Vaiśvānara or the Lord of all, devoid of all evils, the sustainer of our bodies (*Tanūpaḥ*), the *Agni*, may He protect us from all evils.

There can be no clearer a demand of a good re-birth than what has been given in this *mantra*.

The Atharvaveda[2] (5, 1, 2) is also equally clear in this respect:

One who in the first (life) does actions unto *dharma* or righteous dictates, on that account he obtains good bodies in the (next) life. That soul, after leaving the first, enters into the (next) *yoni* or womb. There having known the true godly speech, he enjoys.

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1. पुनर्मनः पुनरायुर्म आगन् पुनः प्राणः पुनरात्मा म आगन् । पुनश्चक्षुः पुनः श्रोत्रं म आगन् । वैश्वानरो अदब्धस्तनूपा अग्निर्नः पातु दुरितादवद्यात् ॥ (Yv. 4, 15)
2. आ यो धर्माणि प्रथमः ससाद ततो वपूंषि कृणुषे पुरूणि । धास्युर्योनिं प्रथम आविवेशा यो वाचमनुदितां चिकेत ॥ (Av. 5, 1, 2)

This *mantra* refers to the fact that the nature of the next birth depends on the actions done in the previous birth. It expounds the doctrine of *Karma*.

Another *mantra* [1] of the Atharva (7,67,1) says:

May we again obtain the senses or organs, the self-possession, the wealth, and the knowledge, again the fires. May we get all as we have been getting so far, so that we may be able to lead good life.

Prof. Rānāde refers to a hymn of the Ṛgveda in connection with eschatology. He says: "We have one very characteristic hymn of the Ṛgveda which we fear has not been noticed with even a tithe of the attention which it really deserves. The meaning which Roth, Böhtlingk and Geldner have found in at least two verses of the hymn has been strangely overlooked, and it is wonderful that people keep saying that the idea of transmigration is *not* to be found in the Ṛgveda. The hymn we refer to is the great riddle-hymn of the Ṛgveda, I, 164." (*A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy*, p. 147). The verses referred to are

1. पुनर्मैत्विन्द्रियं पुनरात्मा द्रविणं ब्राह्मणं च । पुनरग्नयो धिष्ण्या यथास्थाम कल्पन्तामिहैव ॥ Av. 7, 67, 1)

30th, 38th and we can include the verse 31st also of this *Sūkta*. The poet asks in one of the earlier verses, who has ever seen the precise mode in which the boneless soul, the very life-blood and informing spirit of the earth, comes to inhabit a body tenement [1]. It shows that here the context is soul. On this, "the seer says categorically that this breathing, speedful, moving life-principle is firmly established inside the tenements of clay.[2] Moreover, he tells us that the immortal principle, conjoined with the mortal one, *moves backwards and forwards* by virtue of its natural power, but the wonder of it is, the poet goes on to say, that the mortal and immortal elements keep moving ceaselessly in opposite directions, with the result that people are able to see the one, but unable to see the other[3]."

In fact these two verses were referred to by Roth, Böhtlingk and Geldner as against Oldenberg who held that there is no

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1. को ददर्श प्रथमं जायमानमस्थन्वन्तं यदनस्था बिभर्ति (I, 164, 4)
2. अनच्छये तुरगातु जीवमेजद् ध्रुवं मध्य आ पस्त्यानाम् ।
जीवो मृतस्य चरति स्वधाभिरमर्त्यो मर्त्येना सयोनिः ॥ (३०)
3. अपाङ् प्राङेति स्वधया गृभीतोऽमर्त्यो मर्त्येना सयोनिः ।
ता शश्वन्ता विषूचीना वियन्ता न्यन्यं चिक्युर्न निचिक्युरन्यम् ॥ ३८ ॥

mention of eschatology in the Ṛgveda. Roth and others are right in regarding that "the verses tell us that the soul is moving, speedful life principle which comes and goes, moves backwards, comes in contact with the body and then moves from it in the opposite direction." Sāyaṇa also refers this verse (38) to eschatology.[1]

Rānāde says, "But the culminating point of the whole doctrine is reached when the poet tells us that he himself saw (probably with his mind's eye) the guardian of the body, moving unerringly by backward and forward paths, clothed in collected and diffusive splendour, and that it kept on *returning frequently* inside the mundane regions.[2] That this 'guardian' is no other than the soul may be seen from the way in which verse 31 follows immediately on verse 30 which mentions the 'breathing, speedful, moving

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1. अपाङेति अशुक्लं कर्मकृत्वाधो गच्छति प्राङेतिऊर्ध्वं स्वर्गादिलोकं प्राप्नोति परमात्मैव सूक्ष्मशरीरोपाधिकः सन् नानाविधं कर्म कृत्वा तद्भोगाय जीवसंज्ञां लब्ध्वा शरीरत्रयेण सम्बद्धो लोकान्तरेषु संचरति स्थूलसूक्ष्मोभयशरीरपरिग्रहेण लोके गुणत्रयान्वितः सन् परिभ्रमति तथा च श्रूयते—गुणान्वयो यः फलकर्मकर्ता कृतस्य तस्यैव सचोपभोक्ता ॥ (सायण)

2. अपश्यं गोपामनिपद्यमानमा च परा च पथिभिश्चरन्तम् ।
स सध्रीचीः स विषूचीर्वसान आ वरीवर्ति भुवनेष्वन्तः ॥३१॥

life principle'; moreover, the frequentive (*varīvarti*) tells us the *frequency* of the soul's return to this world."

EMANCIPATION OR SALVATION

We have just seen that the Veda is positively in favour of the doctrine of eschatology. The ultimate goal of life is difficult to fix up. In our body, we all feel bondage, and think that so long as we are under the clutches of birth and death, we cannot be free from pain. The Vedic seer knows that God and God alone is the source of all bliss, all strength and all pleasure. In our worldly life, we demand from Him all that we need :

O God, Thou art the light, give us light,
Thou art the essence, give us essence of life.
Thou art the strength, give us strength,
Thou art the valour, give us valour.
Thou art the anger, give us anger.
Thou art the forbearance, give us forbearance. [1]

Another weary soul demands :

'O light, the Lord of all, take away from

1. तेजोऽसि तेजो मयि धेहि वीर्यमसि वीर्य्यं मयि धेहि ।
बलमसि बलं मयि धेहि ओजोऽस्योजो मयि धेहि ।
मन्युरसि मन्युं मयि धेहि सहोऽसि सहो मयि धेहि ॥
(Yv. 19, 9)

us all that is evil and whatever be to our good, give us all.'[1]

Here is the demand for supreme intelligence:

'The very intellect which both elders and the learned adorned, O Agni, make us full of that.[2]'

The man who takes the vow of truth[3] says:

O Agni, the Lord of vows, it is only with thy help that we are able to take the vow. May we with thy grace leave untruth in order to attain truth.

The Ṛg says:[4] To one who has not known the Lord, what would the knowing of all the knowledge (*ṛcha*) do. Having known him alone we derive satisfaction.

In deep meditation, when a devotee becomes one with God, or gets very much absorbed in Him, he sees through all

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1. विश्वानि देव सवितर्दुरितानि परा सुव । यद्भद्रं तन्न आसुव ॥ (Ṛv. V. 82, 5)
2. यां मेधां देवगणाः पितरश्चोपासते । तया मामद्य मेधयाग्ने मेधाविनं कुरु ॥ (Yv. 32, 14)
3. अग्ने व्रतपते व्रतं चरिष्यामि तच्छकेयं तन्मे राध्यताम् । इदमहमनृतात्सत्यमुपैमि ॥ (Yv. 1, 5)
4. यस्तन्नवेद किमृचा करिष्यति य इत्तद्विदुस्त इमे समासते ॥ (Ṛv. I, 164, 39)

the souls, the one *Atman* pervading and in that state he can say, "Now where is the attachment and where is the agony? There is only one Lord before him".[1]

So what is the final goal of life? Is it mere peace and prosperity in the present life or even something higher? The Veda does not want us to abhor wealth or victory in ordinary life. We can pray to Him "*Syāma patayoḥ rayīṇāṁ*"—may we be the master of immense wealth; but this does not give us the ultimate satisfaction. On a higher plane we demand three things from Him, the right intellect, the truth and his direct contact. But all these things one can also possess in the mortal body, where the soul works, feels and thinks in terms of the physical body.

We have seen in the last section that there is an inner urge in us to get rid of death which is the deadliest of the phenomena which one experiences in the mortal life. The Vedic seers have got a confidence in the attainment of an immortal life, the life of " not-death " or *amṛta*. They believe that the worldly pain and pleasure are the functions of physical body. They also realise that God is the source of all bliss. So long as one is within body, he is separated from God.

1. तत्र को मोहः कः शोक एकत्वमनुपश्यतः (Yv. 40, 7)

This body stands between the two. And, therefore, he is anxious to get himself released from the cycle of birth and death.

When did the cycle of birth and death start with a particular soul ? Is it with him since eternity ? If it is so, how can an eternal cycle be ever ended ? How can emancipation be possible ? Then was the soul, before he entered the cycle, emancipated ? Necessarily, if emancipation would ever exist in future, it already existed sometimes in the past. Between two emancipations is the cycle of life and death and between two such cycles there is one emancipation. We can say that there exists a wider cycle of bondage and emancipation beyond the cycle of life and death. Therefore, Dayānanda not only believes in emancipation but also a return from emancipation. We shall discuss the subject in some other chapter.

In this connection, Dayānanda says, " It is not true that the emancipated soul never returns to this world because the Veda contradicts this view." The Ṛgveda says :[1] " Whose name shall we hold sacred ?

1. कस्य नूनं कतमस्यामृतानां मनामहे चारु देवस्य नाम । को नो मह्या अदितये पुनर्दात्पितरं च दृशेयं मातरं च ॥ अग्नेर्वयं प्रथमस्यामृतानां मनामहे चारु देवस्य नाम । स नो मह्या अदितये पुनर्दात्पितरं च दृशेयं मातरं च ॥ (Ṛv. I, 24, 1-2)

Who is that all-glorious, resplendent being? Who is imperishable among all the perishable things? Who having made us enjoy the bliss of emancipation again invests us with bodies and thereby gives us the pleasure of seeing our parents? It is all-glorious, eternal, immortal, all-pervading, Supreme Being whose name we should hold sacred. He, it is, who helps us to enjoy the bliss of emancipation and then brings us back into this world, clothes us with bodies, and thereby, gives us the pleasure of seeing our parents. The same divine spirit, it is, who regulates the period of emancipation and lords over all."

According to Dayānanda, when the word *amṛta* or immortality is used, it does not denote the period of eternity. It signifies only a very long period. How can a state be extended to eternity, which has a beginning?

THE VEDIC CONCEPT OF MIND

Barring the two subjects, Brahman and the soul, no other problem is so intricate as one concerning " mind. " The function of mind is so prominent that sometimes the ego appears to be lost in it. It appears to be as " *chetana* " or active as ego itself. Ordinarily, it does not behave as if it be material, because the physics, chemistry and biology of it are still unexplored, nor is it immaterial,

for it only exists in the material body. It is a connecting link between the soul and physical world. What is mind ? Is it something which knows, which feels, which thinks, which has a memory and which is active in dreams ? or more exactly, through which the ego knows, feels, thinks, memorises and dreams ?

The Vedic concept of mind is very well given in the following set of *mantras*: (Yajuḥ, 34, 1–6)

(i)

The one which runs away while awakened
And similarly, which runs of one asleep.
One which moves afar, which is the light of light,
That my mind be of blissful ideas.

(ii)

By which in *yajña* and on other occasions, the learned,
Wise, and the intelligent perform their actions,
One which is the best amongst the organs or senses
That my mind be of blissful ideas.

(iii)

One which is the instrument of knowing (*prajñāna*), thinking (*chetaḥ*), retaining (*dhṛtiḥ*).

One which is the immortal light of all the senses,
One without which not a single deed performed,
That my mind be of blissful ideas.

(iv)

By which immortal, this past, present and future,
Apear as if all within reach,
By which is ordained this *yajña* of seven '*hotās*'.
That my mind be of blissful ideas.

(v)

In which, Ṛg, Sāma and Yajuḥ are fixed up
As if poles in the centre of a wheel,
In which the consciousness of all the senses rests,
That my mind be of blissful ideas.

(vi)

That which drags men with force, as if
The good horse-driver controls mighty horses with reins,
Never growing old, the fast one, that which is seated in the heart,
That my mind be of blissful ideas.

The complete working of mind has been very nicely summarised in these *mantras* which need no comment. The Veda distinguishes between mind and intellect, while the control over both is necessary before one can realise God. The process through which it is achieved is called *yoga*. The other words which have been used in the Veda to convey the sense of *yoga* are '*Yuñjate*', '*Yuktena*' etc. The Ṛgveda[1] says:—

The devotees or *Vipra* concentrate *(yuñjate)* mind in the great and all-knowing and so do they concentrate intellect (*dhiyaḥ*).

The word '*yuñjate*', signifies the whole process of *yoga* of which 'concentrate' is not an appropriate rendering. However, it has been used in absence of any other better term.

The Yajurveda[2] also says :

'The man doing *yoga* (*yuñjānaḥ)* first controls mind to attain the principle (the

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1. युञ्जते मन उत युञ्जते धियो विप्रा विप्रस्य बृहतो विपश्चितः ।
वि होत्रा दधे वयुनाविदेक इन्मही देवस्य सवितुः परिष्टुतिः ॥
(Ṛv. V, 81, 1)

2. युञ्जानः प्रथमं मनस्तत्त्वाय सविता धियम् । अग्नेर्ज्योतिर्निचाय्य पृथिव्या अध्याभरत् ॥ (Yv. 11, 1)

realisation of Brahman), and then the *Savitā*, the God Himself, directs his intellect.

The same idea is developed in other two *mantras* following the above one in the Yajurveda (*yukten manasā vayaṁ* and *yuktāya savitā devān*).

The Atharva describes *yoga* a little more in details. (19,8,2). [1]

The blissful, pleasure-giving, twenty-eight may devote themselves, day and night, to attain *yoga*. *Yoga* leads to *kṣema* and *kṣema* leads to *yoga*.

Kṣema means the competency obtained by *yoga* which is the name of practice. Practice leads to competency and competency encourages for further practice. The 'twenty-eight' referred to in the passage signify:—

Five organs of sense.

Five organs of action.

Four mind, intellect, thought-provoking one, and self-provoking one (*manas*, *buddhi*, *chitta* and *ahamkāra*).

Ten vital breaths—*prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna*, *samāna*, *nāga*, *kūrma*, *kṛkala*, *devadatta*, *dhanañjaya*.

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1. अष्टाविंशानि शिवानि शग्मानि सहयोगं भजन्तु मे ।
योगं प्रपद्ये क्षेमं च क्षेमं प्रपद्ये योगं च नमोऽहोरात्राभ्यामस्तु ।
(Av. 19, 8, 2)

Four sundry—*Vidyā* or knowledge, *svabhāva* or habit, *śarira* or the body, and *bala* or the strength.

THE VEDIC ETHICS

We shall conclude this chapter by giving an outline of the Vedic ethics. We, however, cannot discuss the various implications which arise in ethics in the course of its application to actual life problems. Perhaps, the greatest of the ethical principles is the adherence to truth. Truth in speech, truth in thought and truth in actions,—these are the three aspects of truth. The greatest of the vow is the vow of truth. As will be evident from the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, on every auspicious occasion when a vow was to be taken, it was the vow of truthfulness. The usual pledge was: "*Anṛtat satyamupaimi*", may I discard falsehood to attain truth. A similar Brāhmanic prayer is: *Asato mā sad gamaya*", from untruth, lead me to truth. The basis of creation is threefold: *Ṛta, Satya and Tapas*. Sometimes it has been said that whatever exists is *sat*, or truth and the rest is all non-existing. Sometimes this truth has been allegorically or categorically associated with *sat*, the primordial aspect of *prakṛti* (*prakṛti* has three aspects, *sat*, *rajas*, *and tamas*).

The next to *satya* or truth is *śraddhā*. This word etymologically means the

accepting of truth. Acceptance of the truth has another name "faith", but ordinarily this term has been very wrongly used. Having known what truth is, if one submits himself to it, then it is *śraddhā* or real faith. Something whose truthfulness has not been established if adopted will not be called *śraddhā*. The following *mantra* of the Yajuḥ[1] is very clear on this point.

Having well seen, *Prajāpati*, the Lord of all, has made the truth and not-truth very distinct. He has placed non-faith in not-truth and faith in truth. (19,77)

How does a man attain *śraddhā* and *satya*, faith and truth, is also described in the same chapter of the Yajurveda[2] (19,30).

> By the firm determination or vow (*vrata*), one attains right or claim—*dīkṣā*.
>
> By *dīkṣā*, one attains reward or *dakṣiṇā*. It means the respect of others.
>
> By *daksinā*, one attains *śraddhā* or faith.
>
> By *śraddhā*, one attains *satya* or truth.

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1. दृष्ट्वा रूपे व्याकरोत्सत्यानृते प्रजापतिः । अश्रद्धामनृतेऽदधाच्छ्रद्धाꣳ सत्ये प्रजापतिः ॥ (Yv. 19, 77)
2. व्रतेन दीक्षामाप्नोति दीक्षयाप्नोति दक्षिणाम् । दक्षिणा श्रद्धामाप्नोति श्रद्धया सत्यमाप्यते ॥ (Yv. 19, 30)

The next to truth and *śraddhā* is the attitude of tolerance or *ahimsa.* This implies looking everybody with an eye of friendliness. This friendliness should be extended to all creatures, human and not human both. Friendliness would mean feeling of pain in others just as one feels in himself. In this connection, nothing can be so explicit as the following[1] :

O the kind God, be it so. All creatures may look at me with the eye of a friend.

I may also look at all creatures with the eye of a friend. Let us all see one another with the eye of a friend.

This extends the range of fellow-feeling to all creatures. At another place, it has been said that "*sarvā āśā mama mitram bhavantu*"—let all the directions be my friend, but such a prayer implies that we should also be friends to all in reciprocity.

Regarding covetousness and rightful possession, an indication is given in the following line ; "*Tena tyaktena bhuñjīthā mā gṛdha kasyasviddhanam* (Yajuḥ, 40,1)". Whatever has been given by God, by that alone enjoy, and covet not anybody's

1. दृते दृंह मा मित्रस्य मा चक्षुषा सर्वाणि भूतानि समीक्षन्ताम् । मित्रस्याहं चक्षुषा सर्वाणि भूतानि समीक्षे । मित्रस्य चक्षुषा समीक्षामहे ॥ (Yv. 36, 18)

wealth. Whatever has been given to you or in other words, whatever you have earned, you have a right to enjoy. Do not be covetous of another's property.

Another interpretation of the line is that "enjoy in this world all unattached. Do not be covetous, for to whom does belong this wealth, *i.e.*, to none."

The unattached living in life is further exhorted in the next *mantra* [1] of the same chapter (Yajuḥ,40,2).

Being always busy in active work, have a desire to live for hundred years. In this way alone and by no other way you can remain unattached to the actions.

It means that keep always an eye over work, not on its fruit. Be absorbed in work and work alone. This is the only way by which you can remain unattached. But in case you cease working, you will be absorbed in indulgence or *bhoga*, and then the very actions will bind you up.

The unattached life, the life of truthfulness, the life of forbearance and tolerance, the uncoveted life, such a life, in short, is

1. कुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणि जिजीविषेच्छतꣳ समाः ।
एवं त्वयि नान्यथेतोऽस्ति न कर्म लिप्यते नरे ॥
(Yv. 40, 2)

what the Vedic ethics refers to. Unnecessary to say that there is nothing like the life of celibacy. For,

Brahmacharyeṇa devāḥ mṛtyumupāghnata,

it is the life of celibacy, the life of purity and chastity, by which the godly beings have conquered death. It is *Brahmacharya* and *Brahmacharya* alone which leads to immortality. To the word, *Brahmacharya*, is attached much more significance than to the word celibacy. *Brahmacharya* means the life of chastity in thought, speech and action. It is a godly living. The blessed is one who can lead such a life to perfection.

In all these pages, we have made an attempt to show how Dayānanda has been able to draw up his complete philosophy on the basis of the Vedas alone. In fact, there is nothing new in it for Upaniṣads as well as the later systems of Indian philosophy also take their stand on the Vedas. But in recent years, there have been so many misgivings regarding the Vedas that their fundamental position is almost ignored. As has been said in the earlier part of the chapter, there has ever been a confusion with regard to the interpretation of the Vedic texts. Our readers may at various places differ with Dayānanda so

far as this interpretation is concerned. I shall simply remind them that they must know that after Sāyaṇa, Dayānanda was the greatest of the Vedic scholars. The study of the Vedas was a passion of his life. Whatever he has written in this connection, he has written with a sense of responsibility. He cannot be ignored as a scholar. He has tried to contradict a number of notions prevalent regarding this literature. He writes : "All that conforms to the teachings of the Vedas, nature, attributes and characteristics of God is right, the contrary is wrong." He emphatically declares : "We believe that the Vedas alone are the supreme authority in the ascertainment of true religion—the true conduct of life. Whatever is enjoined by the Vedas, we hold to be right ; whilst whatever is condemned by them, we believe to be wrong. Therefore, we say that our religion is Vedic. All men, especially the Aryas should believe in the Vedas and thereby cultivate unity in religion."

Chapter III

A Synthesis of the Six Systems of Indian Philosophy

PRESCRIBING the course of study for a disciple, Dayānanda writes, "Then they should study the six *Śāstras* (commonly called the six schools of philosophy) with the expositions of *Ṛṣis* —the enlightened great souls, the true seers of nature—as far as available, or in the absence of these, with the help of the true commentaries of other honest scholars. But before taking up the Vedānta Śāstra they should learn the ten Upaniṣads: *Īśa*, *Kena*, *Kaṭha*, *Praśna*, *Muṇḍaka*, *Māṇḍūkya*, *Aitareya*, *Taittarīya*, *Chhāndogya*, *and Bṛhadāraṇyaka*." Further, Dayānanda recommends the following *Ārṣa* commentaries for the six systems of philosophy:

Vyāsa's commentary on the Pūrva-mīmaṁsā.
Gautama's commentary on the Vaiśeṣika.
Vātsyāyana's commentary on the Nyāya.
Vyāsa's commentary on Patañjali's the Yoga.
Bhāguri's commentary on the Sāmkhya.
Vātsyāyana or Bodhāyana's commentary on the Vedānta.

He says " We have recommended books of the Ṛṣis only for students to study, because they were men of great learning, masters of all the *Śāstras*, and also imbued with piety, but the books of *Anṛṣis* we have condemned, because they had only a smattering of knowledge, and were not free from prejudice either. Their writings are also not free from prejudices."

ARE THESE COMMENTARIES EXISTING ?

Dayānanda himself in the passage given above is not very sure whether the mentioned *Ārṣa* commentaries are still available. Vātsyāyana's commentary on the Nyāya Sūtras called the Nyāya Bhaṣya is the most classical one on the subject. Radhakrishnan says, " Evidently, Vātsyāyana is not the immediate successor of Gautama, since his work contains passages of the character of *vārttikas*, which state in a condensed form the results of discussions carried on in the school of Gautama. Vātsyāyana offers different explanations of some *sūtras*, indicating thereby that there were earlier commentators who did not all agree on the interpretations of the *sūtras*." Any way, his commentary which is available is approaching Gautama's view points as propounded in his well-known philosophy of the Nyāya.

Garbe in his *The Philosophy of Ancient*

India says, "The Vaiśeṣika system seems to be of much greater antiquity than the Nyāya." On this Radhakrishnan comments, "This opinion of Garbe seems to be a reasonable one. In human knowledge the particular precedes the general. A theory of knowledge such as the one we have in the Nyāya is not possible until knowledge has made independent progress. Logic appears as a criticism and a corrective. The Sūtra of Kaṇāda and the Padārthadharmasaṁgraha of of Praśastapāda do not show so much the influence of the Nyāya system, while the Sūtra of Gautama and the Bhaṣya of Vātsyāyana are considerably influenced by the Vaiśeṣika views." If these contentions be right, as they seem to be, that in fact originally, Gautama belonged to the school of Vaiśeṣika and later on ,he developed the ideas of Kaṇāda in his own way, it is highly probable that before writing his own system, he might have written a commentary on the Vaiśeṣika also, the mention of which is found in Dayānanda's work. It is not known from which source Dayānanda obtained information regarding this commentary. Praśastapāda also has commented on Kaṇāda's Sutras also, and it is very likely that a confusion might have been made between the two names, Praśastapāda and Akśapāda (the popular name of Gautama).

Bhāguri's commentary on the Sāmkhya is not available. The Sāṁkhyakārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa is the earliest available book of the school. From its name, it is clear that it is not the first book of the system.

Radhakrishnan writes about the commentaries on Patañjali's the Yoga: "Vyāsa's commentary on the Yoga Sūtra (fourth century A. D.) gives the standard exposition of the Yoga principles. Vāchaspati wrote a glossory on Vyāsa's Bhāṣya called Tattvavaiśāradi (ninth century)." So in this case, Dayānanda is right in pointing out to the Vyāsa's commentary for the study of the Yoga.

So far as is known, Sābara is the author of the chief commentary on the work of Jaimini. He lived about the first century B. C. But as Radhakrishnan says, "evidently there were commentators on Jaimini's work prior to Sābara, such as Bhartṛmitra, Hari and Upavarṣa but their works are not available." But to me it appears, that these three commentators besides Sābara are also not very early. It is difficult to say that Vyāsa whom Dayānanda refers to as the commentator of the Pūrva Mīmāmsā is the same as the author of the Uttara Mīmāmsā. But as the names of these two works signify, the author of the Uttara

Mīmāmsā must have either been a contemporary of Jaimini, or followed him.

Now, lastly, regarding the Bodhāyana's commentary on the Vedānta or Uttara Mīmāmsā, I shall quote Thibaut. In his introduction to *The Vedānta Sūtras*, he writes, "It appears that Rāmānuja claims—and by Hindu writers is generally admitted—to follow in his Bhāṣya the authority of Bodhāyana, who, had composed a *Vṛtti* on the Sūtras. Thus we read in the beginning of the Śrī-bhāṣya (*Paṇḍita*, New Series, VII, p. 163), '*Bhāgavadbodhāyana-kṛtam vistīrṇam Brahmasūtra-vṛttim pūrvāchāryāḥ samkikshipus tanmatānusārena sūtrākṣarāṇi vyākhyāsyante.*' Whether Bodhāyana to whom that *vṛtti* is ascribed is to be identified with the author of the Kalpa-Sūtra, and other works, cannot at present be decided. But that an ancient *vṛtti* on the *Sūtras* connected with Bodhāyana's name actually existed, there is not any reason to doubt? Short quotations from it are met with in a few places of the Śri-Bhaṣya, and as we have seen above, Śankara's commentators state that their author's polemical works are directed against the *Vṛttikāra*." It definitely appears that this commentary of Bodhāyana, though ancient did not meet favour of Śankara's school, and in course of time, almost became extinct.

DAYĀNANDA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THESE ŚĀSTRAS

We have already seen in the first chapter that Dayānanda became interested in the doctrine of the Vedānta, after he left his home in search of truth. This was because he came in contact with a number of learned personalities over whom the influence of Śankara was immense. It has also been mentioned that for years he very closely studied and discussed a number of the Vedāntic books, including the Vedanta itself. At one time he was so convinced of the doctrine of Śankara that he actually began to regard himself as Brahman, the Absolute. Such was the influence of the Śānkarika monism on him. But then in the end, he found that he could not derive satisfaction out of the doctrine of the idealistic monism, and he became a staunch realist. This change in him was probably due to his contact with the teacher Virajānanda in an indirect way. In his boyhood, Dayānanda memorised the Yajurveda but since then, till he reached his great master, the study of the Veda was thrown into the back-ground. Virajānanda gave him a new insight into the Vedas and the Vedic and *Ārṣa* literature. This led him to the firm conviction that whatever is written in the Veda, is true. We have already seen in the last chapter that the

Vedas believe in the reality of life or as Radhakrishnan says, "there is no basis for any conception of the unreality of the world in the hymns of the Ṛgveda. The world is not a purposeless phantasm." And if it be so, then Dayānanda with all his convictions regarding the Vedas could not, even for a moment, adhere to the doctrine of monism as propounded by Śankara where the world has been depicted as unreal, a mirage, a phantasm, an empty dream or an enchantment.

This led Dayānanda to explore for himself new avenues in realm of the Vedic literature. The most important thing that he discovered for himself was that all the six systems of the Brahmaṇical philosophy lay their extreme faith in the ultimate authority of the Vedas. And if it be so, then any interpretation of these *Śāstras* which goes against the very fundamental doctrine of the Vedas, is something which is not acceptable. This took him to the inference that whether Śankara's philosophy be right or wrong, this much is sure that it does not interpret the philosophy of Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the Vedānta Sūtras Dayānanda held Śankara always in very high esteem, especially in his pioneering work of driving away the Buddhism from this country, but he could not reconcile

himself with his teachings.

Dayānanda regards all the six *Darśanas* as *Ārṣa Grantha* (the books of the seers) and calls them *Upānga* of the Vedas, that is, the subsidies of the Vedas. Regarding fundamentals, he does not find contradictions in them. So far as the fundamental nature of the three eternals is concerned, he finds that all the six systems are in agreement. His greatest contribution to the six systems of the Brahmanic philosophy is that *he has presented a synthetic view of all of them.* Unlike other interpreters, he neither discards the Sāṁkhya in favour of the Vaiśeṣika nor the Nyāya or the Uttara Mīmāṁsā in favour of the Vedānta. To him, Patañjali's Yoga or direct realisation of the Brahman in *samādhi* does not stand in contradiction to the path of knowledge as propounded by the Vedānta, or the path of *karma* as given by Mīmāṁsā. The *Prakṛti-vāda* of the Sāmkhya and the *Aṇu-vāda* of the Vaiśeṣika are also not inconsistent. So far as the final goal of enquiry is concerned, all agree in the attainment of *mukti* or freedom from bondage. Dayānanda emphatically denies that the author of the Sāmkhya is an atheist, and he substantiates his views from circumstantial and internal authorities. The synthesis of all the six schools which at a later stage have been regarded so diverse, is something

unique and for this contribution, Dayānanda stands uppermost. In this chapter we shall see how one can arrive at such a synthesis. It is rather unfortunate that Dayānanda could not work out this thesis in details, probably, for his life was cut short in such an unexpected way but he has clearly indicated the path which can be followed by future scholars.

COMMON IDEAS

Under the above caption, Radhakrishnan, who is probably the best of our living interpreters of the Indian thought, has given an interesting account with which we shall begin before entering into the detailed discussion. He writes:

"The six systems agree on certain essentials. The acceptance of the Veda implies that all the systems have drawn from a common reservoir of thought. The Hindu teachers were obliged to use the heritage they received from the past in order to make their views readily understood. While the use of the terms *avidyā*, *māyā*, *puruṣa*, *jīva*, shows that the dialect of speculation is common to the different systems, it is to be noted that the systems are distinguished by different significations assigned to those terms in the different schools. It frequently happens in the history of thought that the same terms and phrases are used by different

schools in senses which are essentially distinct. Each system sets forth its special doctrine by using, with necessary modifications, the current language of the highest religious speculation. In the systems, philosophy becomes self-conscious. The spiritual experiences recorded in the Vedas are subjected to a logical criticism. The question of the validity and means of knowledge forms an important chapter of each system. Each philosophical scheme has its own theory of knowledge, which is an integral part or a necessary consequence of its metaphysics. *Intuition, inference, and the Veda are accepted by the systems.* Reason is subordinated to intuition".

Further he says: "All the systems protest against the scepticism of the Buddhists and erect a standard of objective reality and truth as opposed to an eternal, unstable flux." Then again, "All the systems accept the view of the great world rhythm. Vast periods of creation, maintenance and dissolution follow each other in endless succession."........."Except the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, all the systems aim at the practical end of salvation. The systems mean by release (*mokṣa*) the recovery by the souls of its natural integrity from which sin and error drive it. All the systems have for their ideal complete mental poise and freedom from the

discords and uncertainties, sorrows and sufferings of life, 'a repose that ever is the same,' which no doubts disturb and no re-births break into."

Max Müller, in his *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy* writes: "The longer I have studied the various systems, the more have I become impressed with the truth of the view taken by Vijñānabhikṣu, and others that there is behind the variety of the six systems a common fund of what may be called national or popular philosophy, a large *mānasa* lake of philosophical thought and language far away in the distant north and in the distant past, from which each thinker was allowed to draw for his own purposes." (p. xvii).

Regarding the apparent contradiction which sometimes one feels while reading these six schools of philosophy, Dayānanda clarifies his position thus; he begins with a question and then gives the answer:—

> *Q.*—Even the *śāstras* written by *Ṛṣis* contain truth mixed with untruth and contradict one another like other books. Take for example the subject of 'creation'. Now all the six *śāstras* contradict one another on this subject. The Mīmāmsā for instance *karma* as the cause of the world; the Vaiśeṣika,

kāla or time; the Nyāya, *atoms*; the Yoga, *puruṣārtha*; the Sāmkhya, *prakṛti* and the Vedānta, *Brahman* Are their teachings not contradictory?

A.—Firstly, barring the Vedānta, and the Sāmkhya, these *śāstras* do not treat of the subject of Creation directly. It is indirectly mentioned. Secondly, there is no contradiction in their teachings. It only shows that you have no knowledge of *contrariety* and *conformity*.

Q.—Now tell me, pray, do you call it a contradiction when made on different subjects?

A.—When different statements are made on the same subject, here, too, the subject is the same, *viz.*, creation.

Q.—Is knowledge one thing or more than one?

A.—One.

Q.—If it be one, why then are there so many divisions of this knowledge, such as grammar, medicine, and astronomy?

A.—As in the case of one science, its different branches are treated of separately, so are the six branches of the "Science of Creation" treated of separately in six *śāstras*. You can never call it a contradiction, can you? Just as six different causes

> take part in the formation of a pot, *viz.*, *karma*, time, clay, *vichāra*, effort for *samyoga* and *viyoga*, the attributes of *Prakṛti*, and the potter; similarly six different causes of the world have been discussed by the six *śāstras.*,—thus *karma* by the Mīmāṁsā; time by the Vaiśeṣika; the exposition of *upādāna kāraṇa* or the material cause in the Nyāya; the *puruṣārtha* in the Yoga; the counting of the entities at different stages in the Sāṁkhya; the discussion of the efficient cause, Brahman, in the Vedānta. There is no contradiction in it. Or take for illustration, the medical science. Its six different branches, pathology, medicine and therapeutics, materia medica, hygiene and surgery are treated separately, but all of these aim at curing disease. Likewise six different causes have operated in the formation of this world. (*Satyārthaprakāśa, Chap. III.*)

Dayānanda, thereby, means that different schools have treated one and the same subject from different points of view according to their own domain. The complete solution has not been given by any individual. The synthesis of all of them would take one much nearer the truth.

DOES ŚANKARA REPRESENT THE ORIGINAL VEDĀNTA SCHOOL?

Though on matters of details, petty differences of opinions may always arise amongst all the great thinkers of even one and the same school, but before Śankara gave out his philosophy, there has not been so much of confusion of thought regarding some very fundamentals. Had Śankara developed his philosophy independently, and not adhered to Bādarāyaṇa, the matters would have been simpler. We are not going to discuss Śankara here for his doctrines. We shall simply find out whether he is a direct descendent in the Bādarāyaṇa's Vedāntic line or not. Thibaut has ably discussed this point in his introduction to the Vedānta Sūtras.

A. Gough, in his philosophy of the Upaniṣads, advocates the view that Śankara is the true expositor of the Vedāntic school, and that the Vedāntic doctrine of that school 'was handed down by an unbroken series of teachers intervening him and the Sūtrakāra and that there existed from the beginning only one Vedānta doctrine agreeing in all essential points with the doctrine known to us from Śankara's writings.' Gough substantiates his contentions in two ways: Firstly, he compares Śankara's teachings with the teachings of Upaniṣads, and secondly, he compares the purport of the

Sūtras—as far as that can be made out independently of the commentaries—with the interpretations given of them by Śankara.

Thibaut makes an interesting statement regarding the second point. By the time Gough published his above book, the English translation of Rāmānuja's *Śrī Bhāṣya* was not available to the European public. He says, "that as long as we have only Śankara's *Bhāṣya* before us we are naturally inclined to find in the *Sūtras*—which taken by themselves are for the greater part unintelligible—the meaning which Śankara ascribes to them; while a reference to other Bhāṣyas may not impossibly change our views at once". We have already stated that the commentary by Bodhāyana which was written much earlier did not find favour with Śankara, though it represented the Vedānic school more closely. Gough was unaware of Śrī Bhāṣya of Rāmānuja, otherwise he would have revised his views about the Upaniṣads as well as the *Sūtras* themselves.

During the time of Bādarāyaṇa himself, there were considerable differences of opinion. Bādarāyaṇa has quoted the following teachers of the Vedantic school, in his Vedānta Sūtras: *Ātreya*, *Āṣmarathya*, *Auḍulomi*, *Kārṣṇāgni*, *Kāṣakṛtsna*, *Jaimini*, and *Bādari*. In such fundamental matters

as the relation of souls to Brahman, these people have considerably differed. The more important would be the evidence from Śankara-Bhāṣya itself. Thibaut writes that "we there also meet with indications that the Vedāntins were divided among themselves on important points of dogma." He further says: "These indications are not indeed numerous. Śankara does not on the whole impress one as an author particularly anxious to strengthen his own case by appeals to ancient authorities, a peculiarity of his which later writers of hostile tendencies have not failed to remark and criticise. But yet more than once Śankara also refers to the opinion of 'another', *viz*., commentator of the *Sūtras* and in several places, Śankara's commentators explain that the 'other' meant is the *Vṛttikāra*," (as I have said, Bodhāyana S. P.)

Sometimes, in the Vedanta Sūtras it is difficult to find out which is *Uttarapakṣa* and which is *Pūrvapakṣa*, the author's view-point and the prevalent view-point. Śankara has sometimes expressed his disagreement with previous authors also in this respect. At one place (*Adhyāya* 4, *Pāda* 3, *Sūtras* 7-14), he says: "Some declare those *Sūtras*, which I look upon as setting forth the *Siddhānta* view, to state merely the *Pūrvapakṣa*." In conclusion, Thibaut

writes, "From what precedes, it follows that the Vedāntins of the school to which Śankara himself belonged acknowledge the existence of Vedāntic teaching of a type essentially different from their own." My contention is :—

(*i*) The Vedāntadarśana expounds simply the doctrine of the Veda.

(*ii*) During the time of Bādarāyaṇa himself, different views were prevalent regarding the relationship of souls and God. Bādarāyaṇa has made an attempt to discuss some of the views. With the interpreters, there has been much confusion in finding out *Pūrvapakṣa* and *Siddhāntapakṣa*.

(*iii*) Bodhāyana's commentary, which is the earliest one, approached Bādarāyaṇa's views more closely than any other.

(*iv*) During the time of Śankara, different interpretations were prevalent regarding the understanding of the *Sūtras*.

(*v*) Śankara has developed his doctrine of monism almost independently, not always consistent with the doctrine of Bādarāyaṇa. Śankara's greatness as a thinker is beyond

doubt and his originality unquestionable.

Rāmānuja in his *Vedārthasaṁgraha* has quoted a number of authorities regarding interpretations of the Vedānta doctrine: Bodhāyana, Ṭaṅka, Dramiḍa, Guhadeva, Kapardin and Bharuchi. Most of these did not agree with Śankara's interpretation of the Vedāntic doctrine.

As matter is so controversial, discussion over a number of these *Sutras* of Bādarāyaṇa cannot be given here, because that is only possible when the whole structure is built up in a new fashion, but this is beyond the scope of the present book. We shall give here only a few extracts which will indicate Dayānanda's view in this connection.

DAYĀNANDA ON THE VEDĀNTA SUTRAS

It is difficult to discuss any *sūtra* in details. Dayānanda has thrown light on a a few of them in a very brief way. We shall quote them here.

Question

The identity of Brahman is also seen from the *Śārīrika Sūtra* of Vyāsa. See:—

(*i*) सम्पद्याऽऽविर्भावः स्वेन शब्दात् ।

(*ii*) ब्राह्मेण जैमिनिरुपन्यासादिभ्यः ।

(*iii*) चिति तन्मात्रेण तदात्मकत्वादित्यौडुलोमिः ।

(*iv*) एवमप्युपन्यासात् पूर्वभावादविरोधं बादरायणः ।

(*v*) अतएव चानन्याधिपतिः । (IV, iv, 1, 5-7, 9)

The soul having gained its form manifests itself; it was formerly Brahman, because here the term '*sva*' stands for the original Brahman form. (i)

According to Jaimini, '*ayamātmā apahatapāpmā*' etc., *upanyāsa* denotes the various impositions (exalted qualities) on whose account Brahman becomes the *Jīva*. (ii)

According to Auḍulomi, with reference to certain passages of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, with the only characteristic *chit* (or thought), it resides in Brahman. (iii)

On account of these very exalted qualities (*upanyāsa*), Vyāsa expresses no disagreement with the former. (iv)

[Bādarāyaṇa declares himself in favour of a combination of both these views. (S. P.)]

The *Yogin* having obtained his Brahman form, with all the exalted qualities rests in salvation having nobody else as his master. He is the master of himself as well as of others. (v)

Answer

These *sūtras* do not mean this; the real interpretation will be the following:

So long as the soul, having obtained its original pure form, does not free itself from all the malices, upto that period, it neither

obtains the exalted qualities through *yoga*, nor with the contact of the within-residing Brahman, it can rest itself in *ānanda*. (*i*)

When the *Yogin* becomes devoid of malices and attains exalted qualities, then alone along with Brahman he can enjoy the bliss of salvation. This is what Jaimini thinks. (*ii*)

According to Auḍulomi, when the soul becomes free from the malices of ignorance, etc., it with its own *chit* form, attains the *tadātmakatva*, or the direct intimacy with Brahman. (*iii*)

According to Vyāsa, when during the life-time, the soul attains the exalted qualities as well as the true knowledge, it attains the life-salvation, and then having realised its original pure form, it feels happy. (*iv*)

When the *Yogin* develops true determination, then having realised Brahman, he enjoys the bliss of salvation. There he remains free without bondage. Just as in this world, there is someone at the head and others under him, such is not the case in salvation. There all the souls are equally free.

Dayānanda agrees so far, that by attaining salvation, the soul becomes free from all the malices, it gets its original pure form (*Nitya śuddha buddha mukta svabhāva*,) and it enjoys all the bliss by its *chit* form. The difference is that by "*sva*", Dayānanda

does not mean the Brahman form, but the original pure form of the soul itself and by *tadātmakatva*, he means direct *intimacy*, and not the direct *identity* with Brahman. When we speak of anybody as our *ātmīya*, we refer to our mutual intimacy but we never mean the identity. It may be the *similarity* but not the *sameness*.

Dayānanda further says, that if we do not interpret these *Sūtras* in this way, then how would we reconcile with the following ?

1. नेतरोऽनुपपत्तेः (I, i, 16)
2. भेदव्यपदेशाच्च (I, i, 17)
3. विशेषणभेदव्यपदेशाभ्यां च नेतरौ (I, ii, 22)
4. अस्मिन्नस्य च तद्योगं शास्ति (I, i, 19)
5. अन्तस्तद्धर्मोपदेशात् (I, i, 20)
6. भेदव्यपदेशाच्चान्यः (I, i, 21)
7. गुहां प्रविष्टावात्मनि हि तद्दर्शनात् (I, ii, 11)
8. अनुपपत्तेस्तु न शारीरः (I, ii, 3)
9. अन्तर्याम्यधिदैवादिषु तद्धर्मव्यपदेशात् (I, ii, 18)
10. शारीरश्चोऽभयेऽपि हि भेदेनैनमधीयते (I,ii,20)

(*i*) Nobody else other than Brahman is the creator of the world. The soul is limited, a little knowing, and with a little potency, the creation cannot be ascribed to it. Therefore, it cannot be Brahman.

(*ii*) Taittirīya Upaniṣad (II, 7) says: *Rasam hyevāyam labdhvānandī bhavati*. The soul and

Brahman are distinct, because their distinction has been expounded. Had it not been so, then how the soul becomes blissful having attained the blissful God. One is the object of realisation, and the other is the realising object. Therefore, the soul and the Brahman are not one.

Before proceeding further, we reproduce below what Śankara gives about these two aphorisms:

(*i*) (The Self consisting of bliss is the Highest Self), not the other (*i.e.*, the individual soul), on account of the impossibility (of the latter assumption).

"And for the following reason also the Self consisting of bliss is the Highest Self only, not the other, *i.e.*, the one which is other than the Lord, *i.e.*, the transmigrating individual soul. The personal soul cannot be denoted by the term 'the one consisting of bliss'. Why? On account of the *impossibility*. For Scripture says, with reference to the Self consisting of bliss, 'He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth. He brooded over himself. After he had thus brooded, he sent forth whatever there is'. Here the desire arising before origination of a body etc., the non-separation of the effects created from the creator, and the creation of all effects whatever, cannot possibly belong to any Self, different from the Highest Self.

Though the *Sûtra* very clearly aimed at the distinction between the lower soul and the Highest Brahman, Śankara in the end by the stretch of his argument quotes the Śruti which only allegorically in a poetic style deals with the creation. For the Highest Self, a source of all bliss, there is no wishing, no brooding over any problem, nor any necessity of becoming many from one. This is a worldly parent's wish, and then in that case too, when parents wish to become many from one, they do not emanate the coming soul from their own soul. The soul pre-exists; parents become instrumental in providing it with a body. So, here too God became many, not by emanating souls out of Himself, but rather He provided body to the already distinctly existing souls, and He provided them with the field of action. The *Śārīrika Sūtra* is very clear about it. (S.P.)

(ii) And on account of the declaration of the difference (of the two, *ānandamaya* cannot be the transmigrating soul).

"The Self consisting of bliss cannot be identical with the transmigrating soul for that reason also that in the section treating of the Self of bliss, the individual soul and the Self of bliss are distinctly represented as different; Taitt. Up. II, 7. 'It (*i. e.*, the Self consisting of bliss) is a flavour; for only after perceiving a flavour, can this (soul) perceive

bliss.' For he who perceives cannot be that which is perceived."

Upto this place, Śankara proceeds all right. But then, all this argument goes against his very doctrine. So further, he takes shelter under other Śrutis. He says:

"But it may be asked, if he who perceives or attains cannot be that which is perceived or attained, how about the following Śruti and Smṛti passages—'The Self is to be sought'; 'Nothing higher is known than the attainment of the Self?"

And Śankara begins propounding his doctrine of Absolute. He finally concludes: The Lord differs from the soul (the *vijñānātman*, which is embodied, acts, and enjoys, and *is the product of Nescience*) *in the same way as the real juggler* who stands on the ground differs from the illusive juggler, who, holding in his hand a shield and a sword, climbs upto the sky by means of a rope; or as the free unlimited ether differs from the ether of a jar, which is determined by its limiting adjunct, (*viz.*, the jar). With reference to this fictitious difference of the Highest Self and the individual Self, the two last *sutras* have been propounded.

Śankara is very fond of quoting jugglery. Probably in his times, people had real faith

in actualities of jugglery. Any way, it will be clear from these two instances, that though the Bādarāyaṇa Sūtras are very clear regarding the distinction between the individual soul and the blissful Brahman, Śankara somehow or other, with the stretch of his speculations, and bringing forth such Śrutis and Smṛtis which have no apparent connection, upholds his doctrine.

The other *sutras* have been thus interpreted by Dayānanda :

(*iii*) The Mundaka Upaniṣad says : (2, i, 2).

दिव्यो ह्यमूर्तः पुरुषः स बाह्याभ्यन्तरो ह्यजः । अप्राणो ह्यमनाः शुभ्रो ह्यक्षरात्परतः परः ॥

The attributes of Brahman are *divya*, pure, without form, all-pervading within and without, never born, not undergoing birth and death, devoid of breath, body and mind, and resplendent ; He is distinct from other eternals, *prakṛti* and the soul. In these Śrutis, Brahman has been described distinct from the soul or *prakṛti*, and therefore, all these are different.

Śankara writes almost the same thing regarding this *sūtra*. He says that "the source of all beings is the Highest Lord, not either of the two others, *viz.*, the *pradhāna* and the individual soul, on account of the following reason also. In the first place, the text distinguishes the source of all beings

from the embodied soul, as something of a different nature." Here he quotes the same Śruti from the Muṇḍaka, which has been given by Dayānanda. He says. "The distinctive attributes mentioned here, such as being of a heavenly nature, and so on, can in no way belong to the individual soul." So far, he is right, but then in his own natural style, he adds a phrase not at all consistent with the occasion: "which erroneously considers itself to be limited by name and form as represented by Nescience, and erroneously imputes their attributes to itself." By a little distortion like this, he changes the spirit of the *Brahma-Śūtra* completely.

(*iv*) In this all-pervading Brahman, there conjoins the soul and in soul, conjoins the Brahman; on this account Brahman is distinct from the soul, because the question of joining arises with two distinct objects only.

Śankara says: "And for the following reason, also the term, 'the Self consisting of bliss' cannot denote either the *pradhāna* or the individual soul. Scripture teaches that the individual soul when it has reached knowledge is joined, *i.e.*, identified with the Self of the bliss under discussion, *i.e.*, obtains final release. Compare the following passage (of the Taittirīya Up. II, 7): When he finds freedom from fear, and rests in that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined.

unsupported, then he has obtained the fearless. For if he makes but the smallest distinction in it there is fear for him."[1]

The *Sūtra* was propounding the distinction, whereas starting from the theme of distinction, Śankara arrives at quite contrary a conclusion. The bone of contention rests on the interpretaion of " *Antaram kurute* "—the one released should not feel any *antara* or distinction from God, otherwise, he will be plunged into fear again. If in that stage, he has already become one with God, where is the place of 'doing *antara*'—the very emphasis signifies that he has not become one. The question is only of not having fear Here it, therefore, means that in the stage of *mukti*, the individual soul, though distinct from God, should feel quite homely with Him. It should ungrudgingly or without any hesitation become one intimate with God. God will be his and he will be of God; God will be always *by him*, there will be no separation, indifference, or *antara* between the two, either of space or of time or of knowledge.

(*v*) Various attributes, as Brahman is *antaryāmī*, etc., are described of God. Brahman

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1. यदा ह्येवैष एतस्मिन्नदृश्येऽनात्म्येऽनिरुक्तेऽनिलयनेऽभयं प्रतिष्ठां विन्दते ॥ अथ सोऽभयं गतो भवति॥ यदा ह्येवैष एतस्मिन्नुदरमन्तरं कुरुते ॥ अथ तस्य भयं भवति ॥

is pervading even the soul, because the question of pervading and the pervaded arises only with the objects which are essentially different.

(*vi*) Just as Brahman is distinct from the soul ,similarly, He is different from senses, *antaḥkaraṇa*, the five elements (earth, etc.,) space, celestial bodies, and other *devatās* (including learned men).

(*vii*) The Kaṭha says: *Guhām praviṣṭau*, etc., (the two entered into the cave), and therefore, Brahman and the soul are different. A similar reference occurs at many places in the Upaniṣads.

The full text of the reference is: There are two in the world body, drinking *ṛta* as a result of their *sukṛti*, both entered into the inner core, dwelling on the highest summit. The Brahma-knowing persons say : *One is chhāyā or shade and the other is light.* Even those who perform the *Triṇāchiketa Pañchāgni*, say the same[1]." Śankara sees in this Śrutī the identity of the two described, while it very clearly expounds the relation of the two, the Highest and the individual souls. In the heart of man, both are seated side by side, the one pervading and the other

1. ऋतं पिबन्तौ सुकृतस्य लोके गुहां प्रविष्टौ परमे परार्धे ।
छायातपौ ब्रह्मविदो वदन्ति पञ्चाग्नयो ये च त्रिणाचिकेताः ॥
(I, iii, 1)

pervaded, one is the source of knowledge, the light and the other is under His protection or shelter—the *chhāyā*. The word *chhāyā* should be interpreted in the same way as in the Vedic text—*Yasyacchhāyāmṛtam*.

(*viii*) One who is in the body is '*śārira*'. Souls are provided with bodies. The soul in a body is not Brahmaṇ because the attributes, the function, and the nature of Brahmaṇ cannot be applied to the soul.

Śankara says that this *sūtra* expresses that "Brahman only possesses, in the manner explained the qualities of consisting of mind, and so on; not the embodied individual soul." We will probably have to differ with him in his concept of "*manomāyā*" or the relation of the Supreme with mind.

(*ix*) The Bṛhadāraṇyaka says: *Antaryāmī*, etc., (III, vii, 1). In all the celestial objects, the earth, the sun, etc., or mind and sense organs, etc., God is pervading as *Antaryāmīn* (within all). In all the Upaniṣads, the omnipresence and similar attributes are ascribed to God and God alone.

The full text is: O Kāpya, knowest thou that all-pervading (*antaryāmīn*), who rules over this world and the other world and all beings?"

The whole of this Brāhmaṇa of the Bṛhadārṇyaka deals with the omnipresence of

Brahmaṇ, but it does not deny the reality of the pervaded objects. First, it deals with the *ādhidaivat* (pertaining to *devas*, wind, earth, water, fire, *antarikṣa*, wind, sky, sun, directions, moon and stars, ether, darkness and light, 2-14), then with *ādhibhautika* (15) finally, *ādhyātmika* (16-22). The general trend in all the cases is as follows :

" He who dwelling in the wind is within the wind, whom the wind does not know, whose body is the wind, who within rules the wind, is that thy God the *Ātman*, the inner ruler, the immortal".

The question was: "Knowest thou the *thread* (*śūtra*) by which this world and the other world and all beings are *bound*?"[2] The significance lies in the word *thread* and how things are bound by it. Thread does not deny the existence of the objects bound by the thread. It simply acts as the unifying *link* between the entities already existing. And thus we see that the passage is more in conformity with Dayānanda's view rather than with Śankara's. "*ta ātma*" does not mean your ego, the individual soul in you ;

1. यो वायौ तिष्ठन्वायोरन्तरो यं वायुर्न वेद यस्य वायुः
   शरीरं यो वायुमन्तरो यमयत्येष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः ॥८॥
2. वेत्थ नु त्वं काप्य तत्सूत्रं येनायं च लोकः परश्च लोकः
   सर्वाणि च भूतानि संदृब्धानि भवन्ति ।

it means 'your that soul', about whom you have put the question, the one which is the *Sutra*. It means "your that God".

(*x*) The embodied soul is not Brahmaṇ, because in very essence, soul is distinct from Brahmaṇ.

INTERPRETATION OF THE UPANISADS

We have no space here to deal with a number of the Upaniṣadic texts which have so often been quoted in support of one or the other theory. Thibaut writes in this connection: "Meanwhile I only wish to remark concerning the former point that, even if we could show with certainty that all the Upaniṣads propound one and the same doctrine, there yet remains the undeniable fact of our being confronted by a considerable number of essentially different theories, all of which claim to be founded on the Upaniṣads".

Dayānanda has already stated that one should study the Upaniṣads before he begins the study of the Vedānta, since you find hardly a *sūtra* in the Vedānta Darśana which does not refer to the Upaniṣads. Śankara, Rāmānuja, Mādhava, and Dayānanda all the four regard the Vedānta to be consistent with the Upaniṣads and therefore, it very much depends on one's interpreting the Upaniṣads to follow this noted school of philosophy.

Dayānanda considers Upaniṣads amongst authoritative books, though *paratah pramāṇa*. To him the *svatah* or the absolute and independent authority is the Veda only which is the revealed knowledge. The Upaniṣads contain realised knowledge. The ten Upaniṣads, as well as the later one, the *Śvetāśvatara*, are quite consistent with the Vedas. When I say this, I am aware of the views put by a number of scholars, for example, Radhakrishnan writes, "Not being systematic philosophy, or the production of a single author, or even of the same age, they contain much that is inconsistent and unscientific". I agree with him so far as the form of presentation is concerned. But I find in all these eleven Upaniṣads, the ancient Vedic heritage preserved in the most beautiful language. Sometimes, the Brahmanic style is not much appealing, it is mystic and mysterious, and occasionally allegorical. But one finds charming poetry in it. Never in the world literature, the philosophic truths have been so impressively set up as in the Upaniṣads. "Notwithstanding the variety of authorship and the period of time covered by the composition of these *half-poetical* and *half-philosophical* treatises, there is unity of purpose, a vivid sense of spiritual realityin them all, which become clear and distinct as we descend the stream of time."

Here I would simply emphasise one fact. "The aim of Upaniṣads is not so much to reach philosophical truth as to bring peace and freedom to the anxious human spirit." They, at least, contain semi-poetry so far as their form of presentation is concerned. Therefore, some allowance should also be given to their mode of expressions when they speak with fervour, specially, while applying them to philosophy where reason predominates and not the intuition. When in the *yogic samādhi*, or in the high stage of ecstasy, or even in a deep thought, one visualises or realises a blissful source before him,—the goal of his search, the highest ambition of life,—he is filled with thrill. He submits himself to the greater He. He is so much overjoyed that he forgets himself. Wherever, he casts his glance, he finds nothing but his Lord. On such occasions, a poet always says that he has become one with God, or he would say that he sees nothing but one God. He feels as if the duality has disappeared. He is so much submerged in love of the other that he feels as if he has lost his identity. He might even say, that the two have now become one, as we are accustomed to say in human love also, the love of husband and wife, and perhaps with a little advanced ecstasy, he might say, that he is the God, because he feels himself completely merged

into God and his bliss.

There is no rarity of such expressions in the Upaniṣads which are in style at least half-poetical. It is mostly on these occasions that we find the philosophical interpreters becoming too much literary, sometimes catching hold of a particular word without entering into the spirit of it. A poetry cannot stand logical tests, and therefore, a caution is required while developing a philosophic theory on its basis. We have no space here to deal with all such occasions where Upaniṣadic expressions have not been taken in the right spirit by the monists. I shall simply point out a few of them, which have so often formed the bone of contention.

(*i*) Being only was in the beginning, one, without a second[1]. (Chh. Up. VI, ii, 1).

(*ii*) This Self is Brahmaṇ perceiving everything.[2] (Bṛ. Up. II, v, 19).

(*iii*) O Śvetaketu, that *Ātman* art thou.[3] (Chh. Up. VI, viii, 7).

(*iv*) He who knows Brahmaṇ becomes Brahmaṇ[4] (Mu. Up. III, ii, 9).

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1. सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् ।
2. अयमात्मा ब्रह्मसर्वानुभूरिति ।
3. स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो: ।
4. स यो ह वै तत्परमं ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति ।

(*v*) That Brahman knew its Self only, saying 'I am Brahman'. From it all this sprang.[1] (Bṛ. Up. I, iv, 10).

(*vi*) What sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who beholds that unity.[2] (Īśa, Up. 7).

(*vii*) This everything all is that Self.[3] (Bṛ. Up II, iv, 6).

(*viii*) But when the Self is only all this, how should he see another, how should he know another, how should he know the knower?[4] (Bṛ. Up. IV, v, 15).

(*ix*) If a man understands the Self, saying "I am HE", what could he wish or desire that he should pine after body ?[5] (Bṛ. Up. IV, iv, 12).

(*x*) And as the slough of a snake lies on an ant-hill, dread and cast away, thus lies this body; but that disembodied immortal spirit is

1. ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र आसीत् उदात्मानमेवो वेदहं ब्रह्मास्मीति तस्मात्तत् सर्वमभवत् ।
2. तत्र को मोहः कः शोक एकत्वमनुपश्यतः ।
3. इदꣳ सर्वं यदयमात्मा ।
4. सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन कं पश्येत्तत्केन कं जिघ्रेत् ॥
5. आत्मानं चेद्विजानीयादयमस्मीति पूरुषः । किमिच्छन्कस्य कामाय शरीरमनुसंज्वरेत् ॥

Brahmaṇ only, is only light.[1] (Bṛ. Up. IV, iv, 7).

These ten references, we have taken from Śankara's commentary of the first four very important *sūtras* of the Vedānta Darśana. There would be a few more passages like this.

Here I shall give comments over one or two such passages as given by Dayānanda. Regarding a passage in the Chhāndogya (VI, viii, 7) while discussing about '*tattvamasi*,'' he says : "That Supreme Spirit should be sought after. He is infinitely subject. He is the soul of the whole material world as well as of the human soul. The Self-same spirit is the great reality. He Himself is His own soul. O my dear. Śvetaketu. 'That omniscient Supreme Spirit is *within thee*.'[2] This interpretation alone is in harmony with the Upaniṣads. For instance, the great sage Yājñavalkya says to his wife in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 'O Maitreyi, the great God resides *within* the soul and is yet *distinct* from it. The ignorant soul does not know that the supreme

1. यद्यथाऽहि निर्ल्वयनी वल्मीके मृता प्रत्यस्ता शयी हैव-मेवेदꣳ शरीरꣳ शेतेऽथायमशरीरो मृतः प्राणो ब्रह्मैव तेज एव सोऽहम् ।
2. तदात्मकस्तदन्तर्यामि त्वमासि ।

spirit pervades it. The soul is a body unto Him. In other words, just as the soul resides in the body, so does God reside within the soul, and yet He is distinct from it. He witnesses the deeds, good or evil, of the soul and gives it what it deserves, and thereby, keeps it under control. Dost thou know, O Maitreyi, that the very same immortal, omniscient Being resides within *thy* soul.[1] '

In fact, without going to the spirit, no interpretation can be given to such passages as "I am Brahmaṇ" or "That art Thou."

PSEUDO-ATHEISM OF THE SĀMKHYA

We have seen in the preceding section, that the Bādarāyaṇa Sutras can be very well interpreted according to the doctrine of three eternals, a view which is also consistent with the teachings of the Veda. We shall now enter into another highly controversial subject, that is, the pseudo-atheism of the Sāmkhya. It is not that the western scholars have charged the Sāmkhya with atheism, we find that neo-vedāntins have been more anxious to derogate the Sāmkhya system for its dualistic philosophy. There have been

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1. य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मनोन्तरोयमात्मा न वेद यस्यात्मा शरीरम्। आत्मनोन्तरोयमयति स ह आत्मान्तर्यांम्यमृतः॥

a number of western scholars who find a parallelism between the Sāmkhya system and the Buddhist philosophy. Von Schröeder tries to prove the dependence of Buddha on Kapila's views by alleging three points in which both agree: the elimination of the notion of God, the assumption of a multitude of individual souls, and the conception of the absolute liberation of the soul from the bonds of the material world as the highest aim. (Garbe, *Aniruddha's Commentary on the Sāmkhya Sūtras.*) Radhakrishnan writes: " In its classical form, however, the Sāmkhya does not uphold theism. In its indifference to the supremacy of an absolute spirit, as well as in its doctrine of the relation of *avidyā* and the souls' entanglement in *samsāra*, the Sāmkhya reminds us of Buddhism". Vijñānabhiksu even remarks that 'Kapila's denial of *Iśvara* is a regulative principle, which he insisted on to induce men to withdraw themselves from the excessive contemplation of an eternal God, which would impede the rise of true discriminative knowledge. He also regards atheism as an unnecessarily extravagant claim (*praudhivāda*) to show that the system does not stand in need of a theistic hypothesis. He sometimes explains the atheism of the Sāmkhya as a concession to popular views, and suggests also very näively that it is

propounded with the set object of misleading evil men and preventing them from attaining true knowledge.

How do we know that the Sāmkhya is an atheist? The arguments are threefold: (*i*) There is definitely written in the Sāmkhya Sūtras: "Because the existence of an *Iśvara* cannot be proved[1] (I, 92); (*ii*) in the process of evolution, it gives no place to God; and (*iii*) it believes in the dualistic doctrine, that is, in the eternity of a number of souls and of *Prakṛti*, the primordial matter.

There is no validity in the second and third arguments. God is only the efficient or the first cause of creation. He does not involve Himself in the creation nor He enters into the process of evolution. The main thing which undergoes the *material change* is *prakṛti*, and *puruṣa* or the souls also come into bondage. So in fact, the process of evolution only involves changes in *prakṛti* and the incarnation of souls. It must be remembered that the Sāmkhya in its process of evolution does not deal, *i. e.*, neither maintains, nor contradicts, Brahmaṇ as the *nimitta kāraṇa* or the first cause of it.

1. ईश्वरासिद्धेः ।

The Sāmkhya denies Brahmaṇ to be the material cause of the world, which some of the pseudo-realistic *vedāntins*, the *vivartavādins* and *pariṇāmavādins*, believe in their own way. Wherever the Sāmkhya appears to be contradicting Brahmaṇ, it contradicts on this basis, for to the Śāmkhya, the non-changeable, the non-desirous Brahmaṇ cannot transform Himself into this cosmos. Regarding such aphorisms, Dayānanda says, "what the above aphorisms really mean is that the evidence of the *direct cognisance* is wanting not in order to prove the existence of God, but to prove him as the material cause of the universe."

Let us consider in this connection some of the Sāmkhya Sūtras of the fifth chapter.

(*i*) The fruit does not proceed from (the cause), guided by the Lord, since this results from the work.[1] (V, 2)

This *Sūtra* ascribes free will to the souls, who are themselves responsible for their work, and would attain fruit according to the work. God would not decide arbitrarily while according fruits to them. Aniruddha comments on this *Sūtra* as follows. If the Lord were an independent creator, he would create even without work. A Naiya-

1. न ईश्वराधिष्ठिते फलनिष्पत्तिः कर्मणा तत्सिद्धेः ।

yika would argue: But he creates with the co-operation of work (*i. e.*, with regard to merit and demerit). But a co-operative factor does not set aside the force of the chief cause. On this, Aniruddha replies: If it be so, then the independence of the Lord will be annihilated. Aniruddha further argues: (i) We know by experience that all activity is either egotistic or for the sake of others. Now the Lord has no egotistic aim. (ii) If it is for the sake of others, it is unfit to ascribe the painful creation to a benign Lord. (iii) No such activity exists which is exclusively for others, because even by service or the like, bestowed on others, one attains egotistic objects and is active for this reason.

Dayānanda's contention is, as is given in this *Sūtra*, that God does not *arbitrarily* preside over the fruits given to souls. Fruits are given according to *Karma*. "*Jīva* is independent in doing *Karma*? For fruits it depends on God but God also cannot give fruits independently of *Karma*." Thus one can see how Dayānanda has synthesised all the notions in his doctrine. Moreover, the arguments advanced by Aniruddha do not affect what Dayānanda maintains. If God gives fruit to souls in accordance with their actions, it does not charge God of dependence. God is still independent. We shall discuss

Dayānanda's idea of dependence and independence of God later on. Dayānanda also believes that God has no egotistic motive in the creation. He remains unattached, inspite of the creation. Whatever He acts, He acts "*svabhāvataḥ*" and not "*nimittataḥ*" or according to an avowed egotistic object. Dayānanda also does not believe that the world is full of such pains, for which the creator is responsible. This argument shows that the opponent has not at all followed the doctrine of *Karma* and of pleasure and pain, nor does he follow what benignness means. If there is pain in this world, God is still benign, for pain is directed to the benefit of the soul itself. And where there is pleasure in this world, it also aims at the betterment of the bound soul. In view of all this, one can agree with the Sāṃkhya that "God is not an arbitrator so far as the fruit of actions is concerned, for fruits are given in accordance with the *Karma*." This would be the rendering of the *Sūtra* in consistency with Dayānanda's philosophy.

The next few *Sūtras* of the Sāṃkhya can also be explained on this basis. The following things have been propounded in this connection. God is not the material cause of the world. Souls are free to do their action. God does not give them fruit arbitrarily. Fruits are reaped according to the

respective *karma* but this does not charge Brahman with dependence. In giving fruits to souls in accordance to their *karma*, God has no motive of His own to serve.

The third aphorism of this chapter[1] is:

Had Brahman acted arbitrarily, His *adhisṭhāna* (supremacy) would have been for His own benefit, as is always found (in the arbitration) of the people of the world.

The fourth continues:[2]

In that case God would have been just as a worldly king.

The fifth *Sūtra* says:[3]

(If arbitrariness means *adhisṭātṛtva*, His supremacy over the free will of souls) would be nominal. It simply means that the souls are allowed perfect freedom of action, and in this connection God has only nominal supremacy over them.

The reason is given in the following *Sūtra*:[4]

(The interference in the freedom of action) is not possible without attachment, because this is the constant cause (the arbitrariness or the interference with other's actions is

1. स्वोपकारादधिष्ठानं लोकवत् ।
2. लौकिकेश्वरवदितरथा ।
3. पारिभाषिको वा ।
4. न रागादृते तत्सिद्धिः प्रतिनियतकारणत्वात् ।

only possible, when there is some personal motive of the arbitrator, or of the one who interferes).

The last one [1] says:

In case of such an attachment, He could not be then called a *Nitya-mukta*, or the ever-free.

I would request my readers to see if such interpretation of the *Sūtras* does not clarify many statements made against the Sāmkhya.

In the very first *Sūtra*[2] of this chapter, the author avows that while dealing with *maṅgala-ācharaṇa* (the rightful conduct) he would remain in accordance with the Śruti, and how inconsistent it would have been if in the very next *Sūtra*, he goes against Śruti, by discarding God.

The Sāmkhya is not anti-vedic.—

Though people have brought upon Kapila the charge of being an atheist, nobody can say that he does not lay *full confidence in the Vedas.* Whether the Vedas have been revealed by God or not, this might be doubtful to them who take Kapila to be an atheist, but the Sāmkhya is very emphatic about this point that no man, whether liberated or unliberated would be competent regarding

1. तद्योगेऽपि न नित्यमुक्तः ।
2. मंगलाचरणं शिष्टाचारात्फलदर्शनाच्छ्रुतितश्चेति ।

the composition of the Vedas [1] (V. 47). They are not the work of any person, because of the non-existence of any person who could be their maker[2] (V. 46). The Sāmkhya regards these scriptures as "*Apauruṣeya*" (not composed by man). The *pauruṣeya* is one with regard to which the notion arises that it has been made, though he be not seen[3] (V. 50). Because the Vedas have been manifested by their own innate power, they are *svataḥ pramāṇa* [4] (V. 51) or their own authority.

With such a clear conception about the Vedas, which are not man-made and are independent final authority, it is difficult to believe that the Sāmkhya system propounds atheism. Kapila, however, does not admit the eternity of the Vedas, just as nobody believes in the eternity of the universe. Both of them have a beginning, and so they must have an end too.

Max Müller also speaks in this connection as follows: The Sāmkhya, whatever we may think of its Vedic character, never denies the authority of the Veda in so many words,

1. मुक्तामुक्तयोरयोग्यत्वात् ।
2. न पौरुषेयत्वं तत्कर्तुः पुरुषस्याभावात् ।
3. यस्मिन्नदृष्टेऽपिकृतबुद्धिरुपजायते तत्पौरुषेयम् ।
4. निजशक्त्यभिव्यक्तेः स्वतः प्रामाण्यम् ।

though it may express a less decided submission to it......It is important here to remember that the Sāmkhya not only declared for the authority of the Veda, but had never openly rejected it like Bṛhaspati or Buddha. It is quite another question whether it really carried out the spirit of the Veda, particularly, that of the Upaniṣads. That Śankara the great defender of Vedāntism should deny the correctness of the interpretation of the Veda, adopted by Kapila, proves after all no more than that a difference of opinion existed between the two, but it would show at the same time that Kapila, as well as Śankara, had tried to represent his philosophy as supported by passages from the Veda. (*The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, p. 232).

Now, we shall wind up our discussion about the Sāmkhya atheism after considering one *sūtra*, '*Iśvarāsiddheḥ*'. (I, 92) "because the existence of the Lord cannot be proved". Let us see the context of this *sūtra*. The 89th *sūtra* [1] defines *pratyakṣa* or the direct perception. "Perception is that cognition which results from the connection (*sambaddham*), and which is representative of their form". In this definition, the Nyāya's "*Indriyārtha sannikarṣotpannam*" (produced

1. यत् सम्बद्धं सत् तदाकारोल्लेखि विज्ञानं तत् प्रत्यक्षम् ।
(I, 89)

by the contact of the sense organs) words have been substituted by a brief word "*sambaddham*" and for the rest of the words" *avyabhichāri*, *avyapadeśyam* and *vyavasāyātmakam*" one word has been given "*tadākārollekhi*". The next two *sūtras* are "There is no fault, because the perception of the *yogins* is not an external one"[1] *i.e.*, this definition of *pratyakṣa* does not apply to *yogins**. But then he says, the definition may be equally applicable to the *yogic* realisation also, because "He who has attained supernatural power is in connection with things being in the state of the cause" [2] (91). It is evident that the context shows that the author is discussing the limitations of his definition of *pratyakṣa* or direct perception. Continuing he says, "*Iśvarāsiddheḥ*", which can only mean that if this definition of *pratyakṣa* be granted then "the God would remain unproved". The Sāmkhya's definition demands 'connection' and '*tadākārollekhatva*'. The God, certainly, cannot be perceived either by the direct connection of our organs of senses, nor, being "devoid of an *ākāra*", there can be any impression of "*tadākāra*". From the context, and even the *sūtras*

*The Sāmkhya does not, therefore, disbelieve in the yogic realisation.

1. योगिनामबाह्यप्रत्यक्षत्वान्न दोषः । (I, 90)
2. लीनवस्तुलब्धातिशयसम्बन्धाद्वाऽदोषः । (I, 91)

following, we do not find that the author was out for proving or disproving the existence of God. He was simply examining the definition of his *pratyakṣa*.

The Sāmkhya definitely mentions: "For he is omniscient and omnipotent", (III, 56) and then, "The existence of such a Lord is established" (III, 57). These *sūtras* clearly refer to God.

Now, we shall conclude our discussion by quoting a few passages from Yogī Rāmacharaka's "*The philosophy and Religions of India*"[1]: "The first conception of the nature of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* and the one which is favoured by the majority of western writers on the subject, is that which holds that Kapila's theories are atheistic and practically materialistic, in as much as he ignores the existence of a supreme power, *Brahman* or THAT, and postulates a dual eternal thing, one half of the dual being matter. This view interprets the teachings of Kapila to mean that there are two eternal things, the first of which is Matter and the second of which is Spirit, divided into countless atoms, both *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* being held as eternal, infinite and immortal, and both of which are

1. स हि सर्ववित् सर्वकर्त्ता । (III, 56)
2. ईश्वरेश्वरसिद्धिः सिद्धा । (III, 57)

self-existent and sustaining, requiring no supreme power as back-ground. *This conception is decidedly in error and the spirit of the philosophy has been lost to those who so hold.* The error regarding the discarding of the belief in or THAT Brahman, however, is easily explained. In the first place, there is nothing in the teachings of Kapila or of his early followers, in which *the existence of* THAT *is denied or condemned—there is simply a silence* regarding it, just as is the case in Buddhism, and the cause is the same in both cases. Both Kapila and Buddha accepted the centuries old doctrine of THAT, which no Hindu philosophy had questioned, and both then proceeded to account for the phenomenal universe. Had Kapila attempted to discard the universal conception of THAT, he would have set arguments against it, accompanied by illustrations, parables and analogous proofs, with which the Hindu philosophers always have been so well supplied and which they have used so freely. But Kapila does not mention the matter, but calmly proceeds to elaborate his system explaining the phenomena of the universe. To those who have penetrated beneath the surface of the Sāmkhya System, and who are familiar with the Hindu methods of thought and teachings, it readily will be seen that

there is nothing atheistic or materialistic in the conceptions of the Sāmkhya System". (p. 54, 1909)

THE SYNTHESIS OF JÑĀNA AND KARMA

Dayānanda does not belong either to the *jñāna-mārga*, the path of knowledge, or *karma-mārga* or the path of actions. He believes in the synthesis of the two, for which he refers to a triad of *mantras* of the Īśa Upaniṣad : "They enter the region of darkness, who follow the path of *avidyā* or *karma* ; and more than that they go into darkness who indulge in *vidyā* or knowledge. Quite different is the purpose of *karma* and quite different of knowledge. We have heard this from those who can speak with authority. He who realises the nature of *avidyā* or *karma* and *vidyā*, the knowledge *simultaneously*, conquers death by virtue of following the path of *karma* and then immortality by virtue of following the path of knowledge". These teachings are

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1. अन्धं तमः प्रविशन्ति येऽविद्यामुपासते ।
   ततो भूय इव ते तमो य उ विद्यायाꣳ रताः ॥
   अन्यदेवाहुर्विद्ययान्यदाहुरविद्यया ।
   इति शुश्रुम धीराणां ये नस्तद्विचचक्षिरे ॥
   विद्यां चाविद्यां च यस्तद्वेदोभयꣳ सह ।
   अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययाऽमृतमश्नुते ॥ (9-11)

so clear that they do not require any further comment. To Dayānanda the life is a complete whole. He prescribes on one hand the *yajñas*, right from *pañchamahāyajñas* to the *aśvamedha*, and simultaneously demands from everybody to follow the path of *yoga*, from *yama-niyama* to *samādhi*, and also to realise Brahman by intuitional and argumentative knowledge. Our relation with God is not one, and our shortcomings are also not in one direction and so, the path to attain the end of life is also diverse. The Pūrva-Mīmāmsā of Jaimini deals with the *karmakāṇḍa*. The first few *adhikaraṇas* of this system are philosophical for they deal with the criteria of approach, and discuss authority of the Veda, and our relationship with God. But the other subjects of the Mīmāmsā do not fall within the domain of my present book. Dayānanda considers this work to be authoritative but he has only occasionally referred to it. All that we can say is that Dayānanda stands for the harmony between the paths of *karma* and *jñāna*.

ATTITUDE TOWARDS RENUNCIATION

Renouncing the world or entering into the *sanyāsa āśrama* has not been much discussed by Brahmaṇic schools of philosophy. We hear of Yājñavalkya renouncing the world, and taking leave from his wives. The Yogadarśan also does not make it

complusory to adopt *yoga* and attain *samādhi* only after having renounced the world. The *āśrama dharma* falls into the category of *smārta dharma*. Dayānanda himself was a *sanyāsin*, and he demands from others also to be a *sanyāsin* in the later stages of life. A man can become *sanyāsin* just after any other *āśrama*. He says: "Let a man become *sanyāsin* on the day he feels himself free from all worldly desires and affections, no matter whether he is a *vānaprasthī*, a *gṛhasthī* or even a *brahmachārī*." But a Brāhmaṇa who is well-versed in knowledge and who possesses an exemplified character is only entitled to be a *sanyāsin*. *Sanyāsa* life means the leaving of three desires, *vitteṣaṇā*, the covetousness for wealth, *putreṣaṇā* or the desire for progeny and *lokeṣaṇā*, the crave for and hankering after fame. So far as the society is concerned, the *sanyāsa* life for some is always of utility.

SYNTHESIS OF PARMĀNUVĀDA AND PRAKṚTIVADA

Dayānanda adheres to both the Vaiśeṣika and the Sāmkhya doctrines. We shall take up this subject in details in some other chapter. The synthesis of the two systems is very well given in the following definition

of the *Sṛṣṭī*. [1]

"The condition of matter in which *satva, rajas* and *tamas* exist in the equiform is the uncreated imperishable *prakṛti*. The first combination of the highly subtle, indivisible, separately existing particles called *paramāṇus* derived from *prakṛti*,—it is called the beginning of *sāmyoga*. The various combinations of atoms in different proportions and ways give rise to various grades and condition, subtle and gross, of matter till it reaches the gross visible multiform stage called *sṛṣṭi* or the universe". To Dayānanda, the last and the final stage of sub-division of *kārya sṛṣṭi* is *paramāṇu*, just as Vaiśeṣika says. These *paramāṇus* are further indivisible within the *kārya* region, but then they "melt away" and get merged into the *kāraṇāvasthā*, the primordial state of matter, when all become the one unity again, the *prakṛti*, as considered by the Sāmkhya, devoid of all atomicity.

Thus in this chapter, we have made an attempt to show how Dayānanda has synthesised the various concepts which

1. नित्यायाः सत्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्थायाः प्रकृतेरुत्पन्नानां परमसूक्ष्माणां पृथक् पृथग्वर्त्तमानानां तत्वपरमाणूनां प्रथमः संयोगारम्भः संयोगविशेषादवस्थान्तरस्य स्थूलाकारप्राप्तिः सृष्टिरुच्यते ।।

began disunifying the Vedic philosophy. Dayānanda is a realist, materialist, spiritualist and in a way idealist too. He has presented to us the philosophy in a synthetic form not analytical, and he has always aimed at giving a comprehensive view.

Chapter IV

Epistemology of Dayānanda

A complete theory of knowledge will define its position in regard to three problems as has been remarked by Leslie J. Walker. "We have to analyse psychologically, the nature and function of those mental activities by which knowledge is acquired and to discuss the influence which they have upon one another. We have to enquire into the conditions of knowledge, to ask what precisely is to be understood by subject and object and how far knowledge is due to the activity of the one, how far to that of the other; and we have to examine the notions of validity, truth, objectivity and to determine the criterion by which we may decide when these notions are applicable to an act of cognition, and when they are not."[1] The epistemological value of the theory of knowledge consists in the objectivity and validity of cognitive acts and criteria by which we distinguish the true from false.

The whole problem before an epistemologist may be presented thus: "Psychologically knowledge may be regarded either as a

1. Theories of Knowledge, by Leslie J. Walker, 1911.

function of the intellect, or as a function of will; or else we may hold that while both intellect and will co-operate, their functions are distinct. Metaphysically, either the universe is one or many, the origin of knowledge either subjective or objective, the distinction of subject and object either relative or absolute. And epistemologically, truth is either theoretical or practical and depends for its acceptance either upon its power to satisfy our practical needs and our will, or it may be upon both. Again, our present knowledge is either a mere moment in the process of evolution, capable of indefinite modification in the future; or there are some truths which are axiomatic and self-evident and thus form a foundation upon which a system of validated truth may be built."

SCEPTICISM REFUTED

There are some who believe that "human reason lures us on by false hopes only to deceive us in the end". Such scepticism was repugnant to the mind of Kant which was synthetical, critical and religious. The six philosophers of the Brahmanical School were also not sceptic. When they started for the "*jijñāsā*" or enquiry into Brahman or Dharma, they were at least confident of one fact, that the *jijñāsā* or enquiry falls within the scope of knowledge and is probable, and an effort in this direction will not be futile. Pragmatism,

Absolutism as well as Scholastic Realism, all these three schools take it for granted that reason is valid. The theories of Descartes, Leibnitz and Spinoza were incompatible, and their incompatibility demanded explanation, but it did not justify sceptical doubt. Kant saw that scepticism contains its own refutation. The position of a philosopher is that we can know truth and though perhaps the whole truth might never be known, we have a right to seek after truth. Perhaps, these two problems are equally mysterious: (i) Can we know truth ? (ii) Can we know that we can know truth ? How shall a sceptic arrive even at this conclusion that "truth cannot be arrived at." If this conclusion is valid, it is a truth, probably to the sceptic *the* truth, and at least this one truth has been arrived at. But this is inconsistent with the very truth the sceptic started with. If to the problem, that "Can we know that we can know the truth ? " the answer is in affirmative, the same process can lead us to truth, and if the answer be in negative, one has a right to be sceptic about the "scepticism" itself. Thus we find that scepticism contains in it its own refutation.

BUDDHISM RESPONSIBLE FOR INDIAN SCEPTICISM

"Scepticism about the pre-conceptions of common sense and the first principles of

thought is what Śankara inherited from the Buddhist thinkers" writes Radhakrishnan. There are four schools of Buddhism, the Vaibhāṣika,, the Sautrāntika, the Yogāchāra and the Mādhyamika. Without entering into details, we shall refer to some of the epistemological notions of these schools. Dayānanda has discussed the fundamentals of these schools in the twelfth chapter of the Satyārthaprakāśa.

Vaibhāṣikas are natural dualists who maintain the independent existence of nature and mind. Epistemologically, their theory is a näive realism. By experience, they mean knowledge produced by direct contact with the object. The world is open to perception. According to them the perceived object is outside and not within. When one says, "This is a blue pot", the pot with the blue colour exists outside the mind. In this sense, the Vaibhāṣika believes in a realistic outlook. To speak of an inference absolutely independent of any object perceived is opposed to all common sense. Perceptions point to the existence of objects.

The Sautrāntika admits the extra-mental existence of the phenomenal world. According to him, the perception is only partial, though certainly outside. The rest of the object is simply inferred. No object is directly or

wholly perceived. We have mental presentations through which we infer the existence of external objects. But still, the objects exist outside our mind, because otherwise, there would not have been even partial perception and then no inference too in absence of perception. The Sautrāntika further argues that "consciousness by itself is everywhere alike and if it were all, the world must be one. We have, however, now blue, now red. These must be due to the differences in the objects themselves." But Sautrāntikas contend that these outer objects are only momentary though they appear to be permanent. This they account like this. The forms of the object penetrate one after the other into the understanding; the illusion of simultaneity is caused by the swiftness of the proceeding. Hamilton calls this school as of cosmothetic idealists, or we can say, hypothetic dualists. To a Sautrāntika, knowledge is based on four conditions: (*i*) *ālmabana* or data, (*ii*) *Samānāntara* or suggestion, (*iii*) *sahakāri* or medium and (*iv*) *adhipatirūpa* or dominant organ.

According to the Yogàchāra, the realisation of absolute truth is only possible through *yoga*. It gives subjective philosophy. According to one of this school, nothing exists outside, everything appears within the *Jñāna* of the ego. The existence of the

external world is either a fiction, or even if it exists, it cannot be known. As Radhakrishnan puts it, "We can never get behind the screen and know what causes the ideas. Our senses testify not, but that we have certain ideas. And if we draw conclusions from the testimony, which the premises will not support, we deceive ourselves." Matter is an idea and nothing more. In this respect, it resembles the doctrine of Berkeley. Yogāchāras deny the real existence of all except consciousness or *vijñāna*, their doctrine is known as *vijñānavāda*. But our knowledge may not be a true record of the truths of nature; however nobody can deny its existence. Unlike Sautrāntikas the views of Yogāchāras do not admit the dependence of consciousness on external objects, and therefore, their doctrine is called *Nirālambana-vāda*.

The Mādhyamikas represent the oldest Buddhists. Their philosophy adopts mean between extreme affirmation and extreme negation. A Mādhyamika says that objective relations are not discoverable, and therefore, no world exists. External objects as well as the internal states are both void or *śūnya*. We are in dreams even when we call ourselves awake. The void is in the beginning, and the void in the end. The object becomes void just after perception. It exists just for the moment when it is

being perceived. The world has no absolute reality, because it is evolving. Even a world, perfect and real, would have been meaningless, because in such a world, we could not have done anything. How could one have desired to ascend, if everything has its own self-existence, so argues Nāgārjuna. Something like Bradley, it can be said, that matter and soul, space and time, cause and substance, motion and rest, are all alike the baseless fabric of the vision which leave not a rack behind. Reality must at least be consistent. But *the categories through which we construct our reality or experience are unintelligible and self-contradictory.* Nāgārjuna maintains that no substance exists prior to attributes; for that would mean attributeless substance, but we know a thing when we know its attributes. Where then can the attributes exist? They seem to be neither in the substance-without-attributes, nor in themselves, and therefore, they can be nowhere. Similarly, substance cannot exist beyond attributes; at least, we can never experience so, and so substance is also not existing. We cannot even say that the attribute is the substance and the substance the attribute.

According to a Mādhyamika, knowledge is impossible of explanation. The seer, the seeable and the act of seeing, answering to

the passer, the passable and the act of passing are all unthinkable. If there is no vision, there is no colour, and when no colour, there is no vision. How can then vision or colour exist? The reality of experience is a relational one.

DAYĀNANDA'S CRITICISM TO THE BUDDHIST EPISTEMOLOGY

Dayānanda has expressed his disagreement with the Buddhist schools very briefly in the following way; It is a very characteristic epistemological argument: If everything is *śūnya* or void, the knower is also *śūnya* or void. When both are *śūnya*, then nothing has been known by nothing. The *śūnyatva* has also not been known. It does not stand established. If knower is not *śūnya*, then the object known is *śūnya*. But this knowing is also an object. And so one's knowing that all is *śūnya* is also *śūnya*. In that case also, the doctrine of void is not established. Therefore, the knower of *śūnya* and the *śūnya* itself become two distinct and real objects and thus again none of them is *śūnya*. This is what Dayānanda has to say epistemologically about the Mādhyamikas.

Now, the Yogāchāra believes in the existence of the object within mind and not without. If the object exists in mind, then this mental object must be possessing all the attributes ascribed to the so-called externa

object. Then can such an extensive and expansive mountain find place in a small heart? Where is such a space? In mind there can be a miniature projection, but the thing projected cannot have all the dimensions. Why does fire in mind not burn the heart, when mind resides in the heart? We actually find that the external fire burns heart all right if brought in contact with it. If the idea of sugar is in mind only, why can we not be satisfied without obtaining the actual sugar? In fact, the idea of sugar in mind simply corresponds with the sugar outside.

Dayānanda does not agree with Sautrāntikas in the fact that the *pratyakṣa* is only partial, while the most of it about an object is only inferred. If it be true, then with the similar epistemological argument it can be said, that the Sautrāntika and his arguments both are also not real because their *pratyakṣa* is also partial, and rest an inference, because now in turn, the "Sautrāntika and his argument" come in the category of an 'object.' Within that *eka-deśatva* or the partial sphere of a particular object, is *pratyakṣa* not full? For example, while the object was a pot, the perception consisted of only *rūpa* or form, while *ghaṭatva* or the potness was inferred. Now if we say, that let *rūpa* be the only object when *ghaṭa* or pot has been placed before

us. In this case, would the perception of *rūpa* would be *eka-deśi*, or partial or the whole? We have to say, that what-so-ever be the magnitude, the perception within the range perceived is full *pratyakṣa* and therefore, the Sautrāntika's argument becomes invalid. Dayānanda says that it is a wrong understanding of the *pratyakṣa*. When one says that he has perceived a pot, it does not mean that he has perceived the *eka-deśatva* of the pot. He does not perceive the parts; in the parts, and through the parts he really perceives the *avayavī*, the parts-holder. If one can see a part which itself is composed of infinitesimally small numberless parts, then the bigger *avayavī* of which it was only a part can also be perceived. An *avayava* or a component is also an *avayavī* or object, for in its turn, it can be reduced to a number of smaller *avayavas*. Thus when one sees a pot, he perceives the potness in it and not some portions only, of which the pot is made.

Dayānanda further says, that if the Vaibhāṣika on the other extreme, believes that the *pratyakṣa* of an object is exclusively without, he is also not correct, because *pratyakṣa* is only possible when the knower and the known are both present. Though the object of *pratyakṣa* is outside, the *Ātman* gets

the *correspondent knowledge* of it. But it does not mean that after perception, the object perceived and the knowledge concerning it both disappear. They are not momentary. Because, there is "*pratyabhijñā*" or the recollection, a feeling that "I at that time did it". The object once perceived again comes into memory, when some talk goes about it. It shows that the perception is not momentary. Dayānanda believes in the *principle of correspondence*. The perception is relative to both, the object and the subject. The object is really existing outside, and the subject inside. And the perception corresponds with both of them. The perception arises from the object when the knower acts upon it (the process of perceiving) and it rests in the knower.

We have seen in the contentions of various schools of Buddhism how scepticism gained ground with majority of thinkers. By attacking the very fundamental perception, they made an effort to drift the current of thought and enquiry into a region of chaos.

THE JAINAS' THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

The Jainas introduced a new terminology in the realm of Brahmanic philosophy. They admit knowledge of five kinds: (i) *Mati* or direct cognition through sense

organs, including memory, recognition, induction and deduction. (ii) *Śruti* or testimony, which is a knowledge derived through signs, symbols and words. (iii) *Avadhi* or the direct knowledge of things even distant apart in time or space. It may be called clairvoyance. (iv) *Manahparyāya*, or the telepathic knowledge, and (v) *Kevala* or the absolute perfect knowledge, which is independent of time, space or object. The object of knowledge is to discriminate good from evil. *Mati* and *Śruti* are regarded as *parokṣa* knowledge while the other three *pratyakṣa*. Thus we see the difference of terminology. *Jñāna* or the object of knowledge includes self and not-self. "As light reveals itself and other objects, even so does *jñāna* reveals itself and others. In knowing any object, the self knows itself simultaneously. If it did not know its own existence, none else could impart this knowledge to it" (Radhakrishnan). In self-consciousness, the subject of knowledge, the object of knowledge and knowledge itself are different aspects of a single concrete unity.

According to the Jainas, all knowledge is in the soul but it does not manifest itself so long as the disturbing media, as passions and emotions, are present.

Knowledge is of two forms, *pramāṇa* or knowledge of a thing as it is in itself, and

naya or knowledge of a thing in its relation. The doctrine of *nayas* or standpoints is a speciality of the Jain logic. A *naya* is a standpoint from which a statement is made, and what is true from one standpoint may not be true from another. Out of the seven *nayas*, four refer to objects or *artha* and three to words, and all these lead to fallacies, (*ābhāsas*) when taken in absolute or entire sense. The *nayas* are also distinguished into *dravyārthika* or from the point of view of substance and *paryāyārthika* or from the point of view of modification or condition. The former deal with the permanent nature and the latter with perishable aspects of things.

Almost all philosophical dissensions arise out of the jumbling up of these standpoints and it becomes difficult to arrive at the true and complete standpoint which is named by the Jainas as *Niśchaynaya*. In *syādvāda* or *saptabhangi*, we find an important application of these standpoints. Dayānanda has referred to this *syādvāda* in his Satyārtha-prakāśa, Chapter XII. We shall give its brief account here. It holds that there are seven different ways of speaking of a thing or its attributes, according to the particular point of view :

(*i*) *Syād asti* : a thing is from the point of view of its own material, attributes,

and environments. As the pot is. It exists as made of clay, at present placed in my room. Similarly, the soul is.

(*ii*) *Syād nāsti* : Is not : a thing is not from the point of other material, or different attributes and environments. As the clay pot is not of metal placed somewhere else at some other time. Similarly, is not soul, *i. e.*, material objects are not soul.

(*iii*) *Syād asti nāsti* : Is and is not : from the point of view of the same quaternary, relating to itself and another thing, it be said that a thing is and is not both. In one sense, the pot is (clay) and in the other sense, it is not (metal). Similarly, the soul is apparent when in body, and not apparent when not in body.

(*iv*) *Syād avaktavya* : Is unpredicable : The pot has unpredicable potness ; the soul is indescribable.

(*v*) *Syād asti avaktavya* : Is and is unpredicable : The thing exists but is indescribable. The pot has potness but it cannot be described or the soul exists but cannot be described.

(*vi*) *Syād nāsti avaktavya* : Is not and is unpredicable : The non-potness in

the pot is not and is not describable. The soul is not visible in the body and is not describable.

(*vii*) *Syād asti nāsti avaktavya* : is not and is unpredicable : This is the combination of (*v*) and (*vi*). The potness of the pot is, the non-potness in the pot is not, and the potness is not describable. The soul is, the soul is not visible, and the soul is not describable.

Dayānanda says that the complexity of the *syādvāda* is absolutely unnecessary, and could have been treated within *sādharmya*, similarity and *vaidharmya* or dissimilarity as treated by the Vaiśeṣika. The soul is non-existing in the matter and the matter is non-existing in the soul. The similarity (*sādharmya*) between soul and matter is in the fact that the both exist. The dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*) is that the soul is active whereas the matter is inert. Inertness is absent in the soul and activity absent in the matter. The whole of the *syādvāda* can easily be reduced to a simpler form like this.

EPISTEMOLOGY OF ŚANKARA

It is difficult to deal with the epistemology of Śankara in details here. It has been said that Śankara owes much to the Mādhyamika and Yogāchāra schools of the Buddhist

philosophy. We shall very briefly make an attempt to sketch out Śankara's theory of knowledge, based on his commentary of the Vedānta Sūtras. It may be said that the original author, Bādarāyaṇa, has given no clear indication to his theory of knowledge, and it now rests on the interpreters to develop the subject on their own lines.

Śankara begins with the self-evident notion that the subject whose sphere is the notion of ego is quite distinct from the object whose sphere of notion is non-ego, and it is wrong to super-impose the attributes of the subject on the attributes of the object. By super-imposition he means the apparent presentation of the attributes of one thing in another thing. This super-imposition is called Nescience or *avidyā*, and the ascertainment of the true nature of the self, apart from the self super-imposed is called knowledge or *vidyā*. Śankara, moreover, says that Brahman is not the object of knowledge. It is the subject. It is the knower and not an object to be known. Brahman is already known because it is the Self of everyone. Its existence does not lie within the sphere of enquiry. "If the existence of the Self, were not known, every one would think, 'I am not'. And this Self is Brahman. But if Brahman is generally known as the Self, there is no room for the enquiry into it." On this, Śankara says,

the room for enquiry is only so far as there is a conflict of opinions as to His nature. Śankara further says, that though Brahman being subject cannot be enquired, "there are many various opinions, basing part of them on sound arguments and scriptural texts, part of them on fallacious arguments and scriptural texts misunderstood......For this reason the first *sūtra* proposes, under the designation of an enquiry into Brahman, a disquisition of the Vedānta texts, to be carried on with the help of conformable arguments, and having for its aim, the highest beatitude".

Śankara further says, "Nor again can Brahman, though it is of the nature of an accomplished thing, be the object of perception and other means of knowledge. Śankara is against devout meditation, for he writes: "It is impossible that Brahman should stand in analogous relation to acts of devout meditation, for if the knowledge of absolute unity has once arisen there exists no longer anything to be desired or avoided, and thereby the conception of duality according to which we distinguish actions, agents and the like, is destroyed. Brahman can be known through scriptures, not because it is the object of knowledge, but because the "aim of the *śāstra* is to discard all distinctions fictitiously created by Nescience.

The *śāstra's* purport is not to represent Brahman definitely as this or that object, its purpose is rather to show that Brahman as the eternal subject is never an object, and thereby to remove the distinction of objects known, knowers, acts of knowledge, etc., which is fictitiously created by Nescience. (Thibaut's Translation)".

On the basis of the cogniser, the Vedantins distinguish between *jīva-sākṣī* and *īśvara-sākṣī*. *Jīva* is the ultimate consciousness particularised by the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) and the *jīva-sākṣi* is that same consciousness conditioned or limited by the *antaḥkaraṇa*. The *antaḥkaraṇa* enters into the constitution of the *jīva* while it remains outside screening the *jīva-sākṣī*. In the former case, it is an attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*), in the latter case, a limitation (*upādhi*). In the case of *īśvara* and *īśvara-sākṣī*, *māyā* takes the place of internal organ. The ultimate consciousness particularised by *māyā* is *īśvara*, and the same consciousness conditioned by *māyā* is *īśvara-sākṣī*. (Radhakrishnan)

In the empirical world, Śankara is different from what he is in the non-empirical real world. The one is the world of plurality, while the other of unity. Śankara also distinguishes the empirical world which is logically established from dreams and illusions. The tests of logical reality are the

fulfilment of the conditions of place, time, cause and non-contradiction. The objects of dream do not conform to these tests.

RĀMĀNUJA REFUTES ŚANKARA

In many details, Dayānanda agrees with Rāmānuja more than with Śankara. In his Śrī-Bhāṣya, while discussing the first *sūtra* of the Vedānta. Rāmānuja makes a critical survey of the views propounded by Śankara and his school. Rāmānuja while agreeing with Śankara that release consists only in the cessation of Nescience, and that this cessation results entirely from the knowledge of Brahman, questions thus "Is it merely the knowledge of the sense of sentences which originates from the sentences, or is it knowledge in the form of meditation (*upāsanā*) which has the knowlege just referred to as its antecedent? It cannot be the knowledge of the former kind for such knowledge springs from the mere apprehension of the sentence, apart from any special injunction, and moreover, we do not observe that the cessation of Nescience is affected by such knowledge merely." He further says, that "the knowledge which the Vedānta texts aim at inculcating is a knowledge other than the mere knowledge of the sense of sentences, and denoted by *dhyāna*, *upāsanā* and similar terms". He says that in all Upaniṣads, that knowledge which is enjoined as

the means of final release is Meditation.

Like Śankara, Rāmānuja also believes in perception, inference and scripture as valid sources of knowledge. Some persons appear to believe that perception reveals non-differenced substance only, because they think that the perceptional cognition takes place in one moment or is instantaneous, while the full cognition of an object, say jar, occupies different moments of time. But Rāmānuja asserts that there is no proof of a non-differenced substance. Those who maintain the doctrine of a substance devoid of all difference have no right to assert that this or that is a proof of such a substance, for all means of right knowledge have for their object things affected with difference. All states of consciousness have for their object something that is marked by some difference. Cognition essentially means the cognition of difference. The apprehension of an object implies the apprehension of the difference in addition to the quality of mere being. Even *śabda*, sound or speech possesses the power of denoting only such things as are affected with difference. A *śabda* or a sentence has no power to denote a thing devoid of all difference. Everybody would agree that *pratyakṣa* of the determinate type (*savikalpa*) has for its object a differenced substance, but according to Rāmānuja, the non-deter-

minate (*nirvikalpa*) perception has for its object only what is marked with difference. In this case, at least, some difference persists. After all, the apprehension by consciousness takes place by means of some distinction.

Rāmānuja does not believe in the *bhedābheda* view, that is, there is difference as well as non-difference at the same time.

Just as is the case with perception, so is the case with inference which according to Rāmānuja have for its object what is marked with difference. All instruments of knowledge will lead to those objects only which are differenced ones. Rāmānuja puts it emphatically, that "a person who maintains the existence of a thing devoid of difference on the ground of differences affecting that very thing simply contradicts himself without knowing what he does; he is in fact, no better than a man who asserts that his own mother never had any children."

Rāmānuja refutes those people who assert that perception causes the apprehension of pure Being only and therefore, cannot have difference for its object. He says that "even if perceptive cognition takes place within one moment, we apprehend within that moment the generic character which constitutes on the one hand the difference of the thing from others and on the other hand,

the peculiar character of the thing itself." Further, " And if through perception we did not apprehend difference—as marked by the generic character etc., constituting the structure or make of a thing—why should a man searching for a horse not be satisfied with finding a buffalo? "

The complexities of this nature have been discussed by Rāmānuja to establish himself against the Śānkarites who believe in the reality of the non-differenced Being only. For them, the Purity of Brahman means the non-differenced aspect of it.

Is plurality unreal? A Śankarite would argue: As the 'difference' does not persist, all difference presented in cognition—as of jars, pieces of cloth and the like, is unreal. And therefore, the plurality is unreal. On this, Rāmānuja says, " This view, we maintain, is altogether erroneous, springs in fact from the neglect of distinguishing between persistence and non-persistence on the one hand and the relation between that sublates and what is sublated on the other hand. " Regarding this, he says further, " When a thing that is perceived in connection with some place and time, non-existence is perceived in connection with some other place and time, there arises no contradiction; then how should the one cognition sublate the other?

or how can it be said that of a thing absent at one time and place, there is absence at other times and places also. In the case of snake-rope, there arises a cognition of non-existence in connection with the given place and time; hence there is contradiction, one judgment sublates the other and the sublated cognition comes to an end. But the circumstance of something which is seen at one time and in one place not persisting at another time and in another place is not observed to be invariably accompanied by falsehood, and hence mere non-persistence of this kind does not constitute a reason for unreality. To say on the other hand, that what is, is real because it persists, is to prove what is proved already, and requires no further proof."

We shall conclude Rāmānuja with a few more remarks. Besides perception, he believes in the validity of *smṛti* or remembrance and inference also. By means of *tarka* or indirect proof and the use of both positive and negative instances are eliminated the non-essentials and the general rule is established. He accepts the authority of the scripture also.

BASIS OF DAYĀNANDA'S EPISTEMOLOGY

Unlike the other great *āchāryas*, Dayānanda could not write a commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras. The most of his life-time

was spent up in the interpretations of the Vedas and in the dispelling of ignorance and superstition from minds of the Indian public. But he has given clear indication to his philosophic doctrines in his other books, and we shall have to work out his epistemology on the basis of these writings. He has never systematically discussed this subject at one place.

THE OBJECT AND SUBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE

Dayānanda does not believe, that so far as an ordinary perception is concerned, the object and subject of knowledge are one. A knowledge is obtained in two ways, one by "*bahiḥ prajñā*" or the external attachment through intellect and "*antaḥ-prajñā*" the internal attachment through intellect. The one is in the state of awakening and the other in the state of dreams. In the case of sound sleep which is devoid of both *prajñās*, the soul is without knowledge. But the case of a *yogic samādhi* is different. As the stage in *samādhi* progresses, the relation with *prajñā* is loosened. In the initial stage, the Yogi perceives with the help of ego modified with *prajñā* (*samprajñata samādhi*), while in the highest stage, the *prajñā* disappears altogether, and the Yogi perceives and realises through his own Ego without the aid of any *via media* by virtue of his own *chit*. This *chit* of the soul is not separate

from the soul. This *chit* is of the soul, and the soul is the *chit*. One is the attribute and the other substratum. Attribute and substratum are one whole, eternally the same. No substratum is without the attributes and no attribute exists outside the substratum.

This Ego or the Self is the subject of knowledge ; it is the knower. Even when it works through *prajñā*, or through sense organs, the knower is the Self. The other substances of the world perceived or conceived are objects. As the Higher Soul, Brahman, is also ever distinct from the lower soul, the Ego. He is not the subject, but the object of knowledge, as the Bṛhadāraṇyaka says "the Self verily is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought of and to be realised."[1] (IV, v, 6). But so far as the consciousness of itself is concerned, the Self is the subject and not the object. The Self in bondage is conscious by itself of its bondage screening its free pure nature; similarly, when it will be free, it will have the consciousness of its free nature. The self-consciousness for an *Ātman* which is *chit* does not involve knowledge. The knowledge does not mean the knowledge of *abheda* or non-difference. The subjective knowledge is the self-consciousness, implied in the word *chit*.

1. आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः ।

NOT SCEPTIC ABOUT TRUTH

Dayānanda has at so many places emphasised that the truth must be known and he also believes in the fact that the truth can be known. Those who are sceptic on this point raise the following difficulties: (*i*) The truth known will always be with respect to the knower and so it cannot be *the* truth. (*ii*) The means through which a truth is attained are defective, imperfect and illusive and so no truth can be realised. (*iii*) All the processes of cognition deal with objects, which are every moment changing, and therefore, no reality can be cognized. (*iv*) There is no reality existing and hence, the knowledge is futile. Everything that we see is relative,—relative to time and space, objects related to one another and related to the means of cognition.

The first objection relates to the one raised by Yogāchāra and Berkeley They would say that the mere fact of knowledge and thought proves that nothing is conceivable and therefore, nothing can exist unless it is the object of knowing and thinking mind. They lead one to dilemma with the common fallacy. When Berkeley wishes to clinch the question, he asks his opponent to try to imagine a single physical object existing outside the mind and then points out that in every act of imagining it, he is

thinking of it as perceived by himself and therefore, as relative to his own mind. The modern idealist, Signor Gentile would similarly say, "Reality is conceivable only in so far as the reality conceived is in relation to the activity which conceives it." Discussing arguments of this sort, A. C. Ewing of the University of Cambridge, in his famous book, *Idealism: A Critical Survey,* writes: "In discussing this type of argument, philosophers fall into two very sharp divided camps; to one their truth seems self-evident, to the other, they appear mere trivial verbal fallacies. We may certainly concede at least that their plausibility has been *very much increased by verbal fallacies*" A confusion has been made in the usages of the words, 'conceiving,' 'concept,' 'in the mind' etc. Ewing writes, for example, "The phrase 'in the mind' also has a double or rather a three-fold meaning. It may mean either (*i*) a part of our mental process, or (*ii*) dependent on the mind, or (*iii*) apprehended by the mind, and we cannot possibly agrue that because everything that we know is in 'our mind' in the third sense, at the time we know it, it is therefore 'in our mind' in either of the first two (and similarly with the phrase 'in consciousness'). The ambiguity, as has often been pointed out, is

rendered worse by an inadequate spatial metaphor." Ewing again says, "Further, the idealist case acquires a fictitious strength from the fact that the word object implies subject as its correlative. But it does not follow that whatever is the object of thought cannot exist without a thinking subject; it only follows that it cannot be *an object* without a thinking subject."

We make always a confusion like this. Without a thinking subject, a substance is certainly not an *object of thought*, but it is *an object for its own independent existence.* The two objects should not be confused. The verbal fallacy of the arguments will be clear, if we ask: If the truth known is not truth because it is with respect to the knower, will the opponent regard the truth to be the truth had *it not been known to the knower*, because only then it would have been independent of the knower? Even then, there would be no satisfaction. If all truths are known to all persons in all times, will it be called knowledge? Knowledge invariably implies the separate existences of a knower, the object known and the knowledge concerning it. The process of knowing does not deny the reality of the object known; it all the more establishes the reality of three things, the knower, the known and the knowledge. If anyone of the three be

absent, the question of knowledge disappears.

Now coming to the second point,—do we possess reliable means for the acquirement of the knowledge ? In this connection, Dayānanda's view is of a pragmatist, though his pragmatism be not exactly the same as of Mach, Karl Pearson or M. Poincare. But these people believe in the scientific enquiry of a thing, through all the processes of enquiry, experimental, deductive, etc. Mach distinguishes three stages in scientific procedure, the *experimental* stage in which we are in immediate contact with reality, *i.e.*, with sensation and merely tabulate the experimental results; the *deductive* stage, in which we substitute mental images for facts ; and the *formal* stage in which our terms consist of algebraic symbols and our aim is to construct by their means the most convenient and most uniform synopsis of results. It means, in short, relying on the modes and means consisting of scientific enquiry. Dayānanda believes that with the aid of organs of sense and the deductive faculties, one can reach the truth. To Dayānanda, the world is not a phantasm. The phenomena are real ,and through our organs of sense we can arrive at truths concerning them. Śankara might also believe similarly for the empirical world. But to Dayānanda, the question of knowledge always arises in the so-called

empirical world. Dayānanda does not believe in such an absolute world existing where there is one unity, the knower, the known and the knowledge having become one or having annihilated altogether. The question of knowledge is only concerned with the empirical world but this world has also its own reality, its own truth. No doubt the senses delude us but there are criteria on the basis of which we can know whether we are being deluded or not. Gautama has discussed these limitations in his *Nyāya*, and if applied within those limitations, the knowledge acquired would be reliable.

How do we conclude that at times senses are deluding? Nobody doubts that at times, there is delusion. But the delusion can only be discriminated at the back-ground of reality. Had under the normal conditions, the perceptions been not real, one would not have felt a delusion under abnormal conditions. Moreover, is the existence of a delusion, a delusion or a reality? If it is a delusion, then we have substantiated the reality. And if it be a reality, then why not a reality also a reality. When a diseased eye sees all yellow, is this seeing yellow a fact or not, a reality or not. It is real. Simply the error would be in concluding that the object seen is yellow *even when seen with a normal eye*. When we ascribe yellowness to an object by seeing

with a normal eye, we seem to mean that it must be perceived with a normal eye, with all its limitations, in the normal light and normal environments. Such expressions, as a yellow object, the sweet honey, the smelling flower, the sonorous note etc., all imply particular specifications, and to deny truth within these specifications, and to argue outside the sphere of these specifications would certainly lead to absurdities. Dayānanda believes that the very purport of our having been provided with the sense organs is to know truth. Certainly, they alone would not lead to truth, they must be aided with sound judgment. But they are not the agents to delude us on all occasions. It must be borne in mind, that a *perception* is always true, though the inference drawn out of it may be wrong. When one sees a rope in dark, it appears to him like a snake. But in this observation, half is, in fact, the perception and half the inference. The perception gave the idea of form. But the real object is not form *alone*. From form point of view, it would have been a rope, it would have been a snake too. The formal perception was not erroneous. The error was introduced in the hasty inference. To infer only on the basis of one perception is a mistake. But this does not speak against the perception itself. It rather supports validity of the perception all the

more—it demands a thorough perception and on the basis of it a non-hasty inference.

Is momentariness a criterion of unreality?

A *Kārikā* says,[1] that whatever was not in the beginning and would not exist in the end does not exist at all. It simply means what it cannot mean. If a thing does not exist at all in the present, how would one say that in the beginning it did not exist, and afterwards also, it will not exist. A thing which does not exist at all does not exist in all times and under all the conditions. This erroneous notion is due to the fact that one has not followed what *vikṛti* or transformation is. Nobody can deny the changeability which we are experiencing in the world. Had there been no change, there would have been no conception of time or space. The perception means the perception of change. But does this change point to the unreality? Is change itself real or unreal? If not real, does it exist or not? Certainly it cannot exist then. If it does not exist, where is the change? An argument like this contradicts the very thing that one aimed at to propound. Then what is the truth? To regard change as change is truth? The change is a reality, it has a *nimitta* or purpose behind it. We shall

1. आदावन्ते च यन्नास्ति वर्त्तमानेऽपि तत्तथा (Gauḍapādīya Kārikā, 31)

discuss this point while taking up the subject of causality.

The imperfectness of expressions at the root of fallacies :

Nobody perhaps feels the world to be unreal in the sense that it does not exist. If the word 'unreal' is synonymous with 'changeable' there will be no contest. Somebody call it unreal because, the real happiness cannot be derived out of it. To some, it is unreal because on the basis of arguments, they cannot catch hold of the real principle out of it and to some it is unreal, because their aim of life is to attain through the process of abstraction Brahman, the Source of Bliss. Thus we have seen that one and the same expression carries with it the plurality of meaning. Sometimes in poetry, sometimes in philosophy and sometimes in everyday life, we are used to express ourselves through a number of loose expressions. In pure philosophy, such expressions always create difficulty.

Too much of the analytic tendencies hinders the attainment of a synthetic truth.

A philosopher sometimes brings out an untoward confusion because he becomes too analytical. We have just seen while discussing Rāmānuja, that such arguments have been

advanced: nothing exists as nothing persists. Sometimes, we are anxious to know the whole, by the study of its parts, and in that attempt we lose the synthetic significance. Sometimes, we disbelieve in perception and inference both because we cannot draw a line of demarcation between the regions of the two. Our process of apprehending phenomena is not a simple one. It starts from perception, ends into the realisation and it again sprouts forth through the processes of memory, dreams, recollections, speculations etc. In such cases, the analysis is sure to lead to misapprehensions. The linguistic limitations to express all the sub-phenomena and stages bring forth another difficulty. And this is why, that though we live in the life as if it were real, and we move about with the consciousness of reality, yet we find it difficult to express ourselves in the logical categories and finally, arrive at conclusions quite contrary to our experiences. And as such, it is necessary to weigh out oneself in different ways before drawing any conclusion.

HOW CAN WE ARRIVE AT TRUTH?

Dayānanda says that the following five tests should be applied in determining truth:

(i) *The Veda and the nature of the God:*— All that conforms to the teachings of the Vedas, nature and attributes and characteristics of God

is right; the reverse is wrong.

(*ii*) *Laws of Nature*:—All that tallies with the laws of nature is true; the reverse untrue; *e. g.*, the statement that a child is born without the sexual union of parents, being opposed to the laws of nature is untrue.

(*iii*) *The practice and teachings of the Aptas*:—*Aptas* include pious, truthful, unprejudiced, honest and learned men.

(*iv*) *The purity and conviction of one's own soul*:—Whatever is good for you is good for others and so on.

(*v*) *Eight kinds of cognitions*:—(a) *Pratyakṣa* or the direct perception, (b) inference, (c) analogy, (d) testimony, (e) history, (f) deduction, (g) possibility, and (h) negation or non-existence.

Dayānanda does not mind if the eight evidences are reduced to four by including history under testimony, and negation, possibility and deduction under inference.

For the definitions of these terms, Dayānanda agrees with Gautama.

About *pratyakṣa* or the direct cognition or perception, he writes, that "it is the kind of knowledge which is the result of direct

contact of the five senses,—eyes, ears, nose, tongue and skin, with their objects giving rise to the sensations of form, sound, odour, taste and touch, of the mind with the senses and of the soul with mind."—In this definition, Dayānanda goes a step forward than the Nyāya Sūtra where the contact of the five senses (*indriya*) with the object (*artha*) was only referred to. But the perception does not end here. Through the senses, the contact is established in chain like system of the objects with the soul itself. Those who objected that object is not apprehended by perception alone,—it is more of inference,—will appreciate this definition of Dayānanda. The perception involves the activity of mind and soul also. Perhaps, when the Sāmkhya says, "*tat-sambaddham*" it embraces within itself all the contacts, not only of sense organs, but through them of mind and the soul also. Dayānanda further comments :

(*i*) But this knowledge must not be that of the relation of words with the thing signified as of the word 'water' with the substance called water. For example, you ask your servant to bring you some water, he brings water, puts it before you, and says : "Here is water, Sir". Now what you and your servant see is not the word

'water' but the object signified by it. So you have the *direct knowledge* of the object called water. But the knowledge of the relation of an object with its name comes under the evidence 'testimony'.

(*ii*) This knowledge must be differentiative and non-transient: For example, a person saw something at night and took it for a man, but when it was daylight, he found out his mistake and knew that it was merely a pillar. Such perception is also not the *pratyakṣa* evidence.

(*iii*) It should be free from all elements of doubt, and be certain in character. For example, you see a man from a distance, and say, "Is it Devadatta or Yajñadatta ?" So long as this doubt persists in you and you are not sure of the either, such evidence will not be called *pratyakṣa*.

Dayānanda deals with three kinds of inference, the *pūrvavat*, in which you reason from cause to effect, *śeṣavat* in which one reasons from effect to cause, and *sāmānytodṛṣṭa*, in which there is no causal relation, but some other kind of association existing.

Dayānanda also agrees with Kaṇāda of the Vaiśeṣika regarding six kinds of inferential knowledge :

(*i*) From cause to effect (*kāryam*); (*ii*) from effect proceeding to cause (*kāraṇa*); concurrent (*saṁyogi*) ; (*iv*) antithetic (*virodhī*) ; (*v*) inherent (*samavāyi*); and (*vi*) the two inherent in one (*ekārtha-samavāyi*).

Under testimony Dayānanda includes the testimony of the Veda and other reliable authorities. Analogy is the knowledge of a thing from its likeness to another. In our everyday experience, analogy is the most used evidence.

LIMITATIONS OF OUR KNOWLEDGE

It is a very appropriate question: Can we know all? According to Dayānanda's philosophy, the *jīva* or soul is finite and will ever remain finite, and therefore, obviously, it cannot be omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent like Brahman. A soul with limited capacity and within limited time cannot acquire what is unlimited. The Upaniṣad, rightly puts : what is that which having known the rest all becomes as if known? If the soul only realises one thing, that is, Brahman, it need not realise anything further, for having known Him, the rest all becomes as if known. But even having

realised Brahman, the soul does not become, *Sarvavit*, the all-knowing and '*Sarvakartā*' the all-doing. It does not become the creator of another universe; it does not take law in its hands so far as its relation with other souls, still in bondage, is concerned; it simply remains one with God in order to enjoy the bliss of immortality.

PURPOSE OF KNOWLEDGE

The purpose of knowledge, even of the material one is to attain *niḥśreyasa*, *amṛtatva*, *apavarga* or immortality. In Brahmanical philosophy, acquirement of knowledge without purpose is not prescribed. In Dayānanda's view, the right knowledge is one which leads to the right conduct of life. Knowledge must be transcribed into the dealings of life. As the Upaniṣad says, "The great *Ātman* is not obtained by *pravachana* or the philosophic discussions, nor by intellect or *medha* nor by hearing sermons The one whom the great *Ātman* thinks worthy of choice, to him, He reveals Himself[1] " (*Muṇḍaka*, III, ii, 3). The direct realisation of God is only through the practices of *yoga*, the indirect realisation is through knowledge and through right conduct. This whole universe is a manifestation of godliness, and if one studies the laws governing the

1. नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन लभ्यो न मेधया न बहुना श्रुतेन ।
यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यस्तस्यैष आत्मा विवृणुते तनुं स्वाम् ॥

phenomena, he is in a way studying the ways of God Himself. And this is why, the Vaiśeṣika regards the study of the six entities, *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma*, etc., leading to immortality (I, i, 4). But it must be remembered that according to Dayānanda, the ultimate aim of knowledge is not to become all-knowing, which is only an improbable probability. One should only aim at the purpose, and if one has realised God in all phenomena of the Universe, he has gained sufficiently to acquire the great bliss.

THE INTUITIONAL KNOWLEDGE

What do we mean by apprehension? When a certain thing is impressed upon us either by direct perception or by argumentation, we ultimately feel that we have apprehended it. We begin to feel that we already knew it but it was under the veil of something, and now through the process of perception or inference, the veil has been set aside. A child also apprehends. How could one make it know that two plus two is four? How could it realise or apprehend it? Is not apprehension always a correlation with intuition? Intuition is at the very root of apprehension.

Then besides the intuition for ordinary apprehension, man has the faculty of divine insight or mystic intuition by which he transcends the distinctions of intellect and

solves the riddles of reason. By this intuition, one scales the highest peak of thought and intuits the reality. To one gifted with intuitive realisation, "the unheard becomes heard, the unperceived becomes perceived and the unknown becomes known".

The intuition decides the conduct of life also. Dayānanda writes, "When *Atman* directs its mind or other sense organs to any object, or initiates some action, whether bad as theft etc., or good as generosity to others, at that moment, its desire, knowledge and other essentials are also directed to the desired object. At that very moment, there arise within the *Atman* the fear, the doubt, and the hesitation when undertaking a bad action, and fearlessness, doubtlessness, and the joyful imperativeness while undertaking a right action. This is not on the behalf of the lower soul, but it is on the behalf of the higher soul, the God. And, when after being purified, the soul engages itself in the meditation of God, it at that time, realises the both, itself and the God."

The intuition is the call of one's innermost Self. It transcends the reason of argument and is the best developed in them who live a life of chastity and purity, and who are prepared to hear the voice of consciousness and who do not overrule the intuitional commandments. Intuition is a

measure of judgment where other measures fail.

The fourth test which Dayānanda has pointed out for arriving at truth is "the purity and conviction of one's own soul"

FROM RELATIVE TO ABSOLUTE

The realisation of the Absolute is the ultimate goal of philosophy. There is no denying regarding the truth that mostly all knowledge is the knowledge of relations, and yet we make an effort to transcend the region of relativity to arrive at the Absolute. What is an Absolute? Can it be defined? Taylor says, "We may, in fact, conveniently define the Absolute as that structure of the world system which any and every internally consistent purpose must recognise as the condition of its own fulfilment. To deny the existence of an Absolute, thus defined, is in principle to reduce the world and life to a mere chaos". At another place he says, "Our Absolute can now be said to be a conscious life which embraces the totality of existence, all at once, and in a perfect systematic unity as the contents of experience." We shall not make an attempt to define Absolute here.

In an attempt to explain how relations between 'ideas' can be universal and yet real, the theory of 'apriorism' was adopted

which postulates that in knowledge, the object conforms to *a priori* mental forms, and therefore knowledge, though it pre-supposes experience, is not due wholly to experience. Kant divided knowledge into three kinds, empirical, *a priori* and 'pure' *a priori*. Knowledge for Kant was always human knowledge, and human-like, he could not altogether rid himself of a realistic attitude. He believed in *noumena*, in a real and independent *Ding-an-sich* (Things-in-themselves) which was outside the mind and so beyond the reach of human experience. It is from the *Ding-an-sich* that the material element is derived, but as it is on this element, *viz*, sensation, which conforms to the *a priori* structure of mind, things-in-themselves are left without, and hence are declared unknowable.

Kant upto the end appears to have remained a dualist, while next to him, Fichte at once abolished the *Ding-an-sich*, and so got rid of dualism, but in his theory, *nature* is inadequately accounted for, and his Absolute is never realised. He reduced nature to a mere moment in an eternal act of self-consciousness, to a limit imposed only in order to be transcended. It reduced the scientific theories and discoveries to mere illusions. This shortcoming of Fichtes's

theory was removed by Schelling but his Absolute remained a mere abstract. Hegel overcomes these defects by making the Absolute at once ground, organic unity and final end or term. As ground or idea, it is the source whence flow both self and non-self, intelligence and nature ; as organic unity, it is the life of the universe in which it progressively realises itself, and as final end or term, it is self-consciousness in which the Absolute idea recognises itself as one and thus overcomes its own differences.

We shall not enter here into the detailed discussions of various views put forward as "Absolutism". The neo-Vedāntins would consider an Absolute in the light of Fichte by reducing whole of the world to a chaos or illusion. But no theory of Absolutism would be perfect which does not reconcile itself to scientific theories and facts, and the methods, which a pragmatist may employ. Hegel is nearer the concept of an Absolute because he takes a comprehensive view. We find in the creation law, order and purpose, contrary to lawlessness, disorderliness or purposelessness. And so far, the world is real. The relativity does not deny reality. We always find, that within a number of phenomena, there exists a general principle, and again, a higher principle presides over a number of minor

principles. But the higher principle does not deny the minor ones. It simply embraces them all. Nor a general principle denies phenomena. If the phenomena are illusive, the underlying principles are equally illusive. If the relativity is unreal, the Absolute becomes meaningless. We are convinced of an Absolute because we believe in the real diversity.

The doctrine of Absolutism does not deny the reality of the relative world. The idea of an Absolute embraces the minor and major principles. It gives a coherence to the apparently incoherent world. The goal of knowledge is to transcend from ordinary phenomena to minor principles, from principles to laws, from laws to the fundamentals and ultimately, to the final law of laws, the Absolute. Had phenomena not been a truth, the minor principles would not have been true and so would have been our laws, fundamentals and the Absolute itself. The Veda says, "One who knows the thread (*sūtra*) of the thread, *i. e*, the law of the laws, he knows the Great Brahman". This is how the study of natural laws leads to the knowledge of Brahman.

To sum up, in the matters of theory of knowledge Dayānanda synthesises the essentials of various doctrines. Dayānanda

is not a sceptic. Dayānanda does not refute realism as of Aristotle and others which means systematisation and co-ordination of the diversities of the nature without attempting to explain them. Dayānanda believes in the real coherence of the objects perceived, and mind, the perceiver. In methods of acquirement of knowledge, Dayānanda is a pragmatist also because he thinks that the world is presided over by laws and principles, which can be studied by observations, by the processes of induction and deduction that is, by the so-called scientific methods. Dayānanda believes in the absolutism also so long as it does not stand against realism. It may transcend realism but not contradict it. To him, the Absolute means the all-embracing principle. It does not reduce the world to a chaos. The Absolute is the law of laws, and knowing the Absolute means knowing God or Brahman.

Chapter V

God or the Supreme Self

PROF. R. D. Ranade in his "*A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy*" writes, "If we look at the history of philosophic thought, we shall see that there are various ways in which the problem of ultimate reality has been approached. The three chief types of approach are the Cosmological, the Theological and the Psychological. Dr. Caird (in his '*Evolution of Religion*') has said, that, by the very constitution of man's mind, there have been only three ways of thinking open to man: 'He can look outward upon the world around him; he can look inward upon the Self within him, and he can look upward to God above him, to the being who unites the outward and the inward worlds, and who manifests himself in both.' According to him, the consciousness of objects is prior in time to self-consciousness, and the consciousness of both subject and object is prior to consciousness of God." The idea of God is universal, and probably, it is instinctive also. Man feels himself to be infinitesimal in the vast infinity around him. He also feels that he has not put himself into

the physical bondage voluntarily, nor from it can he be free of his own accord. He wonders at the universe around him. In it instead of finding a chaos, he finds an orderliness. As his knowledge advances, he begins feeling unity in diversity, and yet he finds, that this diversity is not accidental, it is determined, it is not purposeless, such a huge system is not a mere waste and he finds that as if everything is meant for him. Then he discovers his own helplessness, his own limitations, and he finds that he cannot be the master of all that he surveys. He ponders over his past, and he thinks about his future; he is not ready to believe that his present is all and all. He argues that as he is, he must have been in the past also, and for the same reason, he will be in the future too. But still his past is a mystery for him and he has no control over his future. He sees his dearests dying, and he is confident that he would also die, but in his idea of death, he does not feel his own complete annihilation. He aspires for a happy end and a better new life. Thus originates in him the idea of a supreme, the all-knowing, the all-powerful and the all-blissful.

THE GOD IS

The atheistic tendencies in this country started with Bṛhaspati, the founder of the

Chārvāka cult, also known as Lokāyata. Lokāyatikas believe that death means the end of all. So long as one lives, he should eat, drink and be merry. There is no world beyond this world and no life beyond this life. But the more vehement atheists were the Jainas, who believe in the eternity of creation, and according to whom the development of the world is rendered possible by "the doctrine of indefiniteness of being and interaction of substances". They say that there can be no destruction of things that do exist, nor can there be a creation of things out of nothing. If by all this, they simply mean the material cause ever persisting, Dayānanda would agree with them because he also does not believe in a creation out of nothing. But the Jainas go a step ahead, and say, that there is no God necessary for creation and destruction. They do not think it to be necessary to assume with other theists the existence of a first cause of the universe. They argue that everything that exists, if necessarily, has a maker, then that maker himself would stand in need of another maker, and so on, and thus we shall be landed in an infinite regress. The Jainas trace the origin of diversity to the five co-operating conditions: *kāla* or time, *svabhāva* or nature, *niyati* or necessity, *karma* or activity and *udyama* or desire

to be and act. But they believe in *arhats* who are highly evolved souls, omniscient and perfect. But these souls are not responsible for creation.

While commenting on the Jainism, Dayānanda has given an interesting dialogue between an atheist and a theist where he repudiates various atheistic contentions (*Satyārthaprakāśa*, Chap. XII): We shall give a few extracts from it.

God is the first cause.

Atheist: There is no first cause of the universe, it is self-born.

Theist: The Jainas are wrong at this point. We do not see any action in the world without a doer, and any effect without a cause. This is as if the Jainas could obtain the self-born wheat flour in the converted form of bread in the farm itself. Cotton is not found to be changing by itself to thread, cloth, coat, *dhoti*, turban and other dresses. If this does not happen, then how, without God as the first cause, this multiformed universe could have originated. If one still insists upon that the creation is self-manifested, he should show that these various dresses can also be self-made without a first cause. So long as it cannot be shown, no one would agree.

God and the world entanglement.

Atheist : When God is eternal, without beginning, the ever source of pleasure and all-knowing, why did He enter into the entanglement and trouble of the world?

Theist : God never enters into entanglement, nor is overpowered by pain, nor forsakes pleasure. Only he enters entanglement and falls in pain who is not omnipresent but is limited If the eternal, blissful and all-knowing God does not create the universe, then who else could create. Souls have no potency to create, and the inert matter cannot create by itself. And therefore, it is clear, that God is the only one who creates and who still remains in pleasure. Just as He makes the creation out of atoms, similarly, He has arranged that another sort of creation should go on with parents as the first cause.

Atheist : But if God is the first cause of the creation and gives the souls fruit of their actions, then God Himself would become entangled and suffer.

Theist : We always see that even a good impartial worldly Judge, who is a doer of many actions and who pronounces judgments over a number of cases is not entangled, nor becomes attached, then one who is omnipotent can much the less, rather never, fall

into entanglement. One who is all-knowing will ever remain unattached.

Atheist: Is God attached or unattached? If unattached, why has He entangled Himself in the world creation? And if attached, He cannot be potent enough to make this creation.

Theist: The question of being attached and unattached does not arise in the case of God, for, one who is all-pervading, can neither leave anything, nor become attached with something. There is nothing which is better than He, and there is nothing which He possesses not, and therefore, He cannot be attached. The question of attachment and detachment is applicable to the souls only and not to God.

There is only one God.

Atheist: God is not one. All those souls who have obtained salvation are Gods.

Theist: To say so is inappropriate. The one who was once in bondage and has now attained salvation would necessarily again come into bondage, because he is not ever-free by nature, just as your twenty-four Tīrthankaras were once in bondage and have now attained salvation and will again come into bondage. Moreover, when there are so many Gods, then as we find different people fighting over here, similarly, these

Gods must also be entering into conflicts.

God is omnipresent.

Atheist: God is not all-pervading. Had He been so, then everything would have been conscient or *chetana*; there would have been no distinctions as Brāhmaṇa, Kṣattriya, Vaiśya, etc., the distinctions of low, middle and high categories. For, when God is similarly pervading through all, there should have been no gradation.

Theist: The all-pervading and the pervaded do not become one. The pervaded remains limited whilst the all-pervading is unlimited. Just as space is everywhere, while the pervaded, the earth, pots, etc. are limited in space, and still the earth and space are not one, nor the pots and space one, similarly, if the all-pervading God is *chetana*, it does not mean that the pervaded objects would also become *chetana*. Nor the learned and not-learned, the pious and not-pious become one. These distinctions are based on their own merits, actions and conducts.

God is the giver of fruit of actions.

Atheist: Nothing depends on the will of God. Whatever happens, happens on account of *karma*.

Theist: If all happens on account of *karma*, then on whose account the *karma*

itself happens. If you say, that it happens on account of the souls etc., then on whose accounts, ears and other organs which are instrumental in doing *karma* happen? If you say, they are eternal or by nature, then for the same reason it is impossible to be relieved of them because they are eternal. And therefore, according to you, there would be no salvation. If you say that like *prāgabhāva*, they have no beginning but still have an end, then they would end by themselves without any efforts on your part. If God is not the giver of fruits, then no soul of its own accord would accept punishments, just as we find in the world, that thieves etc. do not enjoy punishment voluntarily,—it is the law which punishes them, and similarly, when enforced by God, souls reap fruits of their actions, good or bad. Without Him, there would be no standard of *karma*, and in all probability, the fruit of one's action may fall to the lot of some one else.

Is God a doer ?

Atheist: God is not a doer. Had He been a doer, He would have reaped fruits of His actions also. And therefore, we believe that those who have attained salvation are non-doers. Why don't you believe the same?

Theist: God is not a non-doer. He is active, when He is a *chetana*, or a conscient

being, why should He not be a doer. And when He is a doer, He cannot remain aloof from the action. Nobody can believe in the artificially made God as you do in the case of *Tīrthankaras*. Because the one who is a God by some *nimitta*, *i. e.*, who has become God *on some accounts*, cannot be eternal and it will be dependent. It was simply a soul before being God, and for certain reasons, it has become God. It will again become a soul, because, essentially, it is a soul. And therefore, in fact, it can never become God. God by nature is eternal and self-existing. It is the soul which does good or bad actions, and consequently, gets pleasure and pain. But not the God. Had God not been a doer, who else would have created this cosmos?

We shall give a few more questionaires from the seventh chapter of the *Satyārtha-prakāśa* regarding God :

The direct cognition of God :

Q. But there can be no evidence of direct cognition, with regard to God?

A. The *pratyakṣa* or direct cognition is thus defined in the Nyāya : "The knowledge which is the result of the direct contact of the five senses—optic, auditory, olfactory,

> gustatory, and tactile,—and of the mind with light, sound, smell, taste and touch, with feelings of pleasure and pain, truth and untruth is called direct cognition. But this knowledge must be free from error and doubt."

On reflection, it will be clear that these are only attributes that can be known through the senses and the mind, *not substances* to which those attributes relate. As for example, we are cognisant of a solid substance when it gives rise to the sensations of touch, smell etc., by coming in contact with our four senses, such as the tactile sense, and the senses with mind, and the latter with the soul; similarly, we are cognisant of the existence of God *by observing such qualities as design and intelligence* in this world.

Besides, instantly the soul directs the mind and the latter directs the senses to the pursuit of a certain object, either good—such as acts that promote public welfare—or bad such as theft, they all incline to the desired object, and at that very moment, feelings of fear, shame and distrust arise within, if the action be sinful; and those of fearlessness, courage and satisfaction or felicity, if it be good; *these feelings are*

prompted, not by the human soul, but by the Divine Spirit.

Lastly, when the soul, freed from all impurities, devotes itself to the contemplation and realization of God through *yoga*, it becomes cognisant of both—itself and the Divine Spirit. When we can be directly cognisant of the existence of God, how can there be any doubt about His existence by inference and other evidences, because the cause is inferred from its effects.

Dayānanda as a true *yogin* does, in fact, not require any arguing about the existence of God. Those, who by direct cognition expect to see God in form, with flesh and bones, will certainly be disappointed. I may add here that to establish a formal God is beyond the domain of philosophy; perhaps philosophers would not like to stoop down so low as to discuss whether God possesses a body or not, whether He can be incarnated or not, or whether He can be worshipped through idols or not. No philosopher thinks it worthwhile to entangle himself in such nonsenses. Unfortunately, in order to dispel ignorance from the Indian public, Dayānanda, as a great reformer, has to discuss these topics also. I would simply impress that like all other philosophers, Dayānanda also does not believe in a formal God.

Is God all-powerful ?

On this point, Dayānanda says : Yes, He is, but what you understand of the word "*sarva-śaktimān*" (the all-powerful) is not correct. It really means that *God does not require the least assistance from any person in all His works*, such as creation, sustenance and dissolution of the universe, and administration of justice. In other words, He does all His work *with his own infinite power.*

Generally, people think that by all-powerful is meant one who is capable of doing all improbabilities, or one who can break his own laws or one who can do anything arbitrarily. Regarding this, Dayānanda further says, on being asked whether God can do all whatever He likes : "What does He like ? If you say that He likes and can do all things, we ask, can God kill Himself ? or can He make one other God exactly like Himself ? or can He become ignorant, commit sins such as theft, adultery and the like ? or can He be unhappy ? Your answer can only be in the negative, as these things are opposed to the nature and attributes of God ; hence your contention that God can do all things, does not hold good. Our interpretation only, therefore, of the word "*all-powerful*" is true."

God is just and merciful both.

On being questioned how God can be just and merciful both, Dayānanda says "Justice and mercy differ only in name. The object served by justice is the same as accomplished by mercy. Now the object of inflicting punishment through justice is to prevent people from committing crimes and thereby, enable them to be freed from pain and misery. What is the object of mercy but to rid people of misery? Your definitions of justice and mercy are not correct (if you believe that justice consists in giving a person the just amount of pleasure and pain,—neither more nor less according to the nature of his deeds, while mercy consists in letting the offender go unpunished), because the infliction of just punishment in exact accordance with the amount of crime is called justice. If the offender be not punished, mercy will be destroyed, for suffering one such criminal, as a robber, to go unpunished amounts to giving pain to thousands of righteous and law-abiding people. What mercy can there be then, in allowing one man to go unpunished and making others suffer?"

Dayānanda says that justice and mercy are the same because the object of both of them is to rescue all from sin and consequent suffering. The mercy of God lies in His

being just. His justice is the greatest mercy. He is kind to us because He is just and merciful both.

God is nirguṇa and saguṇa both.

By *nirguṇa* Dayānanda means the absence of some attributes. While by *saguṇa* the possession of certain other attributes. In the following *mantra* of the Yajuḥ[1] (40,8) God is described as *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa* both. He is *saguṇa* for the following attributes;

> "That Supreme Being overspreads all. He is entirely spirit, all energy, all-powerful, pure, perfect, omniscient, inward controller of all, ruler of all, eternal and self-existent."

God is *nirguṇa* for the following attributes :

> "He is *never* embodied, is *never* born, is *never* liable to impression and organization, *never* commits a sin, is *never* subject to pain, grief and ignorance and the like."

To Dayānanda, *saguṇatva* does not mean attachment with primordial *prakṛti*, nor the bondage on account of ignorance (*avidyā*), nor screening with the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*).

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1. स पर्यगाच्छुक्रमकायमव्रणमस्नाविरꣳ शुद्धमपापविद्धम् । कविर्मनीषी परिभूः स्वयम्भूर्याथातथ्यतोऽर्थान् व्यदधाच्छाश्वतीभ्यः समाभ्यः ।

THE PRESENT ATHEISTIC TENDENCIES

In the last few pages, I have made an attempt to represent what Dayānanda thinks of God. To Dayānanda the existence of God is self-evident and from that he has written, it is clear that he believes in His existence for the following reasons:

(*i*) *The cosmological argument*: In the universe, we find design, order and purpose. Behind the cosmos, there must be a potent entity which can be regarded as responsible for the origin, sustenance and absorption, (see also *Taittirīya*,[1] III, 1).

(*ii*) The direct cognition as looking to the godliness in all the phenomena around oneself, in listening to the voice of conscience within and as direct realisation through *yoga*.

(*iii*) God as the giver of fruits of our actions, the cause of our birth and death cycles.

(*iv*) The natural crave for getting released from mortality, and expecting bliss from some divine source.

(*v*) God as the ethical ideal.

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1. यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते । येन जातानि जीवन्ति । यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति । तद्विजिज्ञासस्व । तद्ब्रह्मेति ॥

According to Dayānanda, wherever in a particular phenomenon, we find design, order and purpose, we must conclude that at the basis of it there are three causes :

(*i*) The first cause or *nimitta kāraṇa* or the intelligent cause who intelligently designs, initiates and completes the work, though he himself remains unchanged.

(*ii*) The material cause or *upādāna kāraṇa* which means the substance or substances undergoing design or transformation in the hands of the intelligent cause. *Upādāna kāraṇa* is capable of *being transformed*, but cannot transform by itself.

(*iii*) The minor cause or *sādhāraṇa kāraṇa* which indirectly helps the transformation of the *upādāna kāraṇa*; for example, the various implements and instruments, which by themselves do not change, the entities for whom the change is brought, the space, time etc.

According to the doctrine of plurality of Dayānanda, the first ultimate cause in the creation is God, the primordial *prakṛti* is the *upādāna kāraṇa* and the souls are the minor cause. There have always been two extremes of thoughts prevailing. On the one extreme, the followers of Śankara would probably

regard Brahman as the ultimate cause of the creation; Brahman alone is the first cause, the material cause and the minor cause; nothing else besides Him exists. There is another extreme of thoughts which believes that the whole creation has been evolved out of the material cause alone, neither Brahman exists nor the souls. It is very seldom that a philosopher belongs to the second category. The Jaina doctrine that the universe is uncreated and eternal cannot be substantiated by experience because we find that at every moment, there is some creation or annihilation going on. If by eternity in this case, they simply mean that the primordial matter remains the same, we have no objection, but we believe that by mere accidence, this creation cannot come into existence.

The scientific trend of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries gave an impetus to the materialistic doctrine. It was an age of philosophical dogmas, an age that had the courage of revolutionising the old views and thoughts. In France, owing to social, political and ecclesiastical oppression, an age of Enlightenment dawned. Voltáire (1694-1778) and Montesquieu (1685-1755) awakened a new spirit, not only in France but throughout the Europe. But Voltáire was a theist and he believed in God. He says, "All nature cries out to us that He exists". Descartes (1596

1650) had already pronounced that an animal is a complete machine, and he made an attempt to give a mechanical explanation of the organic world. This suggested the thought that man, too, is a machine, and that the soul is not a separate entity, but a function of the body. On the other hand, the successors of Locke as Condillac, Hartley and others attempted to reduce all mental processes to sensations and ascribe them to be merely the effects of brain. Leibnitz reduced matter to force and conceived it as analogous to spiritual activity. David Hartley (1704-1757) makes all mental processes depend on vibrations in the brain which follow mechanical laws, but he is not sure about the consciousness. Priestley appears to be accepting the materialistic solution of the mind-body problem. But the materialistic theory was elaborated into a comprehensive system of metaphysics by the German Baron d'Holbach (1789), where it was definitely mentioned that everything can be explained by matter and motion, as the effect of necessary laws. There is no soul; thought is the function of brain; the matter alone is immortal. The human will is strictly determined; there is no design in nature or outside of nature, no teleology and no God. A French Biologist Buffon (1749) accepted a modified form of materialism called

'hylozoism' in which the existence of molecules endowed with life is assumed.

Is creation simply a chance?

In this connection, Plato says: "The philosophers say that fire and water and earth and air all exist by nature and chance and none of them by art, and that the bodies which come next in order—the earth, sun, moon, and stars have been created by means of these absolute inanimate existences. The various elements are moved by chance and also by inherent forces according to certain affinities amongst them,—of hot with cold, dry with moist, soft with hard, and according to all the other accidental mixtures of opposites which have of necessity happened. After this fashion has been created the whole of heaven and all that is therein, as well as all animals and plants and all the seasons. These come from these elements, not by any action of mind or of any God, or from art, but by nature and chance only."

What is a *chance*? If we can know this much, we shall be able to know that the creation cannot be attributed to chance. Chance simply means simultaneity of two or more processes, separately and independently going on with some ascribed purpose. Each single process has a purpose and it is well defined. But when a number of such

processes cross at a point unconsciously of the movers, we call it a chance. But then, if creation be a chance from this standpoint, it will involve a number of divinities shaping our ends. These divinities will sometimes conflict, and by chance, unknowingly and unseemingly, they will bring out something unexpected. Another viewpoint of chance involves our limitations or ignorance. To some, the irregularities in the phases of a moon may be a matter of chance alone, but to the one more conversant, it is merely a well-ordered phenomenon. The eruption of a volcano. or sudden occurrence of an earthquake may be an undetermined phenomenon to those who still lack in the science of the earth, but to the higher divinity, it is also a well-organised and well-purposed act. In this connection, the following remarks of Flint will be valuable. "There can be no chance where there is law. Chance or accident is what occurs when two or more independent series of phenomena meet, without their meeting having been premeditated or proved. ......The word chance or accident can have no intelligible sense, unless, however, there, be such independent series of phenomena,— unless there be mental and material existences, mental and material laws. Chance cannot be conceived of, even by the atheist,

as the origin of existence."

Order in the creation :

That there is an order or system of nature, and that we live in a Universe and not a multiverse, is a well-nigh universal assumption or intuition. The present day science would have been nowhere, had there not been such a conviction underlying all attempts that this world is orderly in the strictest sense. Who would say that our world is a chaos? At least, science has not so far shown so. Fulton writes in his book, *Nature and God*, "It may also be observed that the advance of natural science but serves to reinforce the belief in the orderliness or systematic character of nature. As we pass through new gateways of knowledge we find the same 'sentinals of order' keeping watch and ward. The chemistry of the stars is the same as the chemistry of the Solar system: 'The same light throbs in their immemorial rays as in the sunbeam.' *Order would certainly appear to be nature's first law.* In fact, as V. F. Storr well insists, nature must be assumed to be an orderly system from the first. Chaos is unthinkable. 'To postulate chaos as the *fons et origo* of the order that exists is to use language which has no meaning'."

While rejecting the false symbolism of

divine personality, Huxley attaches what he calls residuum of meaning to the term God. He says, "We want a unitary term, because it is important to bring ourselves as units into some sort of relation with the universe as a unit, and because the existence of proper term facilitates thought and action. I, therefore, retain the term God to denote this very important concept, but deliberately reject the idea of personality in God. The purging of the concept of God of any inherent notion of personality is to me a further step in the evolution of the idea of God, comparable for instance, to the step from polytheism to monotheism". Huxley undoubtedly believes in one fundamental law pervading through the pluralities of laws. But he does not agree with the 'personal God' as presented in the Bible. We also do not ascribe that 'personality' to God which the Bible ascribes, and therefore, the Vedic concept of God does not require that purging which Huxley refers to.

Design in the universe:

Design is another name of order. Not only the one unitary law pervades the pluralities, but we are simply astonished to see the wonderful design or pattern all around us. Not only within the atom itself, nor only on the beautiful leaves and petals, nor only in our own physiological body, but in the whole of

the cosmos, we find a perfect sort of design. Flint says on this, "It is far more unreasonable to believe that the atoms or constituents of matter produced of themselves, without the action of a supreme mind, this wonderful universe, than that the letters of the English alphabet produced the plays of Shakespeare, without the slightest assistance from the human mind known by that famous name. These atoms might, perhaps now and then, at great distance and long intervals, produce, by a chance contact, some curious collection or compound; but, never could they produce order or organisation on an extensive scale or of a durable character, unless ordered, arranged and adjusted in ways which intelligence alone can be the ultimate explanation."

Are 'laws' cause of creation?

We generally say that the whole universe is run *by laws*. Laws themselves would account for the creation. Dayānanda says that law itself has no potentiality to bring about any action, just as the law of government itself does not catch hold of an offender. There is no doubt that we find laws all around us, but then, this does not eliminate the personality who rules through the laws. At this point, I may ask, whether they who maintain that law is all and all, and there is no ground to

believe in God, would have submitted to the belief in God, had they found lawlessness everywhere ? Perhaps, lawlessness would have gone more against the theistic conception than the existence of law.

What is a law ? It is simply an expression of a particular order in which a number of phenomena occur. It is a commonness amongst the diversity. It is not a doer, nor a cause. We must remember that the universe is not run by laws. The running of the universe implies that there is particular law and order. Law is simply a wider expression of individual phenomena. It does not *explain* the WHY of the phenomena, it simply *expresses* the HOW. The existence of laws does not go against the theistic conception, rather it strengthens it.

Purpose in the material and non-material universe.

We live in the midst of purpose. "When rooks take fresh water mussels to a great height and let them fall on the shingle beneath, so that they are broken ; when a mother weasel, accompanied by one of her offspring, about to be overtaken on the links, seizes the youngster in her mouth, dashes on ahead, and lays it in a sandy hole ; when beavers cut a canal right through a large island in a river ;...we say, with probable

accuracy, that the creature was actuated by a definite purpose." (J. A. Thomson, *The System of Animate Nature*, I, 335). In fact, wherever we find a design or order, we suspect that the one who has designed had some *purpose* or *motive* behind it. I am not using the word 'motive' in a narrow mean sense. What can be the purpose of this whole creation? Whether we are able to answer this great question or not, we all living creatures know that this universe serves, at least, our purpose fully well. We find that from our own narrow stand-point, the world is not without purpose.

What is purpose? According to the mechanical view, the whole is the product of the parts by their mutual interaction—that is the purpose of the parts of a machine, to let the machine work as a whole. The mechanic has given the purpose to the individual parts, and he has designed the machine accordingly. Where there is a design, there must be a purpose in the brain of the designer. Greek philosophy developed the concept of purpose from organic point of view. According to the organic doctrine, the whole is ideally prior to the parts,and constitutes the explanation of their mechanical actions and reactions. Professors Baldwin and Stout in their *Dictionary of*

Philosophy and Psychology, define purpose as a project which is adopted for execution but not yet executed. Or as it may be otherwise "it is a positive result as ideally represented or in some measure cognised before its achievement." If the universe is an achievement, why shall we fail to find in every throb of it some purpose underlying? We see the mechanical, organic as well as the teleological purpose in the creation. The very existence of design and order shows that the world is not a waste, nor an aimless phantasm but an outcome of a definite purpose.

Does man make God after himself?

This is so much true of the anthropological Gods. But the Vedic concept of God is just contrary to it. What man is, is not God. God is simply God. What He is may be difficult to say. When we know so little of so common things around us, we may never be able to say that we know God, and still God is known to us. We feel His existence, and the more we think about Him, the more we become confident of His being with us.

Chapter VI

The Ego

WHEN questioned about the essence of God and the soul, Dayānanda replied as follows: "In essence, they are both conscious entities (*chetana*). By nature, both are pure, immortal and virtuous, etc., but the creation of the universe, its sustenance and dissolution into elementary form and its control, the awarding of the fruits of their deeds—good or evil—to the souls are the benevolent actions of God; whilst the reproduction and rearing of children, the distribution of knowledge and arts etc., are acts of the soul which may be virtuous or sinful. Eternal knowledge, eternal bliss and omnipotence etc., are the attributes of God whilst those of the soul are:

(*i*) *Desire* for the acquisition of things.
(*ii*) *Repulsion* or aversion from pain etc.
(*iii*) Activity or *effort*.
(*iv*) Pleasure.
(*v*) Pain.
(*vi*) Knowledge, or consciousness.

"These six are according to the Nyāya[1].

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1. इच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखज्ञानान्यात्मनो लिङ्गमिति ॥ (1, i, 10)
2. प्राणापाननिमेषोन्मेषमनोगतीन्द्रियान्तरविकाराः सुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नाश्चात्मनो लिङ्गानि ॥ (III, ii, 4)

The Vaiśeṣika has added a few more as inspiration and expiration, nictitation (the winkling of the eye), organic growth, discernment, memory and individuality, movement, the regulation of the senses, internal changes and disorders, such as hunger and thirst, joy or sorrow.

"These attributes distinguish the soul from God. The existence of the soul is known only by these attributes, because otherwise, it is neither material nor perceptible by the senses. These attributes manifest themselves only so long as the soul is present in the body, but cease to do as soon as the soul leaves it." (*Satyārthaprakāśa*, Chapter VII).

Dayānanda regards the souls in different bodies to be distinct entities. He writes: "Had there been only one soul, pervading them all, the wakeful state, slumber, deep sleep, birth and death, union and disunion (with the body and the senses) could never have taken place; the nature of the soul is, therefore, finite, and so is its knowledge; it is also subtle (*sūkṣma*), whilst God is still more subtle, infinite, omnipresent and omniscient by nature. Hence God and the soul stand in relation of the *pervader to the pervaded*".

On this, an objection was raised that 'one thing cannot contain another thing at one

and the same time *i.e.*, two things cannot co-exist; therefore, God and the soul can only be in the relation of close union but not in that of the pervader and the pervaded. But Dayānanda replies: "This law holds good in the case of things of the same condition but not in that of different conditions. Just as iron is gross while electricity is subtle, the latter pervades the former and resides in the same space with it, similarly, the human soul is less subtle than God whilst the latter more subtle than the former, and therefore, it is that God pervades the human soul while the latter is pervaded by the former".

Dayānanda further writes, "Just as God and the soul stand to each other in the relation of the *pervading and the pervaded*, so do they stand in the relations of (i) one who is served and servitor, (ii) the supporter and the supported, (iii) the master and the servant, (iv) the ruler and the ruled, and (v) the father and the son.

RĀMĀNUJA'S CONCEPT OF PRAKARA OF ISVARA

Like Dayānanda, Rāmāmuja was also a dualist, so far as he believed in the separate entities of numberless souls. Dayānanda says that God is pervading while the soul is pervaded, but Rāmānuja establishes the following relationships between God and the soul

Prakāra as the logical ego is related as:

(i) *Cause and Effect*.—The *jīva* is the effect of *Īśvara* in the sense that a term connoting the Highest Self in the effected state is exhibited in co-ordination with another connecting the same in the causal sense.

(ii) *Substance and Qualities*.—Rāmānuja distinguishes between *dharmin*, substance and *dharma bhūta jñāna*, attribute, inseparably associated with but yet absolutely distinct from it. God is the *dharmin* and the soul, the *dharma bhūta jñāna*.

(iii) *Whole and Part*.—The soul does not admit of spatial division on account of its spirituality, and *Brahman* is not a quantitative infinite, nor is the soul a reflection of nescience like the image of the sun in water. Rāmānuja defines a part as the particular region (*deśa*) of a whole and identifies the part with the attribute. The *prakāra* when regarded as the *amśa* of *Īśvara*, it is not a geometrical point vanishing in space nor is it an element in a pantheistic Absolute. The finite itself is *aṇu* or atomic like the point of a goad.

Prakāra as the ethical ego is related as:—

(*i*) *Śeṣa* and *Śeṣin* : *Jīva* is dependent on God and therefore, it is called *Śeśa* and the God is then known as the *Śeṣin*.

(*ii*) *Svāmin* and *Dāsa* : The devotee realises his absolute serviceability to God (*ananyārha śeṣatva*). The highest freedom of man consists in his absolute surrender to God.

Prakāra as a śarīra of Īśvara.

Rāmānuja concludes that God is the material as well as the operative cause of creation. In ordinary experience, no doubt, the two do not go together. By knowing clay, we also know the pot, as the cause is contained and continued in the effect. But, by knowing the potter, the operative cause, we may not know the pot. Clay cannot direct the potter nor can the potter evolve himself into clay. *But Brahman can be both at the same time.* By virtue of His being the source and support (*ādhāratva*), God Himself evolves into the cosmic manifold and by virtue of His rulership (*niyantṛtva*), He enters into His creation as its ruler and directs its process without being stained by its evil. (cf. *Śrī Bhāṣya*, I, iv, 23).

On this synthesis, Rāmānuja regards the relation between the *Jīva* and Brahman as body and soul (*śarīra-śarīrībhāva*). On this, P. N. Srinivaschari in his "*Rāmānuja's Idea of Finite Self*" writes: "The cosmos throbs with the pulse of Puruṣottama and is sustained and controlled by Him. Owing to the indwelling of the infinite, the individual draws substantiality and sustenance from it. The universe is not only pregnant with God; it lives, moves and has its being in Him. It is of the nature of body of God, the true of the true; and God becomes the life of our life."

According to Dayānanda's conception of the *jīva*, the many of the modes or *prakāras* discussed by Rāmānuja cannot be accepted. It is no doubt that God and the souls exist simultaneously and yet distinctly from the time of eternity, but it does not necessitate that the relation between the two should be of cause and effect, or attribute and substance. We are not contending here whether cause resides in the effect and *vice versa* or not. But *jīva* cannot be the effect of Brahman, because in that case Brahman would be *vikārī* or changeable. Howsoever the effect may be originally present in the cause, the cause always precedes the effect and in that case, the exact simultaneity of the two cannot be established. To say that Brahman is

material cause as well as the operator or the first cause is unwarranted by experience. When in the ordinary experience, the two do not go together, where is the evidence that such a thing would happen exceptionally in the case of Brahman ? And then why all these assumptions ? The theory of *Prakāras* is something new of Rāmānuja himself. Perhaps the word '*prakāra*' had not been used in Upaniṣads and other Vedic texts in this sense ever before. Rāmānuja believes in duality, and so far we agree with him, but then in an attempt to reconcile with the much favoured monistic doctrine, he tries to explain away the case in a round about way. The crux of contention between Dayānanda and Rāmānuja lies only in the fact that on no accounts, Dayānanda agrees to ascribe *upādānatva* or the material causality to Brahman. Brahman is eternally always the same. He suffers no change. Being perfect by Himself, He cannot improve further ; being perfect again, He cannot deteriorate. He being unit Himself, cannot undergo transformation. Nothing else is so potent that can transform Him.

The *jīva* cannot be an attribute of God. We do not follow in what way, it can be called an attribute. Is it not simply on the basis, that 'substance and attribute' provide an illustration of two entities which are

simultaneous and yet distinctive ? But, certainly from other considerations, the relation between the substance and the attributes does not coincide with the relation between the soul and God. The free nature of the soul, the whole doctrine of the cycles of birth and death, pain and pleasure, and the consciousness within, show that the soul is not a mere attribute of God.

Another relation between God and the soul is of the *śarīrī* and *śarīra*. If it simply means that God pervades by His super-subtlety the soul itself, we have no objection, but to regard God to be entangled in form of the soul in the same way as soul gets entangled in the body is something to which we cannot submit. What has made an absolute unchangeable God to be embodied like the soul ? Was it of His own accord or under an external pressure ? And then where is the wrong, if we believe, the soul and God to be eternally distinct not as attribute and substance, nor as cause or effect but really distinct as entities ? These are some of the questions which the pan-synthetic or pan-organismal monism (as Kuppaswāmi Śāstri wants to call it) or the so-called qualified monism of Rāmānuja does not answer to the satisfaction. It is all due to the fact that the material causality as well as the first causality have both been simultaneously applied to Brahman, for

which there was no reason to do so. We shall discuss this point later on.

EVIDENCE FOR EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL

Śankara who regards the lower and Higher *Ātman* as the same, has said a very nice thing while discussing the first *sūtra* of the Vedānta. He says that the Brahman is the subject of knowledge and not the object. He writes, "Moreover, the existence of Brahman is known on the ground of its being the self of every one. For every one is conscious of the existence of (his) self, and never thinks 'I am not'. If the existence of the self were not known, everybody would think, 'I am not'." We agree with Śankara in this so far as the ego is concerned, though we believe that the ego is distinct from Brahman. When Descartes said, *cogito ergo sum*, *i. e.*, I think and therefore I am, he also meant the same thing. The existence of self requires no proof and no arguing. But rightly, Śankara says that "there is a conflict of opinions as to its special nature." The different conceptions regarding nature of the self have been summarised by Śankara as follows:—

(i) The mere body endowed with the quality of intelligence is the soul.

(ii) Organs endowed with intelligence are the self.

(iii) The internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) is the self.

(iv) The self is a mere momentary idea.

(v) The self is the void.

(vi) The self is a transmigrating being different from the body ; and which is the agent and enjoyer (of the fruits of actions).

(vii) The self is only enjoying (*bhoktā*) and not acting (*kartā*).

(viii) In addition to individual souls, there is an all-knowing powerful Lord.

(ix) The Lord is the self of the enjoyer (*bhoktā*) (*i. e.*, of the individual soul whose individual existence is apparent only, being the product of Nescience).

Śankara believes in the last aspect. Lokāyitikas believe in the first. Dayānanda believes in the sixth and the eighth combined, *i. e.*, the self is a transmigrating being different from the body and which is *kartā* and *bhoktā* both. In addition to the individual souls, there is an all-knowing powerful Lord.

The psychological evidence: There are three distinctive ways in which a man is related to his objects. The first is the *cognitive* attitude when he perceives, believes, or apprehends any thing. The second is the *affective*

attitude, that is, he is either pleased or displeased by what he apprehends. The third is the *conative* attitude where he is also active about his objects. Now what is it at the back of these attitudes? Had the attitude been merely cognitive, we would have compared the cognitive agent with a photographic plate which merely records certain impressions. But the cognitive attitude itself is a complex process. What we call "apprehension" cannot be a mere physical phenomenon as of throwing a picture on the screen. It takes one deeper into the search of cognitive agent. But the affective and conative attitudes take us more steps ahead. Firstly, there must be one *single* agent which at times, cognates, then is pleased or displeased and finally conates. Then, there is another feeling which Professor William James puts as follows:

"Whatever I may be thinking of, I am always at the same time more or less aware of *myself*, of my *personal existence*. At the same time it is I who am aware; so that the total self of me being as it were duplex, partly known and as partly knower, partly object and partly subject, must have two aspects discriminated in it of which for shortness we may call one *me* and the other *I*."

While discussing epistemology, I pointed out that the self-cognition does not make the self as an object of knowledge. It is implied in the *chit* of the self that it is conscious of itself. A knower is always self-conscious. This consciousness is part and portion of it. It does not come from outside. The idea of *me* and *I* are essentially the same. This consciousness of *me* and *I* which is present with every living being is the greatest evidence of one's own exsitence.

Let us analyse this consciousness of *I* and *me* a little more. As much as we are conscious of our existence, we are equally conscious of one thing more, that is of that we are something apart from the physical body. We use the terms, *my* hand, *my* heart and *my* brain with exactly the same feeling as my book or my house. This consciousness of *my* is universal. *My* remains unchanged whether the body changes or not. There is another feeling that this *I* within the system persists from birth to the end. So it cannot be the function of the physical changes. Even when one says that he has grown old, there is a feeling in him that though he himself is the same, his body has been merely shattered. He simply expresses his helplessness so far as the use of the body is concerned.

Gautama's conception of the soul.

The Nyāya has given a few good evidences of existence of the soul. As Dayānanda's conception of souls is in perfect consistency with that of Gautama, we shall quote these evidences at length. We have already said, that according to the Nyāya, the soul is a real substantive being, having for its qualities desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and cognition. In the third chapter of the Nyāya, the following evidences have been given which show that the soul is quite distinct from the body.

(*i*) The same object is cognized by seeing and touching both[1] (and therefore, the soul is distinct.) Had there been no soul apart from the sense organs, how could the impressions of different senses be synthesised. There should be a common presiding deity over all the organs of senses to co-ordinate the perceptions.

(*ii*) There is no sin in burning the body after death.[2] Had the body been the real person, it would have been a crime to burn the body. Everybody knows that death means

1. दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामेकार्थग्रहणात् । (III, i, 1)
2. शरीरदाहे पातकाभावात् । (III, i, 4)

separation of the reality from the body.

(*iii*) The object perceived by the right eye is equally recognised by the left eye too, and *vice versa*.[1] How could the other eye have knowledge of the object perceived by the left eye alone, unless there is some body beyond senses which correlates the perceptions.

(*iv*) The perception having been obtained by one organ produces sensations in the other,[2] just as *having seen* lemon with eyes mouth got filled with saliva, or tongue got excited. This shows that seeing is not confined to the eye. The sensation has been conveyed through some other being to the tongue.

(*v*) If you say that all these facts can be accounted if we accept the existence of mind, we shall have no objection because then the difference will be of the name only.[3] What we mean is that there must be some entity which cognizes and uses

1. सव्यदृष्टस्येतरेण प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् । (III, i, 7)
2. इन्द्रियान्तरविकारात् । (III, i, 12)
3. ज्ञातुर्ज्ञानसाधनोपपत्तेः संज्ञाभेदमात्रम् । (III, i, 17)

these sense organs as instruments. This must be a knowing entity.

Gautama has given a number of evidences to prove eternity of the soul. We shall take up these in the chapter on eschatology. Kapila has also advanced similar arguments in order to establish existence of the soul. He says, that the soul is existent because there is no reason for its non-being[1] (VI, 1). It is distinct from the body and from the other material things on account of variety of birth[2] (VI, 2). It is also distinct on account of the use of the genitive case[3] as *my* body etc. (VI, 3).

Consciousness not the property of body.

We have just shown that the senses are not the self. Now on basis of the Sāmkhya Sūtras, we shall see how consciousness cannot be the property of body. "If it were a property of the body, it would exist in the various parts of the body and its material constituents.[4] (III, 20). If the latter were also conscious, then we have to regard the individual consciousness as the combination

1. अस्त्यात्मा नास्तित्वसाधनाभावात् ।
2. देहादिव्यतिरिक्तोऽसौ वैचित्र्यात् ।
3. षष्ठीव्यपदेशादपि ।
4. न सांसिद्धिकं चैतन्यं प्रत्येकादृष्टेः ।

of several consciousnesses produced by the different constituents. If body has consciousness, then all matter must have it, since it is of the same nature as body." There will be no defunction (*prapañcha*) or death if apart from body, there is no other intellectual being.[1] (III, 21). If you say that the intellect is like intoxicating power, it cannot be so. An intoxicant is only intoxicating when we clearly find that it is intoxicating in all the ingredients which give rise to it.[2] (III, 22).

The further evidences given by the Sāmkhya to establish the existence of the soul or *puruṣa* are:—

(i) The aggregate of things must exist for the sake of another[3] (I, 66. cf. also *Yoga*,[4] IV, 24). There must be some body for whom this body is meant.

(ii) The soul is distinct from the body[5] (I, 139), because the combined is for the sake of some other[6] (I, 140)

1. प्रपञ्चमरणाद्यभावश्च ।
2. मदशक्तिवच्चेत् प्रत्येकपरिदृष्टे सांहत्ये तदुद्भवः ।
3. संहतपरार्थत्वात्पुरुषस्य ।
4. तदसंख्येयवासनाभिश्चित्रमपि परार्थं संहत्यकारित्वात् ।
5. शरीरादिव्यतिरिक्तः पुमान् ।
6. संहतपरार्थत्वात् ।

and because all knowable objects have the three *guṇas* and they pre-suppose a self who is their seer devoid of the *guṇas*[1] (I, 141).

(iii) There must be a presiding power, a pure conscience which co-ordinates all experiences [2] (I, 142).

(iv) Because it is experiencer or enjoyer [3] (I, 143). Since *prakṛti* is non-intelligent, there must be someone to experience or enjoy the products of *prakṛti*.

(v) Because the efforts are for the sake of liberation.[4] (I, 144). There is a striving for *Kaivalya* which implies the existence of a *puruṣa* with qualities opposed to those of *prakṛti*.

(vi) Who else would be the witness of profound sleep, dream etc., if the soul does not exist[5] (I, 148)?

1. त्रिगुणादि विपर्य्ययात् ।
2. अधिष्ठानाच्चेति ।
3. भोक्तृभावात् ।
4. कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ।
5. सुषुप्त्याद्यसाक्षित्वम् ।

The Sāmkhya further says that the plurality of souls follows from the diversity of the birth etc.[1] (I, 149).

ARTIFICIAL ATTEMPTS FOR THE SYNTHESIS OF LIFE

In this connection, I shall quote from H. G. Wells. He writes, "We have to answer the question whether under the existing conditions, living things may not still be able to arise from lifelss material ?

" Right down to the middle of the last century, it was thought even by many biologists, that living creatures could so arise 'spontaneously'. It was believed in not as a miracle, a rare and occasional wonder of nature, but as a fact of everyday experience.

"The swarm of busy maggots that appears whenever anything is left to decay was supposed to be directly generated from the putrefying material. In antiquity it was believed that frogs and reptiles could be generated out of mud and slime. Virgil in the Georgics gives a recipe for producing bees from the carcass of an ox.......

"It was not until the seventeenth century that Redi exploded the belief that blowflies and their maggots are produced by decaying meat itself. He marked the blowfly at its

1. जन्मादिव्यवस्थातः पुरुषबहुत्वम् ।

work. When he prevented the flies from having access to the meat by covering it with gauze, no maggots were generated. It was a simple, clear-cut experience, and yet no one had previously displayed the intelligent scepticism needed to attempt it.

"By the seventeenth century, the discovery of the microscope had opened up a new world of living creatures, whose life-histories were hard to trace out owing to their complicated life-cycles, to their minuteness, and their liability to be blown from place to place in a condition of nearly suspended life. These creatures had an air of turning up out of nothingness. Thus they were supposed to be 'spontaneously generated'.

"In the middle of the nineteenth century, the genius of Pasteur, with a combination of rigorous experiment and patient perseverance, *finally clinched* the matter and proved that *all visible living things*, at any rate in the conditions which now obtain in nature, *arise only from others of the same sort.* We can say now with an entirely reasonable confidence that *all life which exists to-day has sprung direct from pre-existing life.*" (*The Science of Life*).

Can life be synthesised out of dead matter? A pure materialist will answer in affirmative, but it is his mere conviction; experiments

have not yet demonstrated the fact. Since the discovery of bacteriophages, or bacterium-consumers as they are called, some people have been led to believe that a connecting link between the living and dead material has been obtained. These ultramicroscopic units are able to grow and multiply so long as they are given a supply of living bacteria to consume. Dead bacteria are, however, no good. In the process of killing bacteria, the number of bacteriophages increase considerably. But how do we know that bacteriophages are not living entities. Their discoverer, d'Herelle at least takes them to be so because they multiply. Others say that they are only an exceptionally active kind of ferment, which happens to be *knocking about in the outside world, but is* helpless to make more of itself except out of matter which is truly alive. But all this uncertainty is due to the fact that the true nature of bacteriophages has not been properly studied. They cannot be in any way a living matter produced out of non-living.

Living matter need not be cellular. Take the case of an ultramicroscopic virus which can pass through even a filter efficient to stop bacteria. Who can say, these ultramicroscopic filtrable viruses, which cause many diseases in animals and plants may be particular kind of bacteria, almost approaching molecular dimensions. But the living life within them

is still of a finer dimension. We say that it is a point with no dimensions. It is a reality in itself. It exhausts no space while it is in space.

PLURALITY OF SOULS

According to Dayānanda, souls are dimensionless *units* while the Absolute Brahman is the dimensionless *unity*. A dimensionless unity can always pervade through dimensionless units, and therefore, Dayānanda has repeatedly emphasised that the relation between God and the souls is of pervading and pervaded. God is all-embracing from within and without[1] (*Īśa*, 5). The same has been said in the "*Antaryāmī Brāhmaṇa*" of the *Bṛhadāraṅyka* (III, 7).

To our present-day philosophers, there is no word so uncomfortable as the word "plurality". It is their prejudice, and is against the very philosophic attitude. Dayānanda believes that the number of souls is infinite, though each soul is itself infinitesimal. The idea of plurality with regards to souls is universal. With the same sort of consciousness, with which one feels 'I', he also feels 'WE' and 'THOU'. If 'I' is all-embracing, how would one account for the distinctions that we find in the world,—the distinction of pain and pleasure, the distinction of learned

1. तदन्तरस्य सर्वस्य तदु सर्वस्यास्य बाह्यतः

and ignorant, the various species and all diversity that we see around? The philosophic attitude should be to find out the easiest solution of the problems confronting without leading to unnecessary complications. The pluralistic doctrine of souls is the easiest solution of the world problems so far given.

The Vedic texts all speak in terms of I, you, thou, we, he and they. Out of the six systems of the Indian Philosophy, barring the Vedānta, all the five are decisive on this point that the number of souls is infinite. All souls are not one. And then the Vedānta also in conformity with the Vedas does not deny the plurality. It is quite different a thing that in the hands of neo-Vedāntins, the position of the Vedānta has become rather uncertain. The Vedānta does not contradict the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā, and if it be a fact, then the cdoctrine of the plurality of souls should be aceptable to the Vedānta also.

"The Mīmāṁsākārs", writes Radhakrishnan, "adopt the theeory of the plurality of selves to account for the varieties of experiences. We infer the presence of the soul from the activities of the bodies, which are inexplicable without such a hypothesis. As my actions are due to my soul, other activities are traced to other souls. The differences of *dharma*, and *adharma*, which are qualities of souls, require the existence of

different souls. The analogy that as the one sun reflected in different substances, becomes endowed with distinct qualities, the one soul reflected in different bodies becomes endowed with different qualities, will not hold, since the qualities that appear different belong to the reflecting medium and not the sun. If the analogy were true, the diverse qualities appearing in connection with to the souls would belong to the bodies and not the soul. But pleasure, pain etc., are qualities of the soul and not of body".

The Sāmkhya and the Nyāya undoubtedly believe in the plurality of souls. According to the Sāmkhya, as Max Müller reports, "there are many *puruṣas*, as many as there are divine, human, animal and vegetal souls, and *their plurality is conceived as eternal, not as phenomenal only.*" The Vaiśeṣika follows the Nyāya in its conception of souls. In this school of philosophy, "the plurality of souls," writes Radhakrishnan, "is inferred from differences in status, the variety of conditions[1]" (III, ii, 20). The scriptural injunctions assume the distinctness of souls[2] (III, ii, 21). Each soul undergoes the consequence of its own deeds (VI, i, 5)[3].

1. व्यवस्थातो नाना ।
2. शास्त्रसामर्थ्याच्च ।
3. आत्मान्तरगुणानामात्मान्तरेऽकारणत्वात् ।

There would be no risk of the absolute dissolution of the world by the emancipation of the souls from it, since their number is infinite.

Dayānanda's conception of the plurality of souls may be summarised thus:

(i) Pleasure and pain etc. can only be attributed to souls and not to bodies. It is the property of the *chetana* and not of *jaḍa*, and therefore, the difference that one sees in the creation with regard to pleasure and pain etc. should be ascribed to the distinctiveness of souls.

(ii) Each soul transmigrates according to its own actions.

(iii) Each soul is quite independent and distinct regarding the attainment of emancipation.

(iv) The doctrine of *karma* rests on the plurality of the existence.

(v) The purpose of creation is in conformity with the plurality.

(vi) Even when souls are emancipated, they retain their individuality and are not annihilated or absorbed in God. The period of emancipation

being limited, they again come back into bondage.

(vii) The consciousness of 'I am' if indicates the existence of 'I', then equally significant is the consciousness of the fact, that 'I am not he or thou', and also at the same time, we are consciously confident that He or Thou also exists as distinctively as I.

Distinctiveness of the souls is absolute and not empirical.

We shall now conclude this chapter by summarising our views regarding the soul.

Just as God is a dimensionless unity, all-pervading and active (*chetana*), similarly, the souls are dimensionless units pervaded by God. The souls are also *chetana*. They are identified and distinguished on account of three attributes, (i) the capacity to know, (ii) the capacity to do, and (iii) the capacity to enjoy pleasure and pain: *Jñātṛtva*, *Kartṛtva* and *Bhoktṛtva*[1]. These three tendencies are manifested while in bondage into six attributes : desire, avarice, volition, pleasure, pain and cognition. According to *karma*, each soul undergoes transmigration from one body to the other, and finally, when sufficiently

1. See Gangā Prasāda Upādhyāya's book the *Jīvātmā*.

purified it attains emancipation and reverts to its natural integrity or *śuddha-buddha-mukta svabhāva*. In the state of emancipation too, the soul does not lose its individuality, and after a definite period comes again into bondage, and this cycle goes on.

Chapter VII

Law of Causation

IN the chapter on epistemology, we have refuted the idea of scepticism in matters of knowledge. We have also impressed this point that where our cognitions and inferences are affected by the relativistic notions, the basis is always an Absolute. Such an absolute which denies, ignores or eliminates relativities is also not an absolute truth. Taking for granted that there are some truths,—necessarily the denial of truth implies also some truth, —we have to proceed on to find out the ways of acquiring these truths. There are only four methods by which we can endeavour to arrive at them; deduction, induction, intuition and authority. Induction implies our everyday experience, it takes us from the scattered individualities to generalities. Deduction means the application of some convictions, which might have originally depended on either convictions or inductions. Intuition is a very mysterious process by itself, but it does not deny or contradict deduction and induction; it is of a special value when these two do not lead to a decision. Authority imposes limitations on some of the individuals in preference to others, regarding a particular matter, but

these are also to be subjected for verification to our day to day experiences.

In all matters of knowledge, we have to start with an *assumption*. We assume the existence of *connection* in nature. We start with the conviction that the objects of knowledge do not lie before us in a chaotic way or scattered state. None of the phenomena that we experience is an isolated one. There are *certain* conditions which fix up all the happenings. We start with another conviction, almost a corollary of the first one, that if these *certain* conditions are again fixed up, that very happening would again happen. The events of our experience are no doubt particular, but we believe the principles which they exemplify to be universal. What is at the basis of these beliefs or convictions ? Perhaps the very urge within oneself to know something is at the basis. The most primitive also possesses a number of generalisations which embrace a number of particularised facts.

The *Law of Universal Causation*, or in brief the *Law of Causation* is the most fundamental law that has ever been realised by any of us. We believe in it because we believe in the *Uniformity of Nature*. "Were everything in nature loose and unconnected, it would be impossible to say that an event occurred *because* of any one

thing rather than another. All these phrases therefore imply Causation and imply Uniformity.[1] " The Law of Causation does not deal with a particular law related to a specific phenomenon. When used absolutely and in a singular sense, it means the principle that there are such particular principles of connection exemplified in the course of nature, and hence, by the Law of Universal Causation, we assert that every event has a cause and no change occurs except under conditions with which its occurrence is connected universally. Nature is uniform in the sense that under like conditions like events occur. But in accepting this too, we presume that like conditions do get repeated and therefore, like events also recur.

WHAT IS A CAUSE ?

The popular idea of cause is one (a thing or person) producing a change in something else. But then what is this *producing* ? When a wave produces motion in a boat, how far is the wave responsible for the motion ? When I give motion to a wheel, I voluntarily act upon it, but does the wave also voluntarily move the boat ? It cannot be so because the wave is devoid of intelligence. To meet this difficulty, many of the thinkers like Hume have attempted to

1. Joseph : *An Introduction to Logic*, 1916 ,p. 401.

eliminate the notions of power, agency or force and to reduce the causal relation to *uniformity in succession.* But some critics do not appear satisfied with this definition. What is uniformity in succession ? It means likeness in conditions upon which like changes succeed. But this simply points out to the *sign* of causal relation, it is not the same with it. Nobody can dispute the fact that between the blow of the wave and ensuing motion of the boat, there is some connection. By a causal relation, we mean something more than the habitual sequence. Cause may be defined as "the invariable and *unconditional antecedent*", and in fact, cause, no doubt, implies change and succession but there can be no change without something which changes *i. e.*, which persists through a succession of states. "It would not be", says Joseph "change but substitution, if one event succeeded another and there were nothing but the events ; just as a child does not change into the changeling which is substituted for it." Mill's addition of the word "unconditional" to the definition of causation is significant. The notion of cause involves some idea of necessity, and the same feeling is expressed in Mill's definition in other words. He defines the cause of phenomenon, "to be antecedent or the concurrence of antecedents, on which it is

invariably and *unconditionally* consequent". This definition has been slightly modified again. The cause of the phenomenon has been defined as the antecedent or concurrence of antecedent on which it is invariably consequent *in the absence* of preventing or counteracting causes.

Need a cause act uniformly?

In fact, a cause is not a cause if it does not act uniformly. To say that the same thing acting on the same thing under exactly the same circumstances may yet produce a different effect is to say that a thing need not be what it is. It is against the Law of Identity itself. "If two plants, whose nature is really the same can determine the growth of totally different seeds, how can we call either the seed *of* that plant at all? Grant that a seed may sometimes be produced by a plant of its own kind, and sometimes by a plant of another kind, without any difference of circumstances, and merely because causes do not act uniformly, and you have really granted that anything may produce anything; flint and steel may produce seed instead of spark, and oil raise the waves or quench a conflagration". To say that anything may be produced out of anything may equally mean that a thing may be produced out of nothing, and then in fact, the word *produce* becomes devoid of all

its meaning and significance.

When we say that a thing is, we definitely mean that under the specified conditions it behaves in a particular way. Its very existence or identity specifies its relationship with others. And therefore, the causal relationship is implied in the very *identity* of the substance; the uniformity of behaviour justifies the very existence. If a particular object behaves differently under the same conditions, it renders its identity itself doubtful.

Causal relationships exist in realities only.

An enchantment is no enchantment, a phantasm no more a phantasm and a jugglery no longer a jugglery if causal relationships can be traced out in the phenomena. A magic loses charm, the moment its trick is known, or in other words, the moment, the causal relationships are established. We can, therefore, with confidence say, that where there is a reality, there will be some causal relationship of one or the other kind, or more truly, where the causal relationships do exist, there we are dealing with the objects of reality. The very fact that in the world phenomena, we at all steps find the Universal Law of Causation holding good, shows that we are dealing with such objects which are real in themselves. They are not the objects of

a fairy-land.

THE BASIC CRITERIA

How shall we know that out of a number of relationships existing between two events, the particular one is the cause? In this connection, Mill has given the following canon :

"If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon."

The another method depends on tracing out the positive and negative instances both in which the two phenomena agree and disagree. Mill says:

"If an instance in which the phenomenon occurs and an instance in which it does not occur agree in all circumstances but one, the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ is the cause or effect, or an indispensable part of the cause of the phenomenon."

In fact, the causal circumstances can only be found by a process of exhaustive elimination. I am not going into these details of the discussion,—I shall feel satisfied to enumerate a few of the groundings which would help us in eliminating unnecessary connections and arriving at the cause. The following principles should be borne in mind :

(*i*) Nothing is the cause of the phenomenon in the absence of which it nevertheless occurs.

(*ii*) Nothing is the cause of the phenomenon in the presence of which it nevertheless fails to occur.

(*iii*) Nothing is the cause of a phenomenon which varies when it is constant, or is constant when it varies, or varies in no more proportionate manner with it.

(*iv*) Nothing is the cause of one phenomenon which is known to be the cause of a different phenomenon.

In applying all these criteria, one must remember that though cause and effect are both directly realised, the causal relationship is always *inferred*.

FREE WILL AND INDETERMINISM

While the psychologists are tending at present to deny existence of anything like free will within the sphere of psychology even, physicists on the other hand are coming forth with evidences which have been interpreted to show that the inert matter too in some cases shows the existence of free will. This doctrine is also known as Indeterminism, because the antecedents alone do not appear to determine the course of the reaction. With given antecedents the reaction can go on in numerous ways depending on the free will of the reactants, and what a physicist

can at the most do is to calculate out the *probabilities* of all these reactions. We can say that everything is left to chance. The illustrations cited in this connection belong to the domain of radioactive transmutations or nuclear physics. Because of the uncertainty of the course taken up by these reactions, people are led to think that probably in these cases, the law of causation fails. In this connection, we shall simply quote the views of Einstein which are also shared by Max Planck, both of them being the leading scientists of to-day. When told that "it is now the fashion in physical science to attribute something like free will even to the routine processes of inorganic nature," Einstein replied, "That nonsense is not merely nonsense. It is objectionable nonsense". Einstein further explains as follows:

"Indeterminism is quite an illogical concept. What do they mean by indeterminism? Now if I say that the average life-span of a radioactive atom is such and such, that is a statement which expresses a certain order, *Gesetzlichkeit*. But this idea does not of itself involve the idea of causation. We call it the law of averages; but not every such law need have a causal significance. At the same time if I say that the average life-span of such an atom is indetermined in the

sense of being not caused, then I am talking nonsense. I can say that I shall meet you tomorrow at some indetermined time. But this does not mean that time is not determined. Whether I come or not the time will come. Here there is question of *confounding the subjective with the objective world*. The indeterminism which belongs to quantum physics is a subjective indeterminism. It must be related to something, else indeterminism has no meaning, and *here it is related to our own inability to follow the course of individual atoms and forecast their activities*. To say that the arrival of a train in Berlin is indetermined is to talk nonsense unless you say in regard to what it is indetermined. If it arrives at all it is determined by something. And the same is true of the course of atoms."

In cases where law of causation is not directly traced out, it does not mean that the law fails there. It simply shows that our observations are not yet complete, on the basis of which right inference could be drawn. Planck has put the idea in a very clear way. He says: "And the non-fulfilment of the statistical rule in particular cases is not therefore due to the fact that the law of causality is not fulfilled, but rather to the fact that our observations are not sufficiently delicate and accurate to put the law of

causality to a direct test in each case. If it were possible for us to follow the movement of each individual molecule in this very intricate labyrinth of processes, then we should find in each case an exact fulfilment of the dynamical laws." (Max Planck: *Where is Science Going?*)

Thus we contend that the law of causation is universal and wherever we find exceptions, they simply denote our limitations on the experimental side.

THE DIFFERENT USAGES OF THE TERM 'CAUSE'

In Indian philosophy, the word '*Kāraṇa*' is used in a number of senses. I shall give a few illustrations

(*a*) On account of cold, one got fever. Here cold itself was not converted to fever, but it produced such circumstances which were favourable for fever.

(*b*) Rāma alone could combat with Rāvaṇa. Here Rāma is directly an agent for the particular action.

(*c*) The chair is made of wood. Here though wood remained wood, yet it changed in appearance.

(*d*) The curd was obtained from milk. In this case, milk which is the

cause cannot be obtained back from the curd which is its effect.

(*e*) I wrote this article with pen. Here pen is also the cause of writing, but neither it is directly responsible for writing nor it undergoes modification in the process of writing.

(*f*) I made the house for Mohana. Had Mohana not been existing the house would not have been constructed, but he is neither the agent, nor the material, nor the instrument involved in construction.

THE VAIŚEṢIKA'S CONCEPTION OF CAUSATION

Dayānanda has based his ideas of causation on the Sāmkhya and the Vaiśeṣika both. Kaṇāda uses the term '*Samavāya*' or inherence to express the relation between cause and effect. *Samavāya* is one of the categories of the Vaiśeṣika[1] (I, i, 4) which it defines as follows. *Samavāya* is the inseparable and eternal relation between the whole and its parts, between an action and its agents, between an attribute and its substratum, between genus and its species,

1. धर्मविशेषप्रसूताद् द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां पदार्थानां साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां तत्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसम् ॥

and between a *cause* and its *effect*.[1] (Dayānanda, *Satyārthaprakāśa*, chapter III). *Samavāya*, hence, is a wider term, not only expressing the relation between cause and effect. Max Müler writes: "With Kaṇāda also it is different from mere connection, *samyoga*, such as obtains between horse and rider, or between milk and water mixed together. There is *samavāya* between threads and cloth, between father and son, between two halves and a whole, between cause and effect, between substances and qualities, the two being inter-dependent and therefore, inseparable." (*The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, 447).

The Vaiśeṣika has given four canons regarding the relation between the cause and effect:—

(i) The effect exists when the cause exists.[2] (IV, i, 3)

(ii) The non-existence of the effect does not imply the non-existence of cause.[3] (I, ii, 2).

1. परत्वापरत्वयोः परत्वापरत्वभावोऽणुत्वमहत्वाभ्यां व्याख्यातः॥२३॥
कर्मभिः कर्माणि ॥२४॥
गुणैर्गुणाः ॥२५॥
इहेदमिति यतः कार्य्यकारणयोः स समवायः ॥२६॥

2. कारणभावात् कार्य्यभावः ।

3. न तु कार्याभावात्कारणाभावः ।

(iii) The non-existence of the cause, however, implies the non-existence of effect.[1] (I, ii, 1).

(iv) Whatever exists as attribute in the cause is also revealed in the effect.[2] (II, i, 24).

Kaṇāda has classified causes into three categories:—

(i) *Samavāyi kāraṇa* or the inherent cause which is the stuff from out of which the effect is produced, just as clay is of the jar.[3] (X, ii, 1).

(ii) *Asamavāyi kāraṇa* or the non-inherent cause. It is the conjunction[4] (X, ii, 2), just as the threads will remain a bundle unless they are conjoined. But the Sāmkhya and the Vedānta do not admit this cause, who regard the cause and the effect bound by the relation of identity. To them the only non-inherent cause is the efficient one (the *nimitta*).

(iii) *Nimitta kāraṇa* or the efficient

1. कारणाभावात्कार्याभावः
2. कारणगुणपूर्वकः कार्यगुणो दृष्टः ।
3. कारणवति द्रव्ये कार्यसमवायात् ।
4. संयोगाद्वा ।

cause which is distinct from the preceding ones. It refers to the motive power by which the effect originates; just as fire is the *nimitta* cause in ripening of the clay[1] (X, ii, 7). According to the Vaiśeṣika, this cause not only includes the motive power but also the means or accessories.

DAYĀNANDA'S CLASSIFICATION OF CAUSES

Expounding the three causes enumerated by the Vaiśeṣika, Dayānanda has repeatedly in his works emphasised his classification of *kāraṇas*. He says (*Satyārthaprakāśa*, chapter VIII):—

Q.—How many causes are there of universe?

A.—Three. The *nimitta* or efficient, the *upādāna* or the material and the *sādhāraṇa* or ordinary. (a) The efficient cause is one by whose directed activity, a thing is made, and without whose direction, nothing is made. *It does not change itself* though it works changes in other things. (b) The material cause is one without which nothing can be made. *It*

1. संयुक्तसमवायादग्नेर्वैशेषिकम्

> *undergoes changes, is made and unmade.* (c) The ordinary cause is one which is instrumental in making of a thing and is common to many things.

Dayānanda gives the illustration of a pot. The potter is its efficient cause, clay its material cause, whilst the rod, the wheel and other instruments, time, space, light, eyes and hands of the potter, knowledge of making the pot, the necessary labour etc., all these constitute the ordinary cause. The *kārya* or effect always implies some design. It does not mean the production of something new. Wherever, there is a design, it implies three things; firstly, the designer which is an intelligent agent, which remains unchanged throughout, and which has the capacity to work out the change; secondly, the material which by itself cannot change into a design or order but which has got the capacity to be worked upon, to be moulded, modified, ordained and designed. The material is inactive by itself but it behaves as if it be active by the reflected and transferred activity of the efficient cause. The third thing that is necessary are accessories which are neither intelligent to bring about a change, nor by themselves are transformed, but still without which neither the purpose of the design is served nor in some cases, the design can exist.

It is sometimes difficult to find out the first cause, specially in those cases, where a number of phenomena are inter-connected. Think of an electric fan driven by electricity. The whole drive of a fan is a complicated process. For the motion of wings, perhaps the motor is the driving agency. It gives motive power to the fan. But the motor does not move by itself. It is the make and break arrangement based on the electromagnetic principle which really works, but then, that too is controlled by electricity flowing through the wires. Now at the power station, there are so many agencies working in circle, each claiming to be the first cause. At the head of all, there may be a supervisor in general who with all his staff is controlling the power. Each may be called a first cause and each may be called an instrumental cause. And therefore, before tracing out the first cause, one should specify definitely the phenomenon which he means or refers to. Again take the case of the working of the electric fan, which is being used in my room. The switch of the fan is in my control. Whenever I desire, I start the fan and whenever I desire, I switch it off. It works with my free will. If we consider the working from this point of view, I shall be regarded as the first cause. But from the other point of view, where the superintendent is

manufacturing electricity for *my purpose*, I am simply the *sādhāraṇā* or ordinary cause. One must know that the efficient cause is always active, and capable, but this activity or capability is not always of one's own. It may be transferred or borrowed one. If my servant works on my initiative, within a certain range he is the first cause but within a wider range, I shall be the efficient cause. The one who has all the design in mind (to use the phrase figuratively), who is in know of the working of the process and who ordains it in accordance to some purpose is really the efficient cause, though at the intermediary stages, the instrumental causes may also *appear* functioning as the first cause. While looking for the first cause of the universe, a philosopher always stops at the Absolute source of the motive force, the One Great Self, which is the primary source, the source of all sources, the One who has designed the whole creation, the One who is Super-intelligence, the knower of all and the One who is omnipotent as the First Cause, that is, the One who for the design and working does not depend on the other *intelligent being*.

DOES EFFECT PRE-EXIST IN THE CAUSE ?

This is an old controversial question. The controversy assumes this form : If the effect does not pre-exist in the cause, then it must

have been created out of nothing which then means that anything may be created out of anything. This goes against the Law of Universal Causation. On the other hand, if the effect pre-exists in the cause, then where is the difference, the effect and cause become identical,—there has nothing occurred which you can call a change.

The two well-known doctrines in this connection are :

(i) *Sat-kāryavāda*, which is advocated by the Sāmkhya and which means that the effect pre-exists in the cause.

(ii) *Asat-kāryavāda*, which is said to have been advocated by Buddhists, the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas, and which maintains that the effect does not pre-exist in the cause.

To these two, I shall add one more :

(iii) *Bhramavāda* or *abhedavāda* which is advocated by neo-Vedāntins, and which believes in the identity of the two by virtue of the fact that *kārya* or the effect is simply a delusion. It is by Nescience that one imposes the *kāryatva* on the *kāraṇatva*. Some of the authors include it under

Sat-kāryavāda, but in fact, the two fundamentally differ.

I shall give here the arguments which Kapila has advanced in support of the *Sat-kāryavāda*:

(*i*) The non-existent cannot be the object of activity. Whatever is non-existent can never be made to exist.

(*ii*) The product is not different from the material out of which it has been composed. Because the product is the cause.[1] (*Sāmkhya*, I, 118).

(*iii*) Because everything is not produced everywhere and always[2] (*Sāmkhya*, I, 116).

(*iv*) Because only the competent produces the possible [3] (I, 117). It is only clay that can produce jar and not the thread.

(*v*) By the virtue of being the material cause[4] (I, 115), the *upādānatva* implies that the effect pre-exists in the cause.

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1. कारणभावाच्च ।
2. सर्वत्र सर्वदा सर्वासम्भवात् ।
3. शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् ।
4. उपादाननियमात् ।

(*vi*) Destruction is simply dissolution in the cause[1] (I,121). Destruction does not mean annihilation. When gold bangle is destroyed, the gold remains. Destruction means reverting back to the immediate cause.

To the Sāmkhya, the production is nothing more than the "*abhivyakti*" or manifestation.

The neo-Vedantic conception.—In the Vedānta, there is a *sūtra* : *The non-difference of them* (*i. e.* of cause and effect) *results from such terms as 'origin' and the like*[2] (II, i, 14). This is followed by four more *sutras*[3] (15-18). We have no place here to discuss all of them. According to the Vedāntins, these refer to the identity of the cause and effect or to the the effect depending on the cause. ("Because only on the existence (of the cause) (the effect) is observed.") (II, i, 15). Śankara has summed up some of the arguments like this (II, i, 18) :

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1. नाशः कारणलयः ।
2. तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः । (वेदान्त २, १, १४) ।
3. भावे चोपलब्धेः (२, १, १५) ।

सत्त्वाच्चावरस्य (२१, १६) ।

असद्व्यपदेशान्नेति चेन्न धर्मान्तरेण वाक्यशेषात् ।(२,१,१०)

युक्तेः शब्दान्तराच्च ।(२, १, १८)

(*i*) From ordinary experience, one knows that curd, earthen jars and gold ornaments can only be produced *respectively* from milk, clay and gold, and not that the curd from clay or gold and so forth. But if the effect is non-existent before its production, all this should be possible.

(*ii*) If you believe that cause and effect are connected by '*samavāya* relation' (the inherence), you have either to admit that *samavāya* is itself joined by a certain connection to the two terms which it binds, and then this connection will require another connection and so forth.

Śankara has very critically and with ability given a number of arguments to refute *asat-kāryavāda*, which for lack of space are not being discussed here. So far as the pre-existence of the effect in the cause is concerned, we have no difficulty. Max Müllar writes: "This problem of cause and effect in connection with the problem of Brahman and the world was no doubt beset with difficulties in the eyes of the Vedāntists. If they turned to the Veda, particularly to the Upaniṣadas, there were ever so many passages declaring that *Brahman is one and*

unchangeable, while in other passages, the same Brahman is called the Creator, and from Him, and not as the Sāmkhyas hold, from a second non-intelligent power, called *prakṛti*, the creation, sustentation and re-absorption of the world are said to proceed. If it be asked, how two such opinions can be reconciled, Śankara answers: 'Belonging to the Self, as it were, of the omniscient Lord, there are names and forms (*nāmarūpa*),' ......they are the figments of Nescience, not to be defined as either real (Brahman) or as different from it. They are the germs of the entire expanse of the phenomenal world. The Lord as the Creator, as the Lord or *Īśvara*, depends upon the limiting conditions of the *upādhis* of name and form, and these even in the Lord, as represented as products of Nescience, not like the Logoi, creations of a Divine Wisdom. The true Self according to the Vedānta, is all the time free from all conditions, free from names and forms and for the truly informed and enlightened man the whole phenomenal world is non-existent."

On this Max Müller further expresses a little dissatisfaction: "To steer between all these rocks is no easy matter. Brahman, though called the material cause (*upādāna*) of the world, is *Himself immaterial*, nay the world, of which He is the cause, is

considered as unreal, while at the same time cause and effect are held to be identical in substance."

Dayānanda also objects the Śānkarika doctrine in the same way. Brahman cannot undergo a change. He is not the material cause of the universe because He Himself is immaterial. How can an immaterial substance be a material cause? Then again, if cause and effect are really identical, then how an unreal world can be the effect of real Brahman? The whole difficulty lies with the Vedāntins in that they regard Brahman as a material cause also.

Max Müller further says: "While the Vedāntist is threatened by all these breakers, the Sāmkhya philosopher is far less imperilled. He starts with a *prakṛti*, a power different from Brahman, generally, though very imperfectly, translated by nature, as the material cause of the world. *Prakṛti* exists as far as man is concerned, only so far as it is taken notice of by man (*puruṣa*); and he, the *puruṣa*, on taking notice, may therefore, be called, the efficient cause." By discarding *prakṛti* as the material cause, Śankara had to assume so many things as *Īśvara*, *Māyā* and so forth and still the position of the Vedāntins is not clear regarding creation. If the world is the production of Nescience, if it is a phantasm, where is the necessity of discuss-

ing the relation between cause and effect? It is futile to talk of the identity of the cause and the effect, or why talk of *upādānatva* at all? And if the causation exists, the world must be real and necessitate a material cause quite distinct from the efficient one. In this respect, Dayānanda's position is very clear and presents the least difficulty.

Dayānanda appears to believe in the *asat-kāryavāda* as well asthe *sat-kāryavāda*. Effect pre-exists in the cause so far as the *upādānatva* in the cause is concerned. The effect does not pre-exist in the cause so far as the *nimittatva* in the efficient cause is concerned. The *upādānatva* implies that *prakṛti* is transferable to *vikṛti*; the *avyakta* can be made *abhivyakta*. The very definition of *upādāna* necessitates it. So a *kāraṇa* persists through all changes to the *kāryāvasthā*. Similarly, the *nimittatva* implies that it becomes an efficient cause to convert *prakṛti* into *vikṛti*. If there is nothing to change, mould or transform, the agency which does so loses the very significance as the changer, moulder or transformer. Thus the cause is manifested in the effect under the action of an efficient cause. In this sense, the cause and effect are identical (from the *upādānatva* or *kāraṇatva* point of view). But they are distinct regarding design, order, purpose, etc., which have been assigned to

them by the *nimitta* agency.

Thus if the three causes as *nimitta*, *upādāna* and *sādhāraṇa* are well comprehended, there will not be much difficulty in following the law of causation and the inter-relationships between cause and effect. Between the two, there is a *samavāya sambandha* (the inherent relation), because the law of causation binds them together; there is the *upādāna sambandha* (or the relation of substratum), in which matter persists through both of them; and then there is the *nimitta sambandha* which produces difference and distinction in form of design, order, and purpose. Perhaps, the truth lies in the synthesis of all the divergent views, because if considered exclusively, they explain a part of the difficulty only.

Chapter VIII

The Monism Reviewed

IN the previous chapter, we have discussed the law of causation and asserted that either the Universal Law of Causation is not valid, or the phenomena with which it deals are real,—real not in the sense that they are not changing but in the sense, that while dealing with them, we are not traversing on the land of magic, or through the region of dreams and phantasms. Certainly, the knowledge of the phenomena will always be with respect to the knower, but this '*with respect to*' can only occur when the object of knowledge has its independent existence, irrespective of the knower. We shall never know what the object would be when there is none to know it, but this difficulty cannot be stretched to an extent as to deny its very existence, or the very entity. If an object appears to one as A and to the other as B, it may be either A or B or both or none of the two, but it is something because it is appearing as A or as B. Two people differ so far as it is A or B, but both agree in the fact that it is *something*, or IT IS. On the very ground of the two differing, if a thing becomes unreal, it becomes

real because the two agree also in their notion of IT IS.

AN EFFICIENT CAUSE CANNOT BE THE MATERIAL CAUSE ALSO

The efficient cause is one which remains unchanged throughout, but brings out a change in the material cause. It is an intelligent being who designs and ordains. Brahman who is universally regarded as the efficient cause is by itself *immaterial* and unchangeable. How can an immaterial being be a *material* cause of the *material* universe? In our experience, we never find an efficient cause becoming material one, and if we make such an assumption in the case of Brahman, we shall certainly be making an exception contrary to our experiences, or an assumption which we ourselves do not believe in nor can justify.

What is against our believing that the two causes are different ? The answer will be that *it takes us to duality*. To speak of the cosmos having evolved out of more than one is unphilosophical. A philosopher is not satisfied unless he can reduce diversity to unity. But why is there such a prejudice ? Reduction to *minimum* is the correct and true attitude of the philosopher, but this minimum need not be unity. If by reduction to unity, one can be a better philosopher, perhaps the still better would be he who

reduces everything to an Absolute Zero. If the object of knowledge is non-existent, why not believe in the non-existence of the subject also. Śankara says that the existence of the Self does not require a proof. "The existence of Brahman is known on the ground of its being the self of everyone. For everyone is conscious of the existence of (his) Self, and never thinks 'I am not'." But if it be so, then everybody is also equally conscious of the fact that he is not the body, and not the universe, and still conscious that the body *is* and the universe *is*. If the one consciousness be the outcome of Nescience, why not is the other consciousness *of being the Self* equally a misgiving of Nescience?

WHAT IS AVIDYĀ OR MĀYĀ?

Even the best of the monists cannot get rid of the duality, for after all he has to explain the diversity in the empirical world. The all-knowing Brahman without *māyā* cannot alone account for the phenomenal nature of the world. In the hands of Indian monists, *māyā* has been such an instrumentality that on its basis, they could account the unaccountable also. Is *māyā* Brahman or apart from Brahman? *Māyā* is the cause of anti-Brahmanical creation, a delusion and so it cannot be Brahman. But with the strict monistical attitude, *māyā* cannot exist

outside Brahman, because besides Brahman, there is nothing else existent. The neo-Vedantins say that *māyā* is existent and non-existent both. *Māyā* cannot be the attribute of Brahman, for the absolute Brahman is regarded as without attributes. Is *māyā* dominant over Brahman? Can the all-knowing Brahman be influenced by Nescience? Is Nescience an entity, attribute or a substratum? If neither, does it exist or not?

Advaitavādins are not themselves clear about *māyā*. According to Śankara, who only lays stress on the transcendent consciousness and discards the immanent aspect of experience, *avidyā* lies at the basis of immanence with its double capacity of concealing truth and holding a scene of multiple existence. It has got epistemological as well as creative functions. Screening Brahman, it creates multiple consciousness. Śankara lays less stress on the creative side of *avidyā*, though he takes it to be the root-cause of the cosmic appearance, be that appearance extra-mental or objective, mental or subjective. He lays more stress on the epistemological side, the moment the epistemological functioning ceases, the truth of identity is revealed. The *avidyā* hides the identity consciousness "though it has its locus in it". *Avidyā* has no definite origin, it may be eternal or may not be.

Rāmānuja's criticism of Nescience or Māyā:

Rāmānuja while commenting on the famous Vedānta Sūtra[1] (II, i, 15) has raised ontological, epistemological and logical objections against the doctrine of *avidyā* or *māyā*. As Dayānanda has also raised similar objections, I shall try to summarise a few of them here :

(*i*) There are three alternatives. Firstly, if the abode of Nescience is constituted by the soul in its *essential* form, it means that Brahman itself is the abode of Nescience. Secondly, if you say that the abode of Nescience is the soul viewed as different from Brahman and fictitiously imagined in it, this would mean that the non-intelligent (*jaḍa*) is the abode of Nescience. Both these views are wrong. Thirdly, if the abode of Nescience is the soul in its essential nature (this is not the view of Advaitavādins but it may also be an alternative view) we must negative this also, because the soul is absolutely homogeneous. It cannot be an abode of anything.

1. तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः । [२,१,१४ (१५ ?)]

(*ii*) If by release be understood the destruction of Nescience, it follows that when one soul attains Release and Nescience is thus destroyed, the other souls will also be released. But Nescience persists because other souls are not released. Well, then the one soul is also not released since Nescience is not destroyed. Shall we mean a separate *avidyā* for a separate soul ? But how does the distinction arise ? What about the distinction of souls implied therein? This distinction cannot be due to the souls, because the *Nescience is assumed for the purpose of accounting the distinction of souls.* You cannot argue in circle that the *avidyās* are established on the basis of the distinction of souls and the distinction of souls is established when the *avidyās* are established.

(*iii*) If you maintain that it is the *avidyās* abiding in the earlier souls which fictitiously give rise to the later souls, then this would imply that the souls are short-lived only, and moreover, that each soul would have to

take upon itself the consequences of deeds not its own and escape the consequences of its own deeds.

(*iv*) For the same reasoning, Brahman cannot be supposed to effect the fictitious existence of the subsequent souls by means of the *avidyās*, abiding within the earlier souls.

(*v*) If a beginningless flow of the *avidyās* be assumed, it follows that there is also a beginningless flow of the condition of the souls dependent on those *avidyās*, and that steady uniformity of the state of the souls which is supposed to hold good upto the moment of Release could thus not be established.

(*vi*) If you say that Nescience being unreal cannot be argued like this (argumentation concerning mutual dependence being applicable to *real* things only), then in that case Nescience would cling even to released souls and the Highest Brahman itself. Either it can cling to all or it cannot cling to the individual souls even. But impure Nescience cannot cling to

what has for its essence pure cognition.

(*vii*) Does the soul perish or not when the Nescience abiding in the individual soul passes away, owing to the rise of the knowledge of truth ? If perishes, Release is nothing else but destruction of the essential nature of the soul ; in the latter case, the soul does not attain Release even on the destruction of Nescience since it continues to exist as soul different from Brahman.

(*viii*) If you maintain that the distinction of souls as pure and impure etc. admits of being accounted for in the same way as the dimness or clearness, and so on, of the different images of a face as seen reflected in mirrors, crystals etc., we will ask: On what occasion do the smallness, dimness and other imperfections due to the limiting adjuncts (*i. e.*, mirrors etc.) pass away?—When the mirrors and other limiting adjuncts themselves pass away! Does then, we ask, the reflected image which is the substrate of those imperfections persist or not? If you say that it persists,

then by analogy, the individual soul also must be assumed to persist, and from this it follows that it does not attain Release. And if the reflected image is held to perish together with its imperfections, by analogy, the soul will also perish and then Release will be nothing but annihilation.

(*ix*) The destruction of the non-advantageous (*apuruṣārtha*) defect is of advantage to him who is conscious of that disadvantage. Is Brahman, which corresponds to the thing reflected, conscious of the imperfections due to the limiting adjuncts? Or is it the soul, which corresponds to the reflected image, conscious of the imperfections, or is it something else? But we always see that neither the reflected image nor the thing reflected is conscious of the imperfections due to the limiting adjuncts. Neither the face reflected nor the reflection of the face is conscious of the imperfections of the mirror. Moreover, Brahman's being conscious of imperfections would imply its being the abode of Nescience. There is no other knowing subject

existing besides Brahman and the soul.

(*x*) Who is the *kalpaka* or imaginatively shaping agent with regard to the soul as formed from Nescience? It cannot be Nescience itself, because Nescience is not an intelligent principle. Nor can it be the soul, because this would imply the defect of what has to be proved being pre-supposed for the purposes of the proof; and because the existence of the soul is that which *is formed* by Nescience, just as shell-silver is. If you, finally, say that Brahman is the fictitiously forming agent, we have again arrived at a Brahman that is the abode of Nescience.

(*xi*) If Brahman is not allowed to be the abode of Nescience, does Brahman see or is conscious of the individual souls or not? If not, it is not possible that Brahman should give rise to this manifold creation, which as Scripture declares, is preceded by 'seeing' on his part, and to the differentiation of names and forms. If on the other hand, Brahman which is of an absolutely homogeneous nature

sees the souls, it cannot do so without Nescience; and thus we are again led to the view of Nescience abiding in Brahman.

Equally forcible arguments have been advanced by Rāmānuja against *māyā* :

(*i*) If Brahman possesses *māyā* or the illusive power, it cannot, without Nescience, be conscious of the souls. Without being conscious of others, how can the Lord of *māyā* delude them by His *māyā* ? *Māyā* itself cannot bring about the consciousness of others on the part of its Lord, for it is a mere means to delude others, after they have by other means become objects of consciousness.

(*ii*) You would say that the *māyā* of Brahman causes him to be conscious of souls, and at the same time is the cause of the delusion of those souls. But if *māyā* causes Brahman—which is nothing but self-illuminated intelligence, absolutely homogeneous and free from all foreign elements--to become conscious of souls, then *māyā* is nothing but another name for Nescience. —Let it then be said

that Nescience is the cause of the cognition of what is contrary to truth; such being the case, *māyā*, which presents all false things different from Brahman *as* false, and thus is not the cause of wrong cognition on the part of Brahman, *is not avidyā.* But this is inadmissible; for, when the oneness of the moon is known, that which causes the idea of the moon being double can be nothing else but *avidyā*.

(*iii*) If Brahman recognises all beings apart from Himself as false, He does not delude them; for surely, none but a mad man would aim at deluding beings known by him to be unreal !

(*iv*) Let us then define *avidyā* as the cause of a disadvantageous cognition of unreal things. *Māyā* then as not being the cause of such a disadvantageous cognition on Brahman's part, cannot be of the nature of *avidyā* !—But this also is inadmissible; for although the idea of the moon being double is not the cause of any pain, and hence not disadvantageous to man,

it is all the same caused by *avidyā*; and if, on the other hand, *māyā* which aims at dispelling that idea (in so far as it presents the image and idea of one moon) did not present what is of disadvantage, it would not be something to be destroyed, and *hence would be permanently connected* with Brahman's nature. But such a view implies the concept of *duality* which a monist would not agree to.

(*v*) Brahman has for its essential nature unlimited bliss: and hence, cannot be conscious of, or affected with, unreal *māyā*, without *avidyā*. Of what use, we further ask, should an eternal non-real *māyā* be to Brahman? You would say, Brahman by means of it deludes the individual souls!—But of what use would such delusion be to Brahman? It affords to Brahman, you would say, a kind of sport or play. But of what use is play to a being whose nature is unlimited bliss?—Do we not then see in ordinary life also that persons in enjoyment of full happiness and prosperity indulge all the same in play? Perhaps you would say

so. But we say, these cases are not parallel. For none but persons not in their right mind would take pleasure in an unreal play, carried on by means of implements unreal and known by them to be unreal, and in the consciousness, itself, unreal of such a play !

COMMONLY USED TERMS OF THE VEDĀNTA

In order to follow Dayānanda's criticims, I would like to explain a few terms as understood by the Vedāntins. Some of these terms are undefinable and mysterious. Though all these terms occur in the Upaniṣad, yet the Vedāntins have attached much more meaning to them, than was probably originally ascribed.

What is Upādhī ?—Before there arises the *māyā* of the *objective* nature belonging as it were to Brahman Himself, there was the *māyā* of the internal or *subjective* world. This was originally the only *māyā*, and deceived by that *māyā*, or *avidyā*, the *Ātman* or pure Self, was covered up, *upahita* or blinded, or conditioned by the so-called *upādhis*, the conditions or impositions, if we may say so in both senses. "There is here again a certain ambiguity, the *upādhis* being caused by primæval *avidyā*, and from another point of view, *avidyā* being caused in the

individual soul (*jīvātman*) by the *upādhis*" (Max Müller).

The five *upādhis* are:

(*i*) The vital spirit or *mukhyaprāṇa*.

(*ii*) The mind or *manas*, one which perceives, feels, thinks and wills.

(*iii*) The sense-organs (*upalabdhi*) and acting senses (*adhyavasāya*), all being ten.

(*iv*) The material organic body.

(*v*) The objective environment, or the objects or meanings of the senses (*artha*.)

All these are not the *Ātman*, and it is only through *avidya* that *Ātman* has become identified with them.

The six beginning-less categories:

Śankara believes in a two-fold category—transcendental and empirical, though strictly speaking his philosophy embraces a single identical category of existence, because the rest all becomes an illusory appearance in the advanced stage of knowledge. To the sophisticated mind of the lower plane, the categories are five more besides Brahman:

(*i*) *Jīva* or the individual soul.

(*ii*) *Īśa*—the enveloping conscious reality.

(*iii*) The difference of the two, of *Jīva* and *Īśa*.

(*iv*) *Avidyā* or the Nescience.

(*v*) The relation of *Avidyā* and *Chit*, the Brahman.

Adhyāsa :

To attribute to the real what is different from it is called *adhyāsa* by Śankara. *Adhyāsa* is defined as the appearance of a thing where it is not. When light appears double, or when rope appears as a snake, we have *adhyāsa*. All knowledge of finite things is in a sense the negation of pure being, since objects are imposed (*adhyasta*) on the one eternal consciousness. The most prominent *adhyāsa* is the confusion of the subject with the object.

The three kinds of existence :

Śankara believes in three kinds of existence: (*i*) *Pārmārthika* or the ultimate or transcendental reality, (*ii*) *Vyāvahārika*, or empirical existence and (*iii*) *Prātibhāsika* or illusory or imaginary existence. Brahman is of the first kind, the world of the space-time-cause of the second and imagined objects like silver in the shell are of the third kind.

Īśvara or Personal God :

To the Vedāntins, Brahman is one who transcends all time-space-cause relation-

ships. You cannot say that he 'exists' because this would imply time and space concept. He is beyond all such conceptions. The Absolute Brahman remains *nirguṇa* or unqualified. He cannot be conceived even.

But the Absolute becomes qualified, active, creative and personal through the deception of the universal and inevitable *avidyā*. It is then called *Īśvara*. It becomes *saguṇa*. *Īśvara* is the first cause, since he has no origin. *Īśvara* as pure being cannot have sprung from another pure being since the relation of cause and effect cannot exist without a certain superiority in the cause. *Īśvara* is unproduced, has no cause and is no effect. That which gives reality to all modifications is *Īśvara*. He is said to be the material as well as the efficient cause of the world. To the objection that in experience the same intelligent being cannot be a non-intelligent material cause. Śankara answers, "It is not necessary that it should be here the same as in experience, for this subject is known by revelation and not by inference." In short, Śankara does not want to argue this point. In such matters, he does not believe in the validity of argumentation even. Creation of *Īśvara* is not like human creation at all.

***Jīvā or the Finite Self*:**

To Śankara, the *jīva* has a continuity of

existence from eternity, through cycles of birth and death, though *this continuity has a break with the dawn of identity-consciousness*. The ego or the Self is neither real nor completely unreal. "The ego is a scientific and a pragmatic reality. It has a psychological or epistemological ideality, but no transcendent reality, a psychological continuity, but no metaphysical unity."

The relation between *Īśvara* and *jīva* is not clear. The Vedāntins differ at this point. *Īśvara* when bound by *antaḥkaraṇa* or the internal organ is known as *jīva*. *Ābhāsavāda* makes *jīva* a reflection which is purely a psychological appearance without any reality. It is an immanent aspect of the *chaitanya*. Radhakrishnan expresses Śankara's views like this: "The Lord endowed with superior limiting adjuncts (*niratiśayopādhi*)[1] rules the souls with inferior limiting adjuncts (*nihīnopādhi*)[2]. *Īśvara* is ever free from *avidyā*[3]. The limitations of *Īśvara* do not effect his knowledge. *Īśvara's māyā* is *subject* to him and so there is no concealment of his nature. It does not hide his qualities, even as glass which covers objects without concealing their properties. The *māyā* which is the limitation of *Īśvara*,

1. Śankara Bhāṣya, (II, iii, 45).
2. Ibid, (II, iii, 43).
3. Nityanivṛttāvidyatvāt, (III, ii, 9).

is made up of *śuddhatattva*, and does not produce *avidyā* or *antaḥkaraṇa*. It is *subject to his control, and helps him in the task of creation and destruction*. This *māyā*, or the force of self-expression, in *Īśvara*, resulting in the multiplicity of the world, deludes the individual soul into the false belief of the independence of the world and the souls in it. *Avidyā* is the result of *māyā*. The pure consciousness of Brahman when associated with *māyā* in this sense, is called *Īśvara*, and when with *avidyā*, *jīva*."

The views regarding *anekajīvavāda* (Multiplicity of Souls Theory) are also conflicting. Some believe that *avidyā* in the form of varying *antaḥkaraṇas* or internal organs gives rise to various *jīvas*. Some believe that *avidyā* has parts, the destruction of *avidyā* can take place in parts also. In fact, no satisfactory view has been pointed out in this connection, and it is one of the weakest points of Śānkarika doctrine.

Sākṣin or the witness-self:

According to the Vedāntins, in each individual self, there is besides the cognitive, emotional and conative experience, the witness-self or *sākṣin*. "The external consciousness is called the *sākṣin* when the internal organ serves as the limiting adjunct to it and when it illumines objects. The presence of

this adjunct is enough to transform the ultimate consciousness into the witness-self. Though this witnessing consciousness arises with the experience of objects, it is not due to the experience, but is pre-supposed by it." (Radhakrishnan).

DAYĀNANDA'S CRITICISM

Dayānanda believes in the eternal individuality and plurality of souls. According to him, Brahman and *Īśvara* are not different. *Māyā* unless it represents the material cause is non-existing. *Jīva* does not feel individuality because of *antaḥkaraṇa-upādhi* or because it has no control over *māyā*. The natural question arises : *Īśvara* had a control over *māyā*, but when did he lose this control as to manifest himself as *jīva*. If he lost control over *māyā* before becoming *jīva*, he has lost his *īśvaratva*. He could not have become *jīva* before losing control over *māyā*. Why did he lose control at all ? These are the questions which the Vedāntins do not answer. To avoid these, some maintain that we cannot say when *Īśvara* came under the control of *māyā*. The *jīvatva* of *jīva* is *anādi* or beginningless, but nevertheless, they maintain that though bondage is from the period of eternity, yet it will have an end. The moment *jīva* is free from *avidyā*, it would be Brahman. But *jīva* is a *jīva* from the period of eternity, *jīvatva* is in its very

essential nature, and therefore, *jīva* can never be *non-jīva*. The contact with *avidyā* is something positive, and if the contact is associated from a beginningless period, it will last upto an endless period.

Criticism of six endless categories:

Dayānanda writes: "As can be no *soul* without the conjunction of *avidyā* with *Īśvara*, and no *Īśvara* without the conjunction of *māyā* with Brahman", the sixth beginningless category of your verse, *i. e.*, the conjunction of *avidyā* with *chit* (conscious entity) as a separate entity or category becomes superfluous, because ignorance and illusion, *avidyā* and *māya* are both absorbed into the soul and *Īśvara*, and form part and parcel of them.

For the same reason, it is useless to count *Īśvara* and the soul as beginningless categories distinct from Brahman. Hence according to your views, only two entities, Brahman and *avidyā* are demonstrable and not six."

Brahman devoid of avidyā:

Dayānanda further writes: "Besides your idea of *Īśvara* and the soul as two entities born of *upādhi* or ignorance can only be true if you could demonstrate the existence of *avidyā* or *māyā* in Brahman who is infinite, eternal, holy, all-knowing, immortal and omnipresent.

(*a*) "Were you to believe that the ignorance (depending upon and relating to Self) in Brahman is restricted to one place at a time, and exists from eternity, the whole Brahman cannot be entirely pure.

(*b*) Besides, when you admit, the presence of ignorance in one place, it being moveable, will keep shifting from place to place; hence whichever part of Brahman it goes to, that will become ignorant and whichever part it leaves, will become enlightened. This being the case, you could call no part of Brahman as eternally pure and enlightened.

(*c*) Moreover, ignorance on account of its presence and consequent pleasure and pain etc. in one part of Brahman will affect the whole, like a wound which though confined to one part of the body causes pain to be felt throughout the system.

(*d*) Again, that part of Brahman which is in the pale of ignorance will know that it is so, whilst the part of Brahman that is outside

the pale of ignorance will know itself to be free from it. Hence Brahman will be divided into parts, one inside and the other outside the pale of ignorance. If you reply, 'Let Him be divided, it would be of no consequence to Him'. He would then no longer remain indivisible, and consequently, He will not be the one Absolute unity.

(*e*) Besides, ignorance or incorrect knowledge being only an attribute must necessarily be associated with the substance in *samavāya* or inherent relation. Hence it can not be temporary, it wlll ever be associated. Thus Brahman would ever remain associated with ignorance.

Antahkaraṇa does not explain the difference. Dayānanda continues :

(*a*) If you believe that Brahman becomes the soul through the intervention of an *upādhi* called *antahkaraṇa* or internal organ, we ask whether Brahman is all-pervading or circumscribed. If you answer that He is all-pervading but the

upādhi is circumscribed, *i. e.*, limited as regards space, and is separate in each man, does that medium then move about or not? If you say, that it moves about, does Brahman as well move with it or does it remain stationary? You will say that he remains stationary. If so, then whichever part the *upādhi*, here the *antaḥkaraṇa*, leaves, that must become free from ignorance, whilst whichever part it goes to, that part of the pure enlightened Brahman must necessarily become ignorant. In other words, man at one moment becomes ignorant and at the next enlightened.

(*b*) Hence salvation and bondage will also become of momentary duration, and just as one cannot remember what another has seen or heard, similarly, what Brahman has seen or heard yesterday, he could not possibly remember today, because the time and place of his observation are totally different from those of his remembrance.

(*c*) If you say that all-where Brahman is the same, then why is it not

omniscient all-where? If you say that *antaḥkaraṇas* are different or distinct from each other in different people, the resulting knowledge will also be then different, our answer is, that medium being material or *jaḍa*, it cannot be the seat of consciousness.

Chidābhāsa doctrine criticised.

Dayānanda criticises the doctrine of of *chidābhāsa* which means that the soul is nothing but an image or reflection of Brahman.

(*a*) The image is of momentary duration and hence it will perish. The image itself neither feels pain nor enjoys the bliss. Who will then enjoy the bliss of salvation?

(*b*) We shall ask, what is the essential form of *chidābhāsa*? You will say, it is essentially Brahman, but Brahman mistakes about his own form. He becomes ignorant of his own Self. We shall ask, what is the motive cause for the forgetfulness? You will say, *avidyā* We shall ask, whether this *avidyā* should be attributed to the all-knowing Brahman or

to one of finite knowledge. You will say, that it should be attributed to one of the finite knowledge. But according to you, before the occurrence of *chidābhāsa* there nothing existed besides the absolute Brahman. The finite soul did not exist. It will only be right, if you believe that the soul existed quite distinct from Brahman from the very beginning.

(*c*) You will say: Just as fire while permeating through different objects, takes their own appearance, similarly, Brahman also appears distinctively in the own-shapes of different objects, material and non-material. In fact, Brahman is neither material nor He is the soul. Just as the sun appears to be many inspite of being one when seen as reflection in a number of pots filled with water, and just as when the pots are broken, the sun remains unaffected, or when the pots are removed, the sun does not move, similarly in various *antahkaraṇas*, Brahman is reflected. We call it *chidābhāsa*. The soul exists so long as the

antaḥkaraṇa exists, but when *antaḥkaraṇa* is destroyed by knowledge, the soul assumes the form of Brahman. So long as *chidābhāsa* imposes upon himself the attributes of an ignorant, enjoying, suffering etc., he cannot get rid of the bondage of the world.

On this, Dayānanda says :

Your this analogy does not hold good, because the sun, water and pot, are all bodies with forms. Moreover, the sun is distinct from water and pots, and water and pot distinct from the sun, and only on this account, the reflection of one can exist in the other. Had they been without form, there would have been no reflection. Because Brahman is omnipresent and devoid of all forms, He cannot exist apart from any other object (just as sky), and being related as the pervading and the pervaded, He is different from the objects. The pervading and the pervaded are distinct and yet together. Had they been one, pervading-pervaded relationship would not arise. The *Antaryami* Brāhmaṇa of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka has clearly

expounded it.

(*d*) There can be no reflection of Brahman because he is devoid of form. If you say that the one devoid of form is also reflected as the blue of the sky in water or mirror, we shall say, how you do state that the sky which is reflected is devoid of form. It would not have been seen, had it not possessed any form. How can a thing be reflected in a mirror or water which has no form ? What you see as the blue sky is not that all-pervading formless sky. What we see as the sky is due to the light scattered by particles of dust, moisture etc., suspended in the atmosphere.

The world of delusion and dreams.

The Adhyāsavādins regard all phenomena to be unreal like dreams, or like a rope taken to be a snake, or a shell appearing like silver or a mirage, or an enchanted island. Whatever appears is a delusion and unreal. By imposing or *adhyāropa*, they mean mistaking something for something else. Dayānanda points out that the fallacy in this analogy is that you regard rope as existing while the snake as unexisting. Does snake not exist ? You

would say that it does not exist in the rope, it exists somewhere else, only its impression is in the mind. If it be so, then snake as such cannot be called at least non-existing. Similarly, the illusions of a man in a tree, of silver in shell etc., do not show that man or silver exists nowhere. The same is the case with dreams. The things visualised in dreams are also not wholly non-existing, they do exist somewhere, and leave impressions in us. The dream is not the imposing of a non-existent in the existent. If it be said that sometimes, it so happens that one dreams such as has never happened, never heard or never seen, for example to see one's own head severed from the body or to see himself weeping and similar other improbabilities, but this too does not support your view, because no such impressions do occur which have not been experienced. Without impression, there is no memory, and without memory, no direct perception. Such impressions only occur when one has seen or heard the head of some one severed, or somebody weeping. This is not the imposing of something non-existent. It can only be compared to the work of a painter who works with memory after experiencing at some particular time. In dreams there may be a disorder of actually cognised impressions but it does not contradict the wholesome

existence.

Similar is the case of misrepresenting a rope for snake when seen in dark. In all these cases, an epistemological difficulty arises. We would ask, who becomes ignorant first? You will say Brahman, it is Brahman who is first affected with *upādhi*. We shall ask, whether He became ignorant first and then was affected with *upādhi*. You would say, Brahman was pure and all-knowing before being affected with *upādhi*. If you say that *upādhi* pre-existed, then He was not Brahman. In either case the state of illusion or of dreams cannot be applied to Brahman, and unless applied He cannot become a soul. To regard Brahman as Absolute, beyond time, space and cause, and then to impose upon Him disabilities of all sorts, does not speak much of the monistic doctrine. To regard Brahman, absolutely unchangeable and immaterial, and then to regard Him as the material cause of the cosmos is simply an argument which even transcends the transcendental plane.

A true Vedāntin would perhaps say that such matters should not be argued by an empirical logic, but he wants us to be convinced of his this conviction on the basis of an empirical logic. A Vedāntin wants us to discard logical categories, but if we ask, 'why', he would try to convince us on

the basis of those very categories. A Vedāntin does not like our taking analogies from the empirical world to establish the pluralistic doctrine, but he on his part would try to expose the empirical by analogies equally empirical. In his enthusiasm of getting rid of duality, he would arbitrarily make an assumption of such entities, which having failed to explain and realise, he would not like to argue.

Dayānanda does not disbelieve in a transcendental state. But his transcendental state is not transcendental in respect that there everything is reduced to an Absolute unity. It is transcendental because it is different from the empirical. In the empirical world, we generally get our experiences in terms of our sense organs and their perceptions. But a *yogin* or the one relieved from the mortal bondage would be now experiencing with his own *chit*. His experiences would be different. The pleasure experienced by him now will be different from what he had been hitherto regarding as pleasure. But this does not negative his experiences in the empirical state. The empirical world would still be existing as real and true. The empirical world has its existence irrespective of the knower or the bound soul. Just as a child when transcends to an advanced stage leaves playing with toys, though toys have independent

existence, similarly, the one unbound discards the empirical world with which he had been so far playing. For him, the empirical world is of no concern, but still the empirical world has a reality of its own. The transcendental world has its own reality, and the empirical world has its own. Brahman is Brahman and the souls are souls, bound by the relationship of pervading and the pervaded, the one being the dimensionless *unity* pervading through other infinite dimensionless *units*. Both being dimensionless are co-existing and yet distinct.

Chapter IX

Prakṛti or Primordial Matter

WE have so far attempted to impress that the empirical world is not unreal or phantastic. It is governed by the Law of Universal Causation. There is order, purpose and design in it. We have also seen that its efficient, immaterial, intelligent cause cannot be the material cause also. We also do not disbelieve in a transcendental world, where the experiences of the self will be quite different from what we have here, because they will be independent of the sense organs, and moreover, the unbound soul in the transcendental stage will be occupied in the communion with the Higher Self, and so the empirical world, would be of no significance to it. But this does not impose phantasm or unreality, at least so far as the existence and purpose is concerned, on the empirical world.

According to Dayānanda, material cause of the creation is known as *prakṛti*. When we say that it is the *upādāna kāraṇa* or the material cause, it is implied that in the hands of an efficient cause, it can be moulded, transformed and designed, thus giving rise to what is known as phenomenon.

Then it has a name and form. The primordial *prakṛti* thus becomes *vikṛti* or the modified one. It is also known as the *karyāvasthā* or the effect-state. *Prakṛti* in the primordial state is all-inclusive, that is, it is capable of giving rise to any name and any form, it is all-embracing ; it is *one*, potentially having *many*. Take the case of gold. We can say, that gold as metal corresponds to the primordial state. It can be converted to rings, bangles, and a number of ornaments. The gold as metal is one, but potentially, it has many forms in it. Simply, it requires a designer or an efficient cause to work out. We shall say, it is the *sāmyāvasthā* of all the ornamental forms. *Sāmyāvasthā* is nothing more than the potential sameness for many forms. Take the case of clay. It potentially contains all the forms of jug, jar, toy, tumbler etc. It is their *sāmyāvasthā*, because from clay, a designer is equally free to design out anything whether jug or jar. A piece of paper has potentially a number of diagrams, pictures and paintings. You can draw out a camel or a cart or anything you like. The paper is all-inclusive. It is the *sāmyāvasthā* of all the sketches, it simply requires an artist to work them out.

When a design has been worked out, it loses the significance of being the *sāmyāvasthā*. Limitations are imposed to its poten-

tiality. From flour, you could have made bread, loaf, cake, pudding and so many things, but once it has been designed to the form of bread, it has attained limitations. It is now potentially much less capable of being transformed to so many forms as before. Thus this *kāryāvasthā* or the effect-form has lost its *sāmyāvasthā* or the potentially all-embracing causal form. Similarly, we know that *vikṛti* is not the *sāmyāvasthā* while *prakṛti* is so. This all-embracing primordial *prakṛti* is the *upādāna* or material cause of the cosmos. It is not *matter* in the sense we generally use the term. It is *matter* because it is the primordial *material* cause of the creation. By matter, we would mean something which can be transformed or designed into phenomena or which primordially embraces all phenomena.

IS PRAKṚTI INFERRED OR COGNISED ?

We have just said, that *prakṛti* is devoid of all names and forms, though potentially it embraces all names and forms. The primordial *prakṛti* is one continuous unity. In the primordial state it has no dimensions. Hence it cannot be the object of perception or cognition. It only manifests itself when it is manifested. Then it becomes *vikṛti*. When we say, it is now *vikṛti*, we mean two things, firstly, it connotes the modified state and

secondly, it is *vikṛti* because it can now produce *vikāra* in our cognising senses. In the *vikṛta* form alone, it is the object of our cognitions. If seen from this point of view, we shall say that *prakṛti* is not directly cognised, it is only inferred from the cognition of the modified state.

But *prakṛti* is not only inferred one; in a way, it is directly cognised too. When we see a gold bangle, and infer that it is made of gold, we do not actually mean that the idea of gold is only inferred one. We feel as if we directly cognise gold too. Similarly, when we see a pot, we feel that we are perceiving clay also, inspite of the fact that the original unburnt clay is quite different from the burnt appearance in the pot. Even on seeing curd, we feel as if we are perceiving milk in the modified form. When a chemist speaks, thinks, or sees a lump of common salt, he feels as if he is seeing before him a multitude of sodium and chloride ions. It is because the cause is not annihilated while passing to an effect. The cause proceeds to the effect, the effect pre-exists in the cause and also because there is *samavāya* or inherent relation of the two. The continuity of state from the cause to effect makes it possible to perceive cause and effect side by side.

The case with an efficient cause is

different. The efficient cause remains itself unchanged, unmodified and unattached. It simply leaves the impression of its intelligence, design and order, in its workmanship. I know that the workmanship emphatically declares out, at each stage and at each point, that there is an intelligent designer, but it actually declares a little more too. It speaks out that to find out the efficient cause, we shall have to transcend deeper and higher. The intelligent cause is not entangled with the creation; it is not directly cognisable. It is not a part and portion of the modification.

DAYĀNANDA'S CONCEPTION OF ORIGIN

In the eighth chapter of the *Satyārtha-prakāśa*, Dayānanda has in brief referred to nine atheistic views regarding creation. We shall begin with an account of them.

(*i*) *The Void Hypothesis* :

In one of the Sāmkhya Sūtras, the argument of an atheist is: The void is the reality ; the positive perishes, because perishing is the character of things[1] (I, 44) There was void in the beginning, and the end would be a void and therefore, the reality is not of a positive nature. On this, Dayānanda says, that void in the beginning and void at the end does not mean the existence of

1. शून्यं तत्त्वं भावो विनश्यति वस्तुधर्मत्वाद्विनाशस्य ।

nothing. By void is meant an entity without dimensions. The term void is also used for etherial void (*ākāśa*), primordial *prakṛti*, and the point. But these all have existence. A point leads to a line, a line to figures, and figures to actual objects. Similarly, from dimensionless *prakṛti* are evolved all the dimensional objects. Nothing can be born out of nothing. Void is not *nothing*, it is simply dimensionless. How can a void be void when it is known? And the knower also cannot be a void, if void means nothing.

(*ii*) *The Non-existent Hypothesis*:

In the Nyāya Sūtras, Gautama has discussed the following argument of an opponent. The existent is born out of the non-existent, because nothing germinates until the seed gets destroyed. We cannot say that the sprout has come out of the seed. It only came out when the seed became non-existent[1] (IV, i, 14). Dayānanda gives the same answer which Gautama gave. The thing out of which the sprout has come forth was pre-existing in the seed. Had it not been so, it would not have been sprouted. The Nyāya (IV, i, 17) also says[2] that had it come out of a non-existent, a spoiled

1. अभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिर्नानुपमृद्य प्रादुर्भावात् ।
2. न विनष्टेभ्योऽनिष्पत्तेः ।

seed, the burnt or ground or eaten up, should have also given rise to a plant, or the seed of one thing should have given the plant of the other. So the reasoning of the non-existent hypothesis is not tenable.

(*iii*) *The Arbitration Hypothesis*:

An opponent says: Why not be God the whole cause of creation? Do we not see that many of the actions done by a man go unrewarded which shows that God works arbitrarily? Then why not be God regarded as an arbitrator in all matters of creation[1], (IV, i, 19)? To this, Dayānanda replies: Had the fruit of an action been arbitrarily depended on God, the fruit could have been obtained without an action too (cf. *Nyāya*[2], IV, i, 20; 21). Neither God gives fruit without action, nor action itself can lead to fruit without God. God gives fruits according to actions.

(*iv*) *The Non-causal Hypothesis*:

The Nyāya quotes an opponent: Substances are produced without cause even, just as thorns are seen without reason in some plants[3] (IV, i, 22). To this the

1. ईश्वरः कारणं पुरुषकर्माफल्यदर्शनात् । न्याय० ॥
2. न पुरुषकर्माभावे फलानिष्पत्तेः ।
तत्कारितत्वादहेतुः ।
3. अनिमित्ततो भावोत्पत्तिः कण्टकतैक्ष्ण्यादिदर्शनात् ।

reply given is (cf. *Nyāya*[1], IV, i, 23, 24): The same is the cause of one out of which it is born. Because the thorns are not seen in all the trees, they are related in a causal manner to the particular trees. And therefore, the creation cannot occur without cause.

(*v*) *The Non-eternal Hypothesis*:

Because *everything* is born and will ultimately end, and therefore, everything is non-eternal[2] (*Nyāya*: IV, i, 25). A neo-Vedāntin says: Brahman is only real, the world is unreal and the soul is non-different from God. Thus these neo-Vedāntins also belong to this school. But this view is refuted by Gautama thus: The non-eternity, at least, of all of them must be eternal, and therefore, *everything* cannot be non-eternal. One would say that just as fire having burnt everything else gets itself extinguished, similarly, therefore, when everything would come to an end this causal eternity will also end[3] (IV, i, 27). On this Dayānanda says: Whatever is cognised and established cannot be non-existing in the present, and in its

1. अनिमित्तनिमित्तत्वान्नाऽनिमित्ततः ।
निमित्ताऽनिमित्तयोरर्थान्तरभावादप्रतिषेधः ।
2. सर्वमनित्यमुत्पत्तिविनाशधर्मकत्वात् ।
3. तदनित्यत्वमग्नेर्दाह्यं विनाश्यानुविनाशवत् ।

causal form, it will always persist and cannot be non-eternal[1] (IV, i, 28).

Regarding neo-Vedantic conception, which maintains that the world is *imaginary* like a dream or like illusion of snake in rope, Dayānanda says that 'imaginary' also denotes a quality. A quality is always associated with *dravya* or substance. The quality and substance cannot be separated. Therefore, at the basis of imaginariness, there must be some substance which cannot be unreal if imaginariness does exist in it. You cannot say that imaginariness is also imaginary. Moreover, if one who imagines is eternal, then the object imagined by him, or rather imagination, should also be eternal in essence.

Another objection is raised like this: Just as the objects externally cognised become non-eternal in dreams, and of dreams and of awakened state disappear in deep slumber, similarly, why do not regard the objects cognised in an awakened state to be also dream-like? Dayānanda says :*

1. नित्यस्याप्रत्याख्यानं यथोपलब्धिव्यवस्थानात् ।

*" As regards the argument from the dream state, it is pointed out that no argument is adduced by the nihilists to show that the knowledge we have is comparable to that of a dream in place of that of our waking experience, nor again is it shown that our dream experience is of non-existing things. To these

that during sleep or, dreams, objects cognised are not destroyed. They simply pass out of consciousness. They are as if thrown into the back-ground, but they do really exist.

(*vi*) *The Eternal Hypothesis*:

The whole world is eternal because it is born out of the eternal five elements. It has no beginning and no end.[1] (IV, i, 29). To this objection of an opponent, Dayānanda says that we actually see that many things are born and they actually end also, and therefore, this gross world (in the effect-form) cannot be eternal (cf. *Nyāya*[2], IV, i, 30). It had a beginning and it will have an end. By end is meant the reduction of the effect-form to the causal one. The world at each step is changing and so it cannot be eternal as such.

(*vii*) *The Distinctness Hypothesis*:

The opponent who propounds this hypothesis maintains, that everything in

retorts, Vātsyāyana adds the telling argument that *the only ground on which it can be taken that things seen in a dream do not really exist is that they are seen no more in the waking state, which implies that our waking experience is real*". (Keith, *Indian Logic and Atomism* p. 209, 1921).

1. सर्वं नित्यं पञ्चभूतनित्यत्वात् ।

2. नोत्पत्तिविनाशकारणोपलब्धेः ।

this world is a distinct separate differentiated entity. We cognise one object at a time and no two objects are inter-related.[1] (*Nyāya*: IV, i, 34). On this Dayānanda says: The whole exists in its parts. They are not devoid of all relations. At least, the following things are common to all, though they themselves are separate entities: Time, space, God and order and genus. There is nothing that can exist separate from or without them. In appearance they might be different, but they cannot be called isolated, they are inter-related. Gautama says that parts are not distinct, they are inter-related to form a whole. The object which can be served by a jar cannot be served by its components or the minute particles. So the existence of jar cannot be denied, but jar is the connective or collective name of the particles. As by cognising different components, the impression of the whole is formed, the hypothesis that everything is distinct and unrelated cannot be maintained[2] (IV, i, 35).

(*viii*) *The Exclusion Hypothesis* :

The opponent maintains that a particular object excludes all other objects, so it is mostly exclusion in all the cases. A cow is not a horse, not a camel, not a cat

1. सर्वं पृथग्भावलक्षणपृथक्त्वात् ।
2. नानेकलक्षणैरेकभावनिष्पत्तेः ।

and not so many things. And so mostly, it is NOT. Similarly, a horse is NOT so far as so many objects are concerned. So mostly, most of the objects are NOT and so everything is NOT.[1] (IV, i, 37).

To this, Dayānanda replies that a cow is at least a cow, and a horse is at least a horse. If everything is NOT, then the cow is also NOT NOT-COW. In fact, cow is cow because something else is not cow. This sort of argument as propounded by the opponent is a mere play of words. If cow is not cow, how will you say that the cow is not horse, not cat and so on. This you could only say because you were sure that cow is cow. If cow would not have been a cow, it would have been equally a horse, a cat, and so on, for horse would not have been a horse and a cat would not have been a cat.

(*ix*) *The Nature Hypothesis*:

Everything is maintained to have been born out of the Nature, just as grain and moisture when in contact produce insects, seeds when come in contact with earth and water produce grass, plants etc., or when air comes in contact with water, it produces foam in sea. Similarly, the world is created by the naturalities of the elements. No efficient creator is necessary. This argument

1. सर्वमभावो भावेष्वितरेतराभावसिद्धेः ।

we have discussed in our chapter on God. Dayānanda maintains that the efficient cause is necessary to bring about the desired contact.

Prakṛti with all atoms in the effect-form unless properly ordained by God with the requisite knowledge and skill cannot by itself produce anything.

(*x*) *The Relativistic Hypothesis*:

The Nyāya Sūtras raise one more objection from the opponent: Nothing possesses a natural attribute of its own because it is all-relative. A thing is long with respect to short and short with respect to long. It is neither long nor short by itself. And so we cannot ascribe any attribute to anything [1] (IV, i, 39). Gautama says that this sort of argument involves *vyāghāta-fallacy*[2] (IV, i, 40). One must fix up a standard and should not argue both ways. If A is to be compared with B, B cannot be compared at the same time with A unless A is established. This sort of relativity does not deny the truths about them. Because there is truth in them and therefore, they are related in a particular way. A relation is only ascribed when the objects are true and real in nature.

1. न स्वभावसिद्धिरापेक्षिकत्वात् ।
2. व्याहतत्वादयुक्तम् ।

Dayānanda agrees with Gautama in all his criticism and finally maintains along with him that the world is real, it has an efficient cause different from the material one. The material cause of the world has given rise to a cosmos which is bound by the causal relations. The empirical cosmos is not eternal in its form, though in essence, it can be reduced to the primordial *prakṛti*, out of which it is born. There is no arbitrariness in the world on the part of God. Everything is worked in perfect harmony and order. The world is real, the phenomena are real and they fall within the domain of a philosopher to study and investigate. It is worthwhile to attempt to explain the cosmos. With this realistic outlook, Gautama proceeds on with his search after truth, and with the same outlook, Dayānanda proceeds through all his investigations. We shall now see how from the primordial cause, the whole cosmos has evolved.

NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

This being established that the world is real, and at the basis of it is some primordial cause, we have now to proceed on to some of the details. There are two processes by which we can approach the problem. The one is *analytic* and the other is *synthetic*. In one case, we have to go down from phenomena to primordiality and in the other

case, from primordiality, we have to rise to the stage of phenomena But what phenomena are we concerned with ? A philosopher works out the fundamentals and it is left to the scientist to work out individual details. Shall we have to explore how the world came into existence, or how moon separated from the earth or how gold came into form in the Kolar Fields, or how from a seed comes out a plant, or again how, we fall ill, we feel pain and pleasure ? There is no dearth of problems, which are as much scientific as philosophic.

A child, at the most, realises that the piece of bread is originally placed somewhere in the kitchen almirah and its mother takes it out from there. The one, more grown up, knows that the bread is made up of flour. If he is more advanced, he would say, that bread originally exists in wheat. Perhaps even the more learned would stop at the point that the wheat comes out of a plant whose seed is no more than a wheat itself. But how does one wheat gives rise to so many grains of wheat ? It does so, this we know but our knowledge ends here. A chemist or a botanist would go deeper and he would explain that starch and protein of the wheat have been synthesised out of the carbon dioxide and water and nitrogen present either in the atmosphere or in the soil. Starch can be transformed to carbon dioxide and water and

the reverse process of synthesising starch from carbon dioxide and water can also be realised. So from the gross form of bread, we have analytically gone to a sub-state, nitrogen, carbon dioxide and water. A chemist will go a step forward and stop at the elements, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen. These elements do not take us to the primordial state, but we are certainly approaching the state by and by.

Let us see, what a physicist has to say. A chemist would regard atoms and molecules as the last units of entity with which he has generally to deal with. But a physicist breaks up the atom into electrons and the nucleus. This nucleus he further sub-a'vides into protons, alpha-particles, neutrons, and positrons. He further finds evidences of such entities as neutrino, negative protons and so on and so forth.

The study of radiations have also taken us very far and wide. Besides visible radiations of light, we have been long in possession of ultra-violet and infra-red. The still finer radiations of very small length are known as X-rays. The radiations of very long lengths have found their application in wireless. From radioactive sources are available highly penetrating radiations like gamma rays, and then there are the universally present cosmic radiations.

Originally, the science was divided between matter and energy. But since, Planck developed his quantum theory of light, the old corpuscular theory, maintaining that the radiations are emitted in discrete particles or quanta has been revised. The work of Max Born, Jordan, Pauli and Dirac gave a new method of reckoning and matrix computation. The work of Heisenberg and de Broglie and also Schroedinger evolved out a system known as wave mechanics. On the other hand, the work of G. P. Thomson, Germer. Davisson and Rupp clearly showed the wave-like character of electrons and other material particles. Thus the present tendencies are to regard matter and energy as inter-related. Fundamentally, both can be reduced to one, the one which is neither matter nor energy, and is still the both.

Going into such details is the scientists' attitude. But a philosopher transcends the scientific method, because the latter involves experimental limitations. What a scientist disintegrates by his physical appliances, a philosopher looks into its plausibility through his mental eye. He is not concerned whether the so-called atom is the last divisible unit or the electron. When we shall come to the Vaiśeṣika Atomism we shall see that a philosopher's atom remains

always indivisible. So long as it is divisible, it is not *atom.* All the scientific attempts are to asymptotically approach the philosopher's atom. A philosopher's atom would always remain a step ahead of the scientist's atom.

THE STARTING POINT

The one fundamental thing in which all the thinkers are probably one is the '*principle of gradual or successive evolution*'. The very idea of a primordial cause existing implies that evolution has taken place in regular steps, and all phenomena have not come out at random. In this successive series of evolution the question is, where to start with ? It depends on one's own choice ; it depends on one's view-point, it depends on to what extent deep the one is prepared to go into the enquiry. In the Upaniṣads, we find the stages of evolution having been treated differently. Professor Rānāde has divided the theories of Upaniṣadic cosmogony into two main groups : the impersonalistic and personalistic. "Among the impersonalistic theories," writes Professor Rānāde, "may be included the theories which regard either or all of the elements as the substratum of things, or even such abstract conception as not-Being or Being or Life-force as lying at the root of all things whatsoever. Among the personalistic theories are theories which try to

account for the origin of creation from the *Ātman* or God and insist in various ways either on the dualistic aspect of creation, or the emanatory or even the highly philosophical aspect implied in Theism proper." Certainly, when one has to trace the orgin to the efficient cause, he will have to advance a personalistic theory, but in the present chapter, we are concerned with the material cause alone, and shall see, how far we can go into the search of origin. I agree with Rānāde when he says that "When the Upaniṣadic sages regard those elements as the source of things, we must take them to mean what they say, and not, as certain later commentators under the spell of their theological idea have done, regard those elements as equivalent to deities.........All theological commentators on the Upaniṣads such as Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja have understood these elements as meaning deities and not the elements proper. But if we just consider for a while the naiveté with which the theories were ushered into being, it may be impossible for us to doubt that the Upaniṣadic seers meant by the elements the elements proper, and not deities corresponding to those elements." This is exactly the view taken by Dayānanda also.

The Bṛhadāraṇyaka (V, v, 1) says that

'*āpa*' was the first to exist[1]. The *āpa* may be water or may mean God. A passage in the Chhāndogya regards air as the final absorbent of all things whatsoever[2] (IV,iii,1-2). "When fire is extinguished, it goes to the air, when the sun sets, it goes to the air, when the moon sets, it goes to the air, when the waters dry up, they go to the air ; thus verily, is air the final absorbent of all things whatsoever." But another passage of the same Upaniṣad traces the origin to *ākāśa* or the void or ether or space. "All these beings emerge from space and are finally absorbed in space ; space is verily greater than any of these things ; space is the final habitat[3] (I, ix, 1)." A passage in Taittirīya says that "*Asat* or not-Being originally existed, and from that came forth the Being[4] (II, 7)." The Nāsadiya Sūkta of the Ṛgveda has already been discussed before. In the Vedas themselves, the evolution has been traced in a number of

1. आप एवेदमग्र आसुस्ता आपः सत्यमसृजन्त ।
2. वायुर्वाव संवर्गो यदा वा अग्निरुद्वायति, वायुमेवाप्येति यदा सूर्योऽस्तमेति वायुमेवाप्येति यदा चन्द्रोऽस्तमेति वायुमेवाप्येति ॥ यदाप उच्छुष्यन्ति वायुमेवापियन्ति वायुर्ह्येवैतान्सर्वान्संवृङ्क्त ।
3. सर्वाणि ह वा इमानि भूतान्याकाशादेव समुत्पद्यन्ते, आकाशं प्रत्यस्तं यन्ति । आकाशो हि एव एभ्यो ज्यायान् । आकाशः परायणम् ॥
4. असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत् । ततो वै सदजायत ।

ways, the starting point in several cases being different.

THE HARMONY

Not only in the Upaniṣads, in the six systems of philosophy too, origin of the cosmos has been treated differently. In this connection, Dayānanda has discussed an essential point. He raises the question thus:

"If they harmonise, why is it that in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, creation is described in the following manner: Out of *prakṛti*, the elementary material cause of the world, God first created *ākāśa*. Then was evolved *vāyu*; out of *vāyu* proceeded *agni*; after *agni* came out water; then earth; from earth then came out vegetables, then food, then the *vīrya* and finally the human body[1]. In the Chhāndogya is written that creation begins with *agni* etc., in the Aitereya, that it begins with water. In the Veda itself in some places, *puruṣa* while in others *Hiraṇyagarbha* has been described as the cause of the Universe; whilst in the Mīmāmsā *karma* (action or application); in the Vaiśeṣika time, in the Nyāya *paramāṇus* or atoms, in the Yoga *puruṣārtha* or the conscious exertion, in the Sāmkhya the *prakṛti* and in the Vedānta the Brahman. Now out of all these, which is right and which is wrong?"

Dayānanda answers the question as follows:

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1. तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाश: संभूत: । आकाशाद्वायु: । वायोरग्नि: । अग्नेराप: । अद्भ्य: पृथिवी । पृथिव्या ओषधय: । ओषधिभ्योऽन्नम् । अन्नात्पुरुष: ॥ २ । १ ॥

"They are all right, not one of them is wrong. He is in the wrong who misunderstands them. God is the efficient cause and *prakṛti* the material cause of the Universe. After *mahāpralaya*, the Great Dissolution, the next creation starts with the *ākāśa* or the space or void. In minor dissolution, when the disintegration does not reach the stage of *vāyu* and *ākāśa*, but only reaches that of *agni*, the next creation begins with *agni* or fire. But when after dissolution in which even *agni* is not disintegrated, the next creation begins with water and so forth. In other words, *the next creation starts at where the previous dissolution ends*.

"*Puruṣa* and *Hiraṇyagarbha*, as we have described in the first chapter, are names of God. Nor is there contrariety in the description of creation given in the six *śāstras*. There is no contrariety, because by contrariety is meant the conflict or difference on one and the same point. Now mark how the descriptions of the six *śāstras* harmonize with each other. The Mīmāṁsā says, 'nothing can be produced without proper application or effort.' The Vaiśeṣika says, 'nothing can be done or made, without the expenditure of time.' The Nyāya says, 'nothing can be produced without the material cause.' The Yoga says, 'nothing can be made without the requisite skill, knowledge and thought.' The Sāmkhya says, 'nothing can be made without the definite combination of atoms.' The Vedānta says, 'nothing can be made without a maker.' This simply shows that the creation of the world requires six different causes which have been described separately by each separate *śāstra*. There is no contradiction in these descriptions. The six *śāstras* together serve to explain the phenomenon of creation in the same way as six men would help each other to put a thatch on

the roof of a house."

Dayānanda then illustrates by the '*Andha-gaja Nyāya*', a story of six blinds and their search to know what an elephant is.

In this passage, Dayānanda has placed two view-points: Firstly, the re-evolution would occur at that stage to which the dissolution occurred previously. The ordinary dissolution does not reduce phenomena always to the same fineness, and therefore, the origin may be at some time one, whilst at some other time, the other. Secondly, for the appearance of a particular phenomenon, the cause need not always be singled out to be one. There may be a number of causes and every philosopher has a right to begin with anyone of them according to his point of view.

THE SĀMKHYA EVOLUTION

The Sāmkhya does not deal with extra-cosmic evolution ; it is mainly concerned with the intra-cosmic. It accounts how from the primordial matter, the whole human body could be evolved. It explains the evolution of the world within our body and therefore, we have called it intra-cosmic. We shall describe the Sāmkhya doctrine in brief as follows:

We can directly perceive the gross form or the *sthūla bhūta*. This becomes our starting point. Because we perceive five

sthūla bhūtas through our five sense organs, we *infer* that they are related to five abstracts, the *panchatanmātrās*, the sound, touch, form, taste and smell corresponding to *ākāśa*, *vāyu*, *agni*, *āpa*, and *pṛthivī*, through five organs, *śrotra*, *tvachā*, *chakṣu*, *rasanā* and *nāsikā*. Thus from the gross forms, we have inferred the presence of *panchatanmātrās*[1] (I, 62). From the correlation of both internal and external organs of senses with *panchatanmātrās*, we next *infer* the presence of the egotizing organ, the *ahamkāra*[2] because without egotization, the varying impressions of organs could not be correlated (I, 63). From *ahamkāra*, we arrive at *antaḥkaraṇa*[3] (I, 64), the internal organ, which is also the same thing as *mahān* or *mahat* or *Buddhisattva* or even *manas*[4] (I, 71). From *mahat*, *manas* or *antaḥkaraṇa*, we arrive at *prakṛti*[5] (I, 65). Now, we can say how the twenty-four entities evolved one after the other. The soul is the twenty-fifth entity, which does not directly partake into the evolution, but still, it is an entity because for its sake, the former evolution takes place.

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1. स्थूलात्पञ्चतन्मात्रस्य ।
2. बाह्याभ्यन्तराभ्यां तैश्चाहङ्कारस्य ।
3. तेनान्तःकरणस्य ।
4. महदाख्यमाद्यकार्य्यं तन्मनः ।
5. ततः प्रकृतेः ।

The whole ordainment must be for somebody else and hence, we infer the presence of the soul[1] (I, 66).

Evolution is the reverse process which we can now follow. From primordial *prakṛti*, the first thing *affected* is *mahat* or *manas*, (I, 71); the next one is egotizing organ, the *ahaṁkāra*[2] (I, 72). From the *ahamkārā*, are evolved the five *tanmātrās* (or rudiments) and two forms of senses (ten in number are the external and mind is the internal, the eleventh). After this, evolved the five gross elements. These together with the soul form the series of the twenty-five[3] (I, 61).

We have said in the beginning in this chapter that *prakṛti* is the *sāmyāvasthā* or the state of equipoise of three *Guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. We have also explained what we mean by equipoise in this case. It is difficult to say what *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* mean, because from any point of view, a classification into three can be easily made, the two, *sattva* and *tamas* being the two extremes and *rajas* being the middle

1. संहतपरार्थत्वात्पुरुषस्य ।

2. चरमोऽहंकारः ।

3. सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था प्रकृतिः, प्रकृतेर्महान्, महतोऽहङ्कारः, अहङ्कारात्पञ्चतन्मात्राण्युभयमिन्द्रियं, तन्मात्रेभ्यः स्थूलभूतानि पुरुषः, इति पंचविंशतिर्गणः ।

one. Dayānanda has translated *sattva* as *śuddha* or pure, *rajas* as *maddhya* or the middle one and *tamas* as *jāḍya* or inert and sloth. The exposition given by Radhakrishnan appears to be quite satisfactory: "The first of these is called *sattva*. It is potential consciousness, and therefore, tends to conscious manifestation and causes pleasure to the individual. Etymologically, the word *sattva* is derived from '*sat*' or that which is real or existent. Since consciousness (*chaitanya*) is generally granted such existence, *sattva* is said to be potential consciousness. In a secondary sense, '*sat*' also means perfection, and so the *sattva* element is what produces goodness and happiness. It is said to be buoyant or light. The second, *rajas* is the source of activity and produces pain. *Rajas* leads to a life of feverish enjoyment and restless effort. The third is *tamas* that which resists activity and produces the state of apathy or indifference. It leads to ignorance and sloth." So long as *prakṛti* is *avyakta* or unmanifested, these three qualities cannot be differentiated and probably, they are not even qualities as understood in the ordinary sense, as mentioned by the Vaiśeṣika. They are abstract to the extreme. All that we can say is that in them lies the germ of the forthcoming diversity. They represent the

material causality of *prakṛti*, which though unity by herself in the primordial state, can be condensed to diverse units.

According to the Sāmkhya, the world is neither real nor unreal. It is not unreal like a man's horn[1] (V, 52), nor real, since it passes away[2] (V,53). The world is neither indescribable, since such a thing does not exist[3] (V,54). The Sāmkhya also repudiates the view that regards the world as a reflection of what is not[4] (V,55), nor is the world a mere idea[5] (I,42). The world exists in its eternal form of *prakṛti* and passes away in its transitory manifestations[6] (V,56).

According to Dayānanda, the Sāmkhya does not deny the importance of the intelligent or efficient cause in the cosmic evolution. This thing we have already discussed in the third chapter. While commenting on a *sūtra*[7] (II, ii, 1) of the Vedānta, Śankara and Rāmānuja have both criticised the Sāmkhya doctrine. Śankara

1. नासतः ख्यानं नृश्रृङ्गवत् ।
2. न सतो बाधदर्शनात् ।
3. नानिर्वचनीयस्य तदभावात् ।
4. नान्यथाख्यातिः स्ववचोव्याघातात् ।
5. न विज्ञानमात्रं बाह्यप्रतीतेः ।
6. सदसत् ख्यातिर्बाधाबाधात् ।
7. रचनानुपपत्तेश्च नानुमानम् (वेदान्त० २,२,१)

has outlined the Sāmkhya doctrine as follows. "Just as jars, dishes, and other products which possess the common quality consisting of clay are seen to have for their cause clay in general; so we must suppose that all the outward and inward (*i. e.*, inanimate and animate) effects which are endowed with the characteristics of pleasure, pain and dulness (*sattvā*, *rajas*, and *tamas*) have for their causes pleasure, pain and dulness in general. Pleasure, pain and dulness in their generality together constitute the three-fold *pradhāna*. This *pradhāna* which is non-intelligent evolves itself spontaneously into multiform modifications, in order thus to effect the purposes (*i. e.*, enjoyment, release and so on) of the intelligent soul. The existence of the *pradhāna* is to be inferred from other circumstances also, such as the limitation of all effects and the like."

Against this doctrine, Śankara has argued as follows: "If you Sāmkhyas base your theory on parallel instances merely, we point out that a non-intelligent thing which without being guided by an intelligent being, spontaneously produces effects capable of subserving the purposes of some particular person is nowhere observed in the world. We rather observe that houses, palaces, couches, pleasure-grounds and the like—

things which according to circumstances are conducive to the obtainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain—are made by workmen endowed with intelligence." Śankara at length criticises the atheistic view. In this connection, we have simply to say that the criticisms are not valid if it can be shown that the Sāmkhya doctrine, though dilating mainly on the material cause, does not deny the existence of an intelligent being as the first cause.* I personally think that the blame of evolving out an atheistic conception in name of the Sāmkhya rests on the author of the *Sāmkhyakārikā*, which misrepresented the original Sāmkhya doctrine. Even if one accepts that Brahman is the intelligent cause of the creation, it will be still necessary to discuss the evolutionary stages through which the primordial matter passed while assuming the present phenomenal form. And in fact, this was the aspect of the problem which Kapila undertook to solve.

*According to some thinkers, the 25 *gaṇas* of the Sāmkhya include the intelligent cause also. The word *puruṣa* implies both, the lower and the Higher Self. The total number of senses and actions is simply ten. Mind as pointed out in the *sūtras* is included in *mahat* already. It cannot be counted again along with *senses*. If it be so then to make the number 25, *puruṣa* should be regarded as two, the one representing the ordinary cause and the other the efficient.

THE VAIŚEṢIKA ATOMISM

Dayānanda has fused the Śāmkhya doctrine with the Vaiśeṣika one. He often uses the term "the atoms of *prakṛti*". We have already seen how according to the Sāmkhya, the primordial causal *prakṛti* ultimately manifests herself to the gross form. We have also given an account of the modern atomism as understood by physicists and chemists.

Dayānanda at one place (the *Satyārtha-prakāśa*, Chap. VIII) writes: The minutest particle that cannot be further divided is called a *paramāṇu*, 60 *parmāṇus* make one *aṇu*.

2 *aṇus* make one *dvyaṇuka* (*dyad*) which enters into the composition of the ordinary gross *vāyu*.

3 *dvyaṇukas* make one *trasareṇu* that forms *agni*.

4 *dvyaṇukas* make one of water.

5 *dvyaṇukas* make one of *pṛthivī*.

The three *dvyaṇukas* make one of *trasareṇu*, by doubling which earth and visible objects are formed. It is in this way, *i.e.*, by the process of combining *paramāṇus* and *aṇus* and so on till the visible things are produced—that the earth and other plants have been made by God

We have mentioned in the last section, that the evolution described by the Sāmkhya is intra-cosmic, but here in the Vaiśeṣika, we find an extra-cosmic account. Dayānanda has summarised some of the essentials of the materialism of the Vaiśeṣika in the third chapter of the *Satyārthaprakāśa*. We shall give a brief account here. The Vaiśeṣika deals with six categories (I, i, 4): *dravya* (noumenon), *guṇa* (attribute), *karma* (activity), *sāmānya* (generality), *viśeṣa* (particularity), and *samavāya* (inherence)[1]. The fifth and the fourth are products of intellectual discrimination (*buddhyapekṣam*) whilst the first three are realisable by intuition (*artha*).

By *dravya* is meant that which contains in it action and qualities and is a *samavāyi* or inherent cause[2] (I, i, 15). According to the Vaiśeṣika, a substance is something over and above qualities. *Dravya is* itself not a quality, it *has* qualities. *Dravyas* (I, i, 5) are nine in number[3]:

(*i*) *Pṛthivī*—it has four qualities, form, taste, smell and touch (II, i, 1).

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1. धर्मविशेषप्रसूताद्द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां पदार्थानां साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसम् ।
2. क्रियागुणवत् समवायिकारणमिति द्रव्यलक्षणम् ।
3. पृथिव्यापस्तेजो वायुराकाशं कालो दिगात्मा मन इति द्रव्याणि ।

Out of these four, smell is its intrinsic while the rest three are derived from *agni*, *jala* and *vāyu* (II, ii, 2).

(*ii*) *Āpaḥ* or *jala*—it has three qualities, form, taste and touch, but of these three, its intrinsic is taste while the rest two are derived from *agni* and *vāyu*. It has got fluidity, mobility and coldness also (II, i, 2; ii, 5).

(*iii*) *Tejas*—it has got two qualities, form and touch, of which the only intrinsic is form while touch is due to *vāyu* (II, i, 3).

(*iv*) *Vāyu*—it has got only one quality, that of touch, but on account of the contaminations of *agni* or *tejas* and *jala*, it has also warmth and cold (II, i, 4).

(*v*) *Ākāśa*—it has none of the above qualities. It is recognised by the fact that exit (*niṣkramaṇa*) and entry (*praveśa*) are possible through it. Sound which is not the quality of any other four can, therefore, be ascribed to *ākāśa* only (II, i, 5; 20; 25).

(*vi*) *Kāla* or time—it is that to which

nearness, futurity, simultaneity, slowness and quickness are predicated. It does not apply to eternals who are above time. It is thus known to be a cause also when applied to non-eternals (II, ii, 6, 9).

(*vii*) *Dig* or space—it is that to which 'hither', 'thither' and similar terms are predicated. The one where the sun rises is known as the east direction, and where it sets is the west. The other directions are the north and the south and then between each two of the four are four corner directions (II, ii, 10, 14).

(*viii*) *Ātman* or the Self—it is recognisable by the following: respiration, nictitation, the closing and opening of eyelids, the healing up of bodily injuries (*jīvana* or life), the movement of the mind, the sense organs, the internal affectations (as hunger etc.), desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, and volition (III, ii, 4).

(*ix*) *Manas* or mind—it is one which establishes a contact between sense organs and the Self. It is through

it that the perceptions are cognised. (III, ii, 1).

The Vaiśeṣika deals with 17 qualities:

1. *Rūpa* (colour)
2. *Rasa* (taste)
3. *Gandha* (smell)
4. *Sparśa* (touch)
5. *Saṃkhyā* (number)
6. *Parimāṇa* (size)
7. *Pṛthaktva* (individuality)
8. *Saṃyoga* (conjunction)
9. *Vibhāga* (disjunction)
10. *Paratva* (priority)
11. *Aparatva* (posteriority)
12. *Buddhi* (knowledge)
13. *Sukha* (pleasure)
14. *Duḥkha* (pain)
15. *Ichchhā* (desire)
16. *Dveṣa* (aversion)
17. *Prayatna* (effort).

Praśastapāda has added seven more to the list: heaviness (*gurutva*), fluidity (*dravatva*), viscidity (*sneha*), faculty (*saṃskāra*), merit (*dharma*), demerit (*adharma*) and sound (*śabda*). A *guṇa* or quality cannot exist by itself, it must abide in a substance. A quality has no further quality. The quality has been thus defined: "The one which remains dependent to the *dravya*, which does not further entertain another quality, which does not become a cause in conjunction and disjunction, and which is thus non-related is called *guṇa*." We have no intention to enter into details of all these qualities.

Dayānanda has discussed in details the Vaiśeṣika definitions of *karma* (I, i, 7; 17),

sāmānya (I, i, 18; 23) *viśeṣa* (I, ii, 5; 3), *samavāya* (VII, ii, 26); and also *sādharmya* (I,i,9) in the third chapter of the *Satyārtha-prakāśa* and the readers are referred to consult them there.

Now, I shall give the atomic theory of Kaṇāda as represented by Max Müller in his '*The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy.*' He writes:

"What is thought to be peculiar to Kaṇāda, nay the distinguishing feature of his philosophy, is the theory of *aṇus* or atoms. They take the place of *tanmātrās* in the Sāmkhya-philosophy. Though the idea of an atom is not unknown in the Nyāya-philosophy (*Nyāya Sūtras, IV, ii, 4-25*) it is nowhere so fully worked out as in the Vaiśeṣika. Kaṇāda argued that there must be somewhere a smallest thing, that excludes further analysis. Without this admission, we should have a *regressus ad infinitum*, most objectionable process in the eyes of all Indian philosophers. A mountain, he says, would not be larger than a mustard seed. The smallest and invisible particles are held by Kaṇāda to be eternal in themselves, but non-eternal as aggregates. As aggregates again they may be organised, organs and inorganic. Thus the human body is earth organised, the power of smelling is the earthly organ, stones are inorganic.

"It is, no doubt, very tempting to ascribe a Greek origin to Kaṇāda's theory of atoms. But suppose that the ayomic theory had really been borrowed from a Greek source, would it not be strange that Kaṇāda's atoms are supposed never to assume visible dimensions till there is a combination of three double atoms (*tryaṇuka*), neither the simple nor the double atoms being supposed to be visible by themselves. I do not remember anything like this in Epicurean authors, and it seems to me to give quite an independent character to Kaṇāda's view of the nature of an atom.

"We are told that water in the atomic state is eternal, as an aggregate transient. Beings in the realm of Varuṇa (God of the sea) are organised, taste is the watery organ, rivers are water inorganic.........

"As to atoms, they are supposed to form first an aggregate of two, then an aggregate of three double atoms, then of four triple atoms, and so on. While single atoms are indestructible, composite atoms are by their very nature liable to decomposition and in that sense, to destruction. An atom by itself invisible, is compared to the sixth part of a mote in a sunbeam." (pp.445-447).

The *paramāṇus* are said to be globular (*parimaṇḍalya*), that is, devoid of angularities.

This is reasonable in view of their kinetic state and because of their further indivisibility. One may differ from Kaṇāda in matters of details but if we consider everything in a philosophic attitude, we cannot discard his views so very lightly. We know that the modern atom of a scientist is much smaller than the one conceived by the Kaṇādic school,—many million times smaller. If Kaṇāda's atom is of the order of—4 in dimensions the modern atom is of the order of—22 (to the powers of ten). We as chemists, have also to differ with him regarding dyads and triads and the notion of elements. But here, we have to consider the whole aspect from a philosophical angle of vision and not from that of an experimental chemist of the twentieth century.

PROPERTY OF AGGREGATE

The most difficult question to answer is from whence does the property of an aggregate arise ? Atoms do not become an object of perception unless they form an aggregate. According to the Vaiśeṣika, an aggregate can have only those qualities which are possessed by the atoms. All atoms do not possess identical property. Being infinite in number, we can classify them according to their possessing qualities, air atoms possessing tangibility, fire that and colour, water these and savour, and earth

these and odour. Aggregates differ by reason of the number of atoms which produce them and thus create magnitude (*mahattva*) which is different from minuteness (*aṇutva*). Śankara has described the Vaiśeṣika doctrine in the following words while commenting on the Vedānta Sūtras [1] "Or (the world may originate from Brahman) as the great and long originate from the short and the atomic" (II, ii, 11): The atoms which possess, according to their special kind, the qualities of colour etc., and which are of spherical form, subsist during a certain period (during the period of each *pralaya*, when all the atoms are isolated and motionless) without producing any effects. After that the unseen principle (*adṛṣṭa*) etc., (*i. e.*, the activity of the Lord) acting as operative causes and conjunction constituting the non-inherent cause, they produce the entire aggregate of effected things, beginning with binary atomic compounds. At the same time, the qualities of the cause (*i. e.*, of the simple atoms) produce corresponding qualities in the effects. Thus, when two atoms produce a binary atomic compound, the special qualities belonging to the simple atoms, such as white colour etc., produce a corresponding white colour in the binary compound.

1. महद्दीर्घवद्वा ह्रस्वपरिमण्डलाभ्याम्

One special quality, however, of simple atoms, viz. atomic sphericity, does not produce corresponding sphericity in the binary compound; for the forms of extension belonging to the latter are said to be minuteness (*aṇutva*) and shortness. And, again, when two binary compounds combining produce a quaternary atomic compound, the qualities, such as whiteness, etc., inherent in the binary compounds produce corresponding qualities in the quaternary compounds; with the exception, however, of the two qualities of minuteness and shortness. For it is admitted that the forms of extension belonging to quaternary compounds are not minuteness and shortness, but bigness (*mahattva*) and length (*dairghya*)."

Thus apparently, all the properties in an aggregate cannot be ascribed to be existing in the components. The 'aggregation' is also a property which can never exist in the atom. But then, does it mean that the effect is something very much apart from the cause or is not related to the cause at all? The modern concept of matter does not even believe that the units of matter possess such qualities as smell, colour, odour, touch etc. Shall we have then to classify qualities into two groups, primary and secondary, as Locke has done? The primary qualities, such as solidity, extension, figure or rest and

number, are utterly inseparable from the body, in whatsoever state it be. In all alterations and changes, these qualities are retained. The secondary qualities, which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves, have powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, as colours, sound, taste etc. Whether the qualities that we perceive in an aggregation exist in the components or not, one thing is clear that all the properties *depend upon certain characteristics of components*. They are not independent of components, because had it been so, then anything would have given rise to everything.

Let us see, what the scientific spirit is in such a case. Take the example of colour. We do not confine ourselves to what we see with eyes. A physicist would study the whole spectrum, visible and invisible. He would try to associate every line in the spectrum to some state of the electron inside the molecule. For rotation and vibration, for excitement and for so many other factors, he would ascribe the exact quantitative magnitudes. He can exactly show that the particular colour emitted by a substance is not an *accident*; it is associated with particular characteristics of the component. Our expressions are more refined now and we do not ascribe blue colour of a body to

the blue colour possessed by atoms or electrons. Blue colour itself is an aggregate of colours and we say that the energetics of a particular line in the blue region of the spectrum correspond to the particular energy level of a particular electron. Thus the Vaiśeṣika may be wrong in the detailed conceptions, but so far as the philosophical implications are concerned, it is right. The philosophical implication is only this much that *the state of individual units exactly and quantitatively corresponds to the state of aggregation*. The trend of science is to associate all the physical properties, not only the directly cognised ones, as odour, colour, sound etc., but also the indirect inferred ones, as magnetic values, dipole moments, parachors, refractive indices, and so many others, with the exact chemical constitution. To a scientist, *no property is accidental*, and whenever a new property manifests itself, he endeavours to associate it to the pre-existing conditions and characteristics. We know that there are difficulties in way of working out all these complexities, but as the knowledge advances, we more and more are led to the belief that all the properties of aggregation are related to in some way to the *characteristics* of primary units. In view of all these standpoints, we can appreciate the philosophical implications of Kaṇada's atomic doctrine.

ŚANKARA'S CRITICISM OF THE ATOMISM

Śankara has raised a number of objections against the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of atomism while commenting on the Vedānta Sūtras (II, ii, 11-17). As we have said in the preceding chapters, Śankara maintains that the non-intelligent world has evolved out of an intelligent Being. We shall summarise a few of his arguments here :—

(*i*) Just as from spherical atoms, binary compounds are produced which are minute and short, and ternary compounds which are big and long, but *not anything spherical*, and then again from binary compounds, which are minute and short, are produced ternary compounds with quite *contradictory* properties, big and long, so this *non-intelligent world may spring from the intelligent Brahman*.

This analogy which Śankara has derived is not correct. Minuteness to bigness and shortness to length are not related in the same way as non-intelligence to intelligence. Non-intelligences added up together would lead to non-intelligence only. Bigness is a collective name of minuteness whilst intelligence is not an aggregate of non-intelligence. It is another thing that small intelligences may lead to a big intelligence, if we can speak like this at all, but not the non-intelligences. So the non-intelligent world

cannot come out of an intelligent Brahman. Non-intelligence is negation of intelligence, whereas minuteness is neither contrary to, nor a negation of, bigness. Here the relation is of a component and an aggregate, or of a part and the whole.

(*ii*) Just as a binary compound which is *absolutely different* from the two constituent atoms is connected with them by means of the relation of inherence (*samavāya*), so the relation of inherence itself being absolutely different from the two things which it connects, requires another relation of inherence to connect it with them, there being absolute difference in both cases. For this second relation of inherence again, a third relation of inherence would have to be assumed and so on *ad infinitum*.

We do not maintain that binary compound is *absolutely* different from the atom. This argument is a mere play of words. Once a *samavāya* is established, it does not necessitate a further *samavāya* on account of its very definition. *Samavāya* does not independently exist as a *thing*, it is potentially *in* things by virtue of the characteristics of the things and manifests when two or more things are brought within each other's vicinity. Because it is *in* things, and it remains also in things, therefore, to connect it with things, no other *samavāya* is necessary.

(*iii*) Another criticism is advanced thus: Atoms are either essentially active (moving) or essentially non-active, or both or neither. But Śankara says that none of the four alternatives is possible. If they were essentially active, their activity would be permanent so that no *pralaya* could take place. If they were essentially non-active, their non-activity would be permanent and no creation would take place. Their being both is impossible because self-contradictory. (Śankara does not feel self-contradiction when defining his '*māyā*'). This criticism is valid when Brahman as an efficient cause is denied. But Dayānanda regards the Vaiśeṣika to be a theist. Besides the four alternatives cited above, there is one more. Atoms are neither active nor non-active, but *can be activated*. They derive their original energy or activity from Brahman. It is the reflected activity by which they appear to be active. And moreover, *pralaya* also does not mean annihilation of activity. It simply becomes potential from kinetic, because, after *pralaya*, there is again a creation.

(*iv*) If atoms have qualities of colour etc., as they have according to the Vaiśeṣikas, this would be contrary to the atomic minuteness and permanency, *i. e.*, it would follow that, compared, to the ultimate cause, they are gross and non-permanent. For, ordinary

experience teaches that whatever things possess colour and other qualities are, compared to their cause, gross and non-permanent. To this criticism, we would say that atoms have. properties also in the atomic dimensions. Just as they are further indivisible, their properties are also further indivisible. We when mean atom to be an atom, we mean that the properties are atomic and therefore, non-gross and permanent.

PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS

Now we shall discuss the philosophic implications. The fundamental question is whether we can reduce all phenomena to numberless *units*, each as if devoid of dimensions, and yet having existence and being further indivisible. The other view is that we can reduce everything to *unity*, the all-pervading one and devoid of dimensions and apparent qualities. The third view is that everything is reducible to an absolute nothing. We are not going to subscribe to the third view, because in this chapter, we have started with the conviction, that at the basis of the phenomena exists a material cause and nothing can come out of nothing and nothing can end into nothing.

We have said that Dayānanda reconciles both the other views. According to him, for ordinary reactions to go on or for ordinary

dissolution, one can stop at the bigger units of mass, which may be triads, dyads or atoms. The primordial state by itself is *avyakta* or non-manifested; even upto *mahat* and *ahamkāra*, it remains almost non-manifested, and the real manifestation occurs when it is condensed to *pañchatanmātrās*. In the non-manifested state, *prakṛti* is numberless and dimensionless, the one all-embracing unit. It is in the *kāraṇāvasthā* or the absolute causal form. The moment, it is condensed to the effect-form, there appear in it numberless points of simply positional dimensions. These are called atoms, and for subsequent transformations, they act as cause. Atoms are the fundamental units of matter in *kāryāvasthā*. No *kāryāvasthā* or the effect-form is possible below atomic dimensions. These atoms cannot be further divided without losing the *kāryāvasthā* of the phenomena. And finally when they merge into *kāraṇāvasthā* or the causal form, they all, as if by a process of *melting away*, become a continuous whole, the heterogeneity disappears, and they are lost as if in a homogeneous one. This state is known as *prakṛti*, which is one homogeneous continuous whole, the one all-embracing unity with only one quality, the *primordial material causality*. *Prakṛti* is a sheet of paper, which is capable of giving rise to all sketches and diagrams, but which by itself is devoid of diagram. In the

hands of a skilful painter, the same paper is manifested in a numberless forms and appearances. The painter without paper and paper without the painter can give rise to no painting. When the pencil sketch is rubbed off, the paper persists, when the gold ornament is fused, the gold is left behind, when the pot is destroyed, the clay remains and similarly when the dissolution takes place, the primordiality persists.

We have not entered into the realm of many discussions concerning details and finitude. It matters little whether the Vaiśeṣika adopts the theory of *pīlupāka*, which maintains that when the jar is baked, the old one is destroyed before the new one appears, or whether the Nyāya believes in the *piṭharapāka* theory, which maintains that the same jar persists, and the change is simultaneous in the atoms and product. All this depends on what we understand by *change*.

Chapter X

Mind and Beyond

WE have seen in the previous chapter, that the first thing which evolves out of *prakṛti* is *mahān*, for which the two other terms given in the Sāmkhya Sūtras are *antaḥkaraṇa* and *manas*. The soul is linked to the body through this *mahān;* and for two reasons, firstly, being the nearest to the primordial *prakṛti* and secondly, also being the nearest to the *ātman*, it acts as if it is also a *chetan* entity, full of activity and vitality. It is so active, being in the close proximity to the soul, that sometimes the ego itself is lost in it. We have also seen that according to the Vaiśeṣika, mind or *manas* is one through which a contact is established between the sense organs and the ego. The Nyāya[1] (I, i, 16) recognises mind to be functioning, from the fact that one is only capable of attending to one thing at a time. Though it is open to all the sense organs to cognise impressions simultaneously, yet it never happens so because of the presence of mind. Eyes are wide open but unless mind directs eyes to see, no seeing is possible, and at the moment one sees, he simultaneously does not hear, nor tastes nor

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1. युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गम् ।

smells and so on. So is the case with hearing, smelling and tasting. Out of so many sensations which can be received by our sense organs, mind directs and controls in such a way, that to the ego, the passage is clear for only one sensation. Mind may be called, therefore, a fine aperture, through which at one particular moment, only one sensation or impression is allowed to pass.

In the fourth *pāda* of the Yoga Sūtra, Patañjali has discussed the nature of mind for which he uses the term *chitta* from the very beginning. He discusses that the *chitta* is different from the objects cognised, because one and the same object is cognised differently by different persons[1]. (IV, 15). Thus, we can say that the subject (here *chitta*) and the objects have their independent existence. The existence of object is not dependent on one mind alone. When the mind is detached, the object does not become *apramāṇaka* or non-evidenced[2] (IV, 16). This view goes against the concepts of Berkeley, who regards the objects to be existing in mind alone.

Patañjali further says that an object becomes known and unknown on account of mind's *uparāgāpekṣitatva*[3] (IV, 17). This

1. वस्तुसाम्ये चित्तभेदात्तयोर्विभक्तः पन्थाः ।
2. न चैकचित्ततन्त्रं वस्तु तदप्रमाणकं तदा किं स्यात् ।
3. तदुपरागापेक्षित्वाच्चित्तस्य वस्तु ज्ञाताऽज्ञातम् ।

term denotes the relative characteristics of mind and the object. Mind cannot cognise unless it has the capacity of establishing a contact, whilst the object cognised should also be such that the mind could be attached to it. It probably means that the cognition requires 'inter-action'.

In spite of the *chitta* being so active, it is not the final cogniser. The characteristics of *chitta* are changeable, and over this changeability, presides the self, which by itself is unchangeable[1] (IV, 18). *Chitta* by itself being a *dṛśya* or perceived, it has no light of its own[2] (IV, 19). The self and mind are not one, because the self realises both, mind and the object, simultaneously. When the self gets an impression of some object, it is not the object that is only cognised, the so-called cognising mind is also simultaneously cognised. To cognise mind, it is not necessary to have another mind, because in this way, the series would never end, and then there will be a confusion of memories too[3] (IV, 20-21). The mind is always coloured or tinted with the cogniser,

1. सदा ज्ञाताश्चित्तवृत्तयस्तत्प्रभोः पुरुषस्याऽपरिणामित्वात् ।
2. न तत्स्वाभासं दृश्यत्वात् ।
3. एकसमये चोभयाऽनवधारणम् । २० ।
चित्तान्तरदृश्ये बुद्धिबुद्धेरतिप्रसंगः स्मृतिसंकरश्च । २१ ।

the self, and the cognised objects[1] (IV, 23). One cannot ignore the self, because the mind tinted with so many impressions is meant for somebody else (*parārtha*). It is the self which correlates the various impressions cognised through mind[2] (IV, 24).

CHARACTERISTICS OF MIND

Mind is attributed to possess five characteristics or modifications called *vṛtti*: *pramāṇa* or the valid cognition, *viparyaya* or misconception, *vikalpa* or imagination, *nidrā* or sleep, and *smṛti* or memory[3] (I, 5, 6). All these *vṛttis* may be paingiving (*kliṣṭa*) or non-paingiving (*akliṣṭa*), and in this way, they are further divided into two groups. Dayānanda has discussed these characteristics in the *Ṛgvedādibhāṣyabhūmikā* in the '*Upāsanā*' chapter. The valid cognition is possible by three means, perception, inference and authority or scripture[4] (I, 7). Misconception or *viparyaya* is an erroneous idea which is not true to the nature of the object[5] (I, 8). *Vikalpa* or

1. द्रष्टृदृश्योपरक्तं चित्तं सर्वार्थम् ।
2. तदऽसंख्येयवासनाभिश्चित्रमपि परार्थं संहत्यकारित्वात् ।
3. वृत्तयः पञ्चतय्यः क्लिष्टाऽक्लिष्टाः । ५ ।
   प्रमाणविपर्ययविकल्पनिद्रास्मृतयः । ६ ।
4. तत्र प्रत्यक्षानुमानाऽऽगमाः प्रमाणानि ।
5. विपर्ययो मिथ्याज्ञानमतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठम् ।

imagination is a form of words which has no positive fact corresponding to it[1] (I, 9). *Nidrā* or sleep is that mental modification which is supported by the negation of waking. It includes dream and sound sleep both[2] (I, 10). *Smṛti* or memory is the recollection of the object through the impressions left behind by the previous experience of it. On its account, the cognised impressions always appear as not lost[3] (I, 11).

Mental states are very well classified in the Aitareya Upaniṣad[4] (III, 2). Rānāde writes that "this passage is remarkable as being the earliest contribution to a classification of mental states." The various characteristics of *prajñāna* or intellect are thus given: "Sensation, perception, ideation, conception, understanding, insight, resolution, opinion, imagination, feeling, memory, volition, conation, the will-to-live, desire and self-control." Rānāde further says: "It is remarkable that the seer not merely mentions the different levels of intellectual experience

1. शब्दज्ञानानुपाती वस्तुशून्यो विकल्पः ।
2. अभावप्रत्ययालम्बनावृत्तिर्निद्रा ।
3. अनुभूतविषयाऽसंप्रमोषः स्मृतिः ।
4. यदेतत् हृदयं मनश्चैतत् ॥ संज्ञानमाज्ञानं विज्ञानं प्रज्ञानं मेधा-दृष्टिर्धृतिर्मतिर्मनीषा जूति स्मृतिः संकल्पः क्रतुरसुः कामोवश इति सर्वाण्येवैतानि प्रज्ञानस्य नामधेयानि भवति ।

such as sensation, perception, ideation, and conception, as different from one another, but also recognises the other two characteristic forms of experience, feeling and volition; makes a distinction between volition which need not involve the idea of activity, and conation which does; as well as recognises the processes of imagination and memory."

THE BODY OF FIVE SHEATHS

Dayānanda describes in details in the ninth chapter of the *Satyārthaprakāśa* the concept of five sheaths, originally propounded in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad[1] (II, 2-5). In the second chapter of this Upaniṣad we are told that "within this physical body which is made up of food is another body which is made up of vital air; the former is filled with the latter, which is also like the shape of man," and so on. Dayānanda describes these sheaths or *koṣa* as follows:—

(*i*) The *annamaya* or physical sheath: It comprises all the tissues and fluids of the body from bone to skin. It is the gross body (*pṛthivīmaya*).

1. तस्माद्वा एतस्मादन्नरसमयात् । अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा प्राणमयः । ···अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा मनोमयः । ···अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा विज्ञानमयः । ···अन्योऽन्तर आत्मानन्दमयः ।

(*ii*) The *prāṇamaya* or the vital sheath which comprises the five great vital or nervauric forces: *prāṇa* or the expiratory force which helps to draw the breath out; *apāna* or the inspiratory force that helps to draw air from without to within; *samāna* which is situated in the centre of the abdomen and serves to carry *rasa* or the essence of food to all parts of the body; *udāna* which helps to draw food down the throat into the stomach and gives rise to strength and energy; and lastly, *vyāna* which helps the soul to move or do anything, it is the cause of motion.

(*iii*) The *manomaya* or the psychic sheath: It contains *manas*, or mind and *ahamkāra* or the egotising organ.

(*iv*) The *vijñānamaya* or the intelligence sheath which includes *buddhi* and *chitta* along with the organs of senses. It is through these that the soul carries on such processes as thinking and the like.

(*v*) The *ānandamaya* or the blissful sheath which comprises love,

cheerfulness, happiness—the lower and higher both; the causal *prakṛti* is the basis of the entertainment of these feelings.

Dayānanda says that "the above-mentioned five sheaths are the *media* through which the soul acquires all kinds of knowledge, carries on all mental processes and performs all its actions."

FOUR KINDS OF BODIES

Dayānanda has in the same ninth chapter referred to four kinds of bodies:

1. The *sthūla śarīra* or the gross physical body which is seen and felt.

2. The *sūkṣma śarīra* or the subtle body which comprises seventeen principles, the five vital airs, the five sensatory principles, the five elementary principles in subtle form, *manas* and *buddhi* (mind and intellect). This body accompanies the soul in all its births and deaths. This is again of two kinds, the one is physical which is derived from the essence of five elements and the other natural which comprises the natural powers and attributes of the soul. This natural *sūkṣma śarīra* is retained in the emancipated state also, and it is through it that the soul enjoys the bliss of salvation. The natural *sūkṣma śarīra* is in fact the

soul itself; it is not the material body at all; it may, at the most, be called egotistic body.

3. The *kāraṇa śarīra* or the causal body which consists of the elementary matter *prakṛti*. It is all-pervading and therefore common to all souls. It is through this that the soul enters into the state of *suṣupti* or the sound sleep.

4. The *turīya śarīra* or ecstatic body through which the soul is absorbed in the all-blissful Supreme Spirit while in *samādhi*. The *śarīra* so developed here is also helpful in the emancipated state.

These four bodies correspond, thus, to the four states in which the soul may be placed. The wakeful state corresponds to the *sthūla śarīra*; the dream and sleep state to *kāraṇa śarīra*; the ecstatic state to *turīya śarīra*; and the emancipated state to the *sūkṣma śarīra* of the second kind, the egotistic one. (The detailed discussion of these bodies will be found in Gangāprasāda Upādhyāya's book, the *Jīvātmā*, p. 232).

THE FOUR STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad has very clearly distinguished between the four states of consciousness to which we have just now referred. The description runs thus:

"This soul is four-footed, that is, it has four phases. (*i*) The first condition is that of *jāgṛti* or wakefulness, when the soul is conscious of only external objects and enjoys gross things, and then it is to be called *vaiśvānara*. (*ii*) The second condition is that of *svapna* or dreaming, when the soul is conscious of internal objects and enjoys the subtle things, and then it is called *taijasa*. (*iii*) When the person in sleep desires no desires and dreams no dreams, that state is to be called the state of *suṣupti* or sound sleep. Thus the third condition of the soul is that of sound sleep, when being centred in itself and being full of knowledge and bliss, it feeds on bliss, it is then called *prājña*. (*iv*) The fourth state of the soul is that of pure self-consciousness (*turīya*), when there is no knowledge of internal objects, nor of external ones, nor of the two together; when the soul is not a mass of intelligence, transcending as it does both consciousness and unconsciousness; when it is invisible, uncommunicable, incomprehensible and indefinable; when it is beyond thought and beyond the possibitity of any indication, being virtually the quintessence of self-intuition, in which all the five kinds of sensation are finally resolved; when it is tranquil and full of auspiciousness and without a second; it is then to be called *ātman*.

(Rānāde: *Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy*, p. 140).

Similar to the Māṇḍūkyā, the Bṛhadāraṇyaka also describes sleep as follows: "As a falcon or any other bird, after having flown in the sky, becomes tired, and folding his wings repairs to his nest, so does this person hasten to that state where, when asleep, he desires no more desires, and dreams no more dreams.[1] " (IV, iii, 19).

THE SPIRIT OF YOGA

Max Müller writes that "a false interpretation of the term Yoga as union has led to a total misrepresentation of Patañjali's Philosophy. Patañjali like Kapila rests satisfied with the isolation of the soul, and does not pry into the how and where the soul abides after separation." Max Müller agrees with Rajendra Lal Mittra in so far that Yoga, in the philosophy of Patañjali, and Kapila, did not mean union with God or anything but effort (*udyoga*, not *samyoga*) pulling oneself together, exertion, concentration. Patañjali uses the term '*dṛśya*'

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1. तद्यथास्मिन्नाकाशे श्येनो वा सुपर्णो वा विपरिपत्य श्रान्तः संहृत्य पक्षौ संलयायैव ध्रियत एवमेवायं पुरुष एतस्मा अन्ताय धावति यत्र सुप्तो न कञ्चन कामं कामयते न कञ्चन स्वप्नं पश्यति ।

for the phenomenal world and the term *dṛṣṭā* for the self. The contact of *dṛśya* with *dṛṣṭā* is the cause of pain[1] (II, 17). This *dṛśya* or the phenomenon comprises of three attributes, light, action and rest, which may be similar to *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* of the Sāmkhya respectively, and which manifest themselves into the five elements and various sense organs. The purpose of the phenomenal world is twofold, the enjoyment or *bhoga* and emancipation or the attainment of *apavarga*.[2] (II, 18)

The soul by mistake thinks itself to be the master of the *dṛśya*, and therefore, it gets entangled into it[3] (II, 23), but after all, the cause of entanglement is *avidyā* or ignorance[4] (II, 24). When ignorance is dispelled, the contact is also broken, and then the *kaivalya* or emancipation is attained.[5] (II, 25). Dispelling the ignorance means the awakening of the right consciousness which is called '*vivekakhyāti*'[6] (II, 26) The eight components of Yoga

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1. द्रष्टृदृश्ययोः संयोगो हेयहेतुः ।
2. प्रकाशक्रियास्थितिशीलं भूतेन्द्रियात्मकं भोगाऽपवर्गार्थं दृश्यम् ।
3. स्वस्वामिशक्त्योः स्वरूपोपलब्धिहेतुः संयोगः ।
4. तस्य हेतुरविद्या ।
5. तदभावात्संयोगाऽभावो हानं तद्दृशेः कैवल्यम् ।
6. विवेकख्यातिरविप्लवा हानोपायः ।

lead one to this attainment; the one following them becomes enlightened[1] (II, 28).

For all these reasons, Max Müller and others have been led to believe that the Yoga of Patañjali is not really *yoga* or union, it is simply disunion or *viyoga*. Yoga is a process of distraction, there is no doubt about it; but to say that the Patañjali's Yoga altogether discards the notion of union is also not very correct. In the very third aphorism of the Yoga, it is said that when the different characteristics of mind come under control, the one becomes concentrated in the own form of *draṣṭā*[2] (I, 3). Vyāsa and others have translated the word *draṣṭuḥ* as 'of the soul', but Dayānanda has translated as 'of God',—"*Draṣṭuḥ sarvajñasya parameśvarasya svarūpe sthitim labhate*" (*Ṛgvedādibhāṣyabhūmikā*, '*Upāsanā*' chapter). If one has to be concentrated or absorbed in his own original form, where was the necessity of '*Īśvarapraṇidhāna*' or the devotion of God in the ready attainment of *samādhi* as given in the Yoga[3], (I, 23 or II, 45). In that case, it would have been irrelevant to refer to God

1. योगाङ्गानुष्ठानादशुद्धिक्षये ज्ञानदीप्तिराविवेकख्यातेः ।
2. तदा द्रष्टुः स्वरूपेऽवस्थानम् ।
3. ईश्वरप्रणिधानाद्वा (1, 23); समाधिसिद्धिरीश्वरप्रणिधानात् (2, 45) ।

in the form of *puruṣa-viśeṣa*[1] (I, 24) or to repeat the *praṇava* syllable (I, 27, 28). Evidently, Patañjali is not an atheist. When the *nirbīja* or *asamprajñāta samādhi* has been attained, the barriers between God and the self are removed. Patañjali aims at removing those barriers and then the contact between the two will be self-evident. Therefore, it is wrong to say that the Yoga of Patañjali does not aim at union. *Yoga* means disunion from the phenomenal world, and union with God. It is thus union and disunion both.

THE OBSTRUCTIONS

The *vikṣepa* or unsteadiness of *chitta* is due to many barriers or obstructions. In the light of Patañjali, Dayānanda has discussed them also in connection with *upāsanā* or devotion. These barriers are known as *antarāya*[2] (I, 30). The barriers are nine: (*i*) *Vyādhi* (disease) which is produced by the disharmony of various health principles; (*ii*) *śtyāna* (inertia) or the incapability towards some action; (*iii*) *saṁśaya* (dubiosity) or the undecisiveness; (*iv*) *pramāda* (lethargy) towards various attempts concerning *yoga*;

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1. क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः ।
2. व्याधिस्त्यानसंशयप्रमादालस्याविरतिभ्रान्तिदर्शनाऽलब्धभूमिक-
त्वानवस्थितत्वानि चित्तविक्षेपास्तेऽन्तरायाः ।

(*v*) *ālasya* (laziness) or feeling heaviness in mind and body and always craving for rest; (*vi*) *avirati* (attachment) in various worldly sensualities; (*vii*) *bhrānti-darśana* (illusion) or misconception; (*viii*) *alabdhabhūmikatva* or the non-attainment of *yogic* grounds; and (*ix*) *anavasthitatva* (unstability) even after gaining a firm ground. These are the nine barriers in the path of *yoga* (I, 30).

The following five are co-barriers which accompany the above ones and produce restlessness: (*i*) *duḥkha* (pain) of three kinds—the self-made, the physical and the accidental; (*ii*) *daurmanasya* (disappointment) when the desired is not accomplished; (*iii*) *angamejayatva* or the fickleness of body-organs; (*iv*) *śvāsa* (breath) with lost control over it and (*v*) *praśvāsa* (respiration) or coming out of the breath without intention. Those who have attained steadiness in matters of *yoga* do not experience these troubles[1] (I, 31). Control is obtained over all these by constant practice of the one principle, probably the meditation of God[2] (I, 32). This is the only way by which success can be attained.

CONTROL OVER MIND

The Yoga says that control over mind

1. दुःखदौर्मनस्याऽङ्गमेजयत्वश्वासप्रश्वासा विक्षेपसहभुवः ।
2. तत्प्रतिषेधार्थमेकतत्त्वाभ्यासः ।

can be obtained in two ways,—in repeated practice (*abhyāsa*), and by detachment (*vairāgya*)[1] (I, 12). The following ethical principles will keep mind within control: *Maitrī* (friendliness); *karuṇā* (sympathy); *muditā* (cheerfulness); *upekṣā* (indifferentness towards undesirables); all these four in matters of pleasure, pain, righteousness and non-righteousness respectively[2] (I, 33).

Another way of obtaining control is by breath-exercises[3] (I, 34) or *prāṇāyāma*. One should take out breath with as much force as he can do with ease, and then stop the breath outside. This would help in keeping mind steady.

THE EIGHT-FOLD METHOD

Dayānanda has discussed the eight-fold method of *yoga* as propounded by Patañjali. He says that "by following these eightfold methods, the impurity and ingnorance gradually decrease whereas knowledge increases so much so that the *mokṣa* is attained finally[4] (II, 28)". The eight-fold methods are:

1. अभ्यासवैराग्याभ्यां तन्निरोधः ।
2. मैत्रीकरुणामुदितोपेक्षाणां सुखदुःखपुण्यापुण्यविषयाणां भावनातश्चित्तप्रसादनम् ।
3. प्रच्छर्दनविधारणाभ्यां वा प्राणस्य ।
4. योगाङ्गानुष्ठानादशुद्धिक्षये ज्ञानदीप्तिराविवेकख्यातेः ।

(1) *Yama* (abstention) which are five: (*i*) *ahimsā* or non-violence which when attained, the animosity disappears; (*ii*) *satya* or truthfulness which brings success in all actions; (*iii*) *asteya* or honesty which leads to accumulation of wealth; (*iv*) *brahmacharya* or celibacy, which leads to vigour and strength; and (*v*) *aparigraha* or the non-attachment with the body which leads to the knowledge of cause of birth and death.

(2) *Niyama* (observances) which are also five: (*i*) *saucha* or purity which leads to indifference towards one's own body and the non-attachment in other's body; (*ii*) *santoṣa* or contentment which leads to pleasure; (*iii*) *tapa* or austerity which leads to a healthy life by removing impurity from body and organs; (*iv*) *svādhyāya* or the self-study which establishes contact with the desired goal; and (*v*) *Iśvara-praṇidhāna* or devotion to God which leads to *samādhi*.

(3) *Āsana* or postures which aim at disciplining the body. The body should be disciplined with ease (II, 46) and not with pressure. The postures are numerous of which Dayānanda refers to the following: *Padmāsana* (the lotus-form), *Vīrāsana* (hero-form), *Bhadrāsana*, *Svastika*, *Daṇḍāsana*, *Sopāśrayāsana*, *Paryanka*, *Krauncha-niṣadanāsana*, *Hastinisadanāsana*, *Uṣṭra-*

niṣadana, and *Samasansthāna*. We are leaving here the details of these postures. The Yogin has an option in matters of postures and he can choose any to his convenience.

(4) *Prāṇāyāma* or breath-control. The breath which goes from outside to inside is called *śvāsa*, and the one which comes outside is known as *praśvāsa*. A Yogin should practice control over both the movements. Dayānanda says that the nose should not be blocked forcibly by introducing finger in it or by holding it tightly. This is a mistake which beginners do He describes four types of *prāṇāyāma*: (*i*) when the breath is coming out from within, stop it outside, (*ii*) when the outside breath is going in, stop it inside; (*iii*) the stationary one (*stambha*) when the breath is stopped then and there, without exhaling and inhaling; and lastly, (*iv*) while the breath is coming in from outside, partially stop it outside, and similarly, when it is coming out from inside, partially stop it inside.

(5) *Pratyāhāra* or sense-control—Dayānanda writes that when one obtains control over mind, and so adapts it that it goes nowhere else other than towards God, the sense-organs get controlled automatically.

(6) *Dhāraṇā* or concentration—It means the concentration of mind, after abstracting

it from other places, at a particular spot as abdomen, heart, the tip of nose or the tip of tongue, or at the summit of brain. While concentrating, one should repeat the *Praṇava* syllable 'Om' and be always contemplating about God.

(7) *Dhyāna* or contemplation—Dayānanda says that after having abstracted from other sides, the Yogin should then be contemplating about the one goal, God, with all devotion and love. He is now at the point of merging himself into the love of God, just as the river is while entering into an ocean. He should direct himself to nothing else but God.

(8) *Samādhi* or the ecstasy—It means deep merging oneself in God, feeling nothing but the blissful God all round, forgetting for the time even one's own self. This is the last stage of *yoga*.

THE MEETING PLACE

Dayānanda describes the '*City of God*' where we can meet Him. The description is given in the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad (VIII, i, 1-5). Beneath the throat, between the nipples and above the belly, there lies the City of God, the *Brahmapura*. In the centre of the city, there is a beautiful pond, where blooms a lotus. Within and without this lotus, permeates the Lord Brahman. You

can meet Brahman there only and nowhere else. There alone you will find Him.

There in that heart, resides Brahman. In the void there, fire, air, the sun, the moon and all the enlightened bodies are bound up. The body gets old and diseased, but God within remains unaffected. His name, verily, is Satya Brahmapura. He is all truth. He is beyond death, desire and pain. We can meet our Lord there and there alone, in our own within, and nowhere else, never outside ourselves. He is so near us. Shall we see Him!

Chapter XI

Life Beyond Death

THE young Nachiketas saw that his father is giving away at a sacrifice everything that he possessed. With his childlike innocence, he asked his father, "Dear father, to whom wilt thou give me?" The father angrily replied, "I shall give thee unto Death". Nachiketas then enters into the abode of Yama Vaivasvata, where he could see him only after three days. Yama says, "O Brāhmana, as thou, a venerable guest, has dwelt in my house three nights without eating, therefore, choose now three boons." While coming to the third boon, Nachiketas says, "There is that doubt, when a man is dead,–some saying he is; others he is not. This I should like to know, taught by thee; this is the third of my boons."

Death said: "On this point even the gods have been in doubt formerly; it is not easy to understand. That subject is subtle. Choose another boon, Nachiketas; do not press me, and let me off that boon."

Nachiketas said, "On this point even gods have been in doubt indeed, and thou Death, hast declared it to be not easy to understand, but another teacher like thee is

not to be found—surely no other boon is like unto this."

Yama wants Nachiketas to choose sons and grandsons, horses, music, and dances and so on instead of pressing for this boon. But Nachiketas is unmoved. He says, "*Thoughts of tomorrow, O Death, wear out the present vigour of all the senses of man. Even the whole life is short.* Keep thou thy horses, keep dance and song for thyself. No man can be made happy through wealth. Shall we have wealth when we see thee, O Death? *Let us live as long as thou rulest?* Only that boon is to be chosen by me. O Death, tell us what there is in that great *Hereafter.*"

THE NECTAR OF IMMORTALITY

Yama teaches Nachiketas, "The wise who by means of meditation on his self, recognises the Ancient, who is difficult to be seen, who has entered into darkness, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow behind. A mortal who has heard this and embraced it, who has removed from it all qualities, and has thus reached that subtle Being, rejoices, because he has obtained what is a cause for rejoicing. The house of Brahman is open, I believe, O Nachiketas.

"*The knowing self is not born, it dies not*, it sprang from nothing, nothing sprang from it. The Ancient is *unborn, eternal and everlasting*: HE IS NOT KILLED THOUGH THE BODY IS KILLED. If the killer thinks that he kills, if the killed thinks that he is killed, they do not understand; for, this one does not kill, nor is that one killed. The self smaller than the small, greater than the great, is hidden in the heart of the creature. A man who is free from grief, sees the majesty of the self by the grace of the Creator. The wise who knows the self as bodiless within the bodies, as unchanging amongst changing things, as great and omnipresent, he never grieves.

"Know the self to be sitting in the chariot, the body to be the chariot, the *buddhi* or intellect to be charioteer, and the mind the reins The senses they call the horses, the objects of senses their roads. When He is in the union with the body, the senses and the mind, then wise people call him the enjoyer.

"He who has no understanding and whose mind is never firmly held, his senses are unmanageable, like vicious horses of a charioteer. But he who has understanding and whose mind is always firmly held, his senses are under control, like good horses of a charioteer.

" He who has no understanding, who is unmindful and always impure, never reaches that place, but *enters into the round of births.* But he who has understanding, who is mindful and always pure, reaches indeed that place, *from whence he is not born again.*"

THE TWO PATHS

While commenting on one *mantra* of the Yajuḥ[1] (XIX,47) Dayānanda writes : "In this world, for enjoying the fruits of good and evil, there are two paths. The one of elders and the learned, and the other of ordinary mortals devoid of knowledge. The one is called the *devayāna* or the path of Gods and the other is the *pitṛyāna* or the path of parents. Where the soul obtains its body through parents and repeatedly enjoys the fruits of good and evil actions, that is, it is again and again born, that path is known as *pitṛyāna* or the path of parents. But where, having attained the stage of immortality, the soul is released from the world of births and deaths, it is the second path called the *devayāna.* In the first path, it is born and it dies again and again in order to enjoy the fruits of actions. In the second path, it is neither born, nor it dies again. This whole creation

1. द्वे सृती अशृणवं पितॄणामहं देवानामुत मर्त्यानाम् ।
ताभ्यामिदं विश्वमेजत्समेति यदन्तरा पितरं मातरं च ॥

thus rests on these two paths. When the soul having left the previous body and having wandered through air, water and vegetation, and having entered into the bodies of father first and then the mother obtains its own body, we say that it is now born again. Then it becomes a soul with body." (*Ṛgvedādibhāṣyabhūmikā*, '*Punarjanma*' chapter).

The same *mantra* is quoted word by word in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad(VI,ii,2). In the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad[1] (V,x,1-6), we are told that there are two ways open to the mortals, the bright way and the dark way, the *archiṣ mārga* and the *dhūma mārga* which respectively represent the *devayāna* and the *pitṛyāna*. The Upaniṣad says that those who practise *śraddhā* and *tapa*, faith and penance, in a forest, their soul enters the path of light and they move successively from light to day, from day to the bright half of the month,

1. ये चेमेऽरण्ये श्रद्धा तप इत्युपासते तेऽर्चिषमभिसंभवन्त्यर्चिषोऽहरह्न आपूर्यमाणपक्षयापूर्यमाणपक्षाद्यान्षडुदङ्ङेति मासाꣳस्तान् ॥ १ ॥ मासेभ्यः संवत्सरꣳ संवत्सरादादित्यमादित्याच्चन्द्रमसं चन्द्रमसो विद्युतं तत्पुरुषोऽमानवः स एनान्ब्रह्म गमयत्येष देवयानः पन्था इति ॥ २ ॥
अथ य इमे ग्राम इष्टापूर्ते दत्तमित्युपासते ते धूममभिसंभवन्ति धूमाद्रात्रिं रात्रेरपरपक्षमपरपक्षाद्यान्षड्दक्षिणैति मासाꣳस्तानैते संवत्सरमभिप्राप्नुवन्ति ॥ ३ ॥

from the bright half of the month to the six months during which the sun moves towards the north (*uttarāyaṇa*), from these months to the year, from the year to the sun, from the sun to the moon and from the moon to the lightning. There becoming immortal, they are led to Brahman. This path is the path of gods or of Brahman."

Then there is a contrary path for those who lead life in towns performing charitable public duties. They travel by the path of smoke. From smoke they go to night, from night to the dark half of the month, from this to the six months during which the sun moves towards the south (*dakṣiṇāyana*), but they do not reach the year. Allegorically, the author means, that the path of the ascetic practising *śraddhā* and *tapa* is the path of enlightenment, while the path of a householder practising the wordly life is comparatively inferior. The former leads to immortality whilst the latter leads to the cycle of births and deaths.

WHAT IS DEATH ?

Death has been called a great cutter. In Bṛhadāraṇyaka, an appropriate question is raised : "What is to be considered the root of life ? The tree is hewn down, springs anew from the previous root ; what must be the root of man's life in order that it may spring up again, even though hewn

down by Death ?[1] "(III, ix, 28). When Śvetaketu was asked by Jaibali the questions : "Do you know where all the creatures go to from hence ? Do you know how they return again ? Do you know why the other world never becomes too full ?," Śvetaketu pleaded ignorance. On this the sage says : "How can a man who does not know these things say that he is instructed[2] ?" (*Chhāndogya* V,iii,1-4).

Max Müller describes death to be the fourth state, the first three being the states of being awake, of dreaming and of deep sleep. He writes that "in the fourth state or disembodied, the *Ātman*, with the *sūkṣma śarīra* is supposed to escape from the heart through a vein in the head or through the hundred veins of the body, and then to take, according to merit and knowledge different paths into the next life." The Ṛgveda[3] (X, xvi, 3) describes the funeral thus : the eye of the dead man moves back to the sun, the *Ātman*

1. मर्त्यः स्विन्मृत्युना वृक्णः कस्मान्मूलात्प्ररोहति ।
2. वेत्थ यदितोऽधि प्रजाः प्रयन्तीति न भगव इति वेत्थ यथा पुनरावर्तन्ता३ इति न भगव इति वेत्थ पथोर्देवयानस्य पितृयाणस्य च व्यावर्तना३ इति न भगव इति ॥ वेत्थ यथासौ लोको न संपूर्यत३ इति न भगव इति ॥
3. सूर्यं चक्षुर्गच्छतु वातमात्मा द्यां च गच्छ पृथिवीं च धर्मणा । अपो वा गच्छ यदि तत्र ते हितमोषधीषु प्रति तिष्ठा शरीरैः ॥

(which Rānāde puts as *anima*) goes to the wind and the *animus* is directed to go to the heaven or to the earth according to its qualities or *dharma*, or else to move even to the waters or plants if it so suited it.

ESCHATOLOGY

Dayānanda says, "The separation of the soul from the body is called death, whilst its union with the body is called birth. When the soul leaves the body, it lives in the atmosphere of *yama* because it is said in the Veda that *yama* is another name of air. (*Yamena vāyunā*). Thereafter, the great judge, God, embodies that soul according to the nature of its deeds done in the previous life. Guided by God, it enters the body of some living creature through air, water, food, drink, or through anyone of the openings of the body. Having entered it, it gradually reaches the semen or the reproductive element and thereby, establishes itself in the womb and is thus invested with a body and, eventually born. It is clothed with a male or a female body, just as it merits a male or a female one ; whilst a hermaphrodite is formed by the union of the male and female elements in equal proportions at the time of conception. *The soul is continually chained down to this wheel of births and deaths* till by the practice of the highest

virtue and complete absorption into Divine contemplation and the acquisition of the highest knowledge, it obtains emancipation. By the practice of deeds of highest virtue, it is born as a good and great personage among men; and being free from births and deaths, and consequent pain and suffering, it enjoys perfect bliss in emancipation till the end of *mahākalpa*." (*Satyārthaprakāśa*, Chapter IX).

Dayānanda's view of transmigration of souls is very well summarised in the above lines. In the *Ṛgvedādibhāṣyabhūmikā*, Dayānanda quotes the following from the Nirukta of Yāska[1] (XIV, vi, 1-3): "Becoming dead, I am again born, and having taken birth, I again die. I have so far been through thousands of lives. In those lives, I have enjoyed various foods, and have suckled various breasts. I have seen numerous mothers and fathers and also friends. With the head downwards in the

1. मृतश्चाहं पुनर्जातो जातश्चाहं पुनर्मृतः ।
नानायोनिसहस्राणि मयोषितानि यानि वै ॥ १ ॥
आहारा विविधा भुक्ताः पीता नानाविधाः स्तनाः ।
मातरो विविधा दृष्टाः पितरः सुहृदस्तथा ॥ २ ॥
अवाङ्मुखः पीड्यमानो जन्तुश्चैव समन्वितः ।
सांख्यं योगं समभ्यस्ये पुरुषं वा पञ्चविंशकम् ॥ ३ ॥
(See also the *Garbhopaniṣad*, IV).

womb and the legs above, I have been put to pain so many times in all these lives."

EVIDENCES FOR THE NEXT LIFE

In my chapter on the Ego, I made an attempt to show that the Ego or the Self exists in spite of the body. From child-birth to death, the body is ever changing, but still we say that this is the same man who was previously a boy or child, and in the old age too, we shall be able to identify the man. Thus, we are sure, that within the changeable exists an unchangeable principle. It does not suffer material changes; it is independent of a change, and probably, it is something for which the rest of the body-system changes. Psychologically, we feel that we are something apart from the body. We also equally feel, that in this body, we have not been kept of our own accord, we are sometimes anxious to flee from the body. We feel that we are not the body but still we are forced to be *in* the body.

Because we *are*, and therefore, we *were* also. The reason for our existence in the present equally holds good for our having been in the past and then because we have been in the past and in the present, there is no reason, why shall we not be in the future too. And so we *will be* also. The argument is clear. Because we persist

unchanged from the child-birth to death, we arrive at the conclusion that in all probability, we are not a function of body-changes. If it were right, then our being in the present takes us to our ever having been in the past and our ever being in the future too. The soul is thus immortal.

The very fact that the soul has come in embodiment in the present life is an evidence that it can be born again. Whatever be the purpose or cause for its taking birth in the present life would equally hold good for any future life and must have been equally held for a series of previous lives. If it were simply by accidence that the soul has been embodied, there is no reason, why such accidents did not occur before and also why such accidencs would not be repeated in future too. If God has arbitrarily embodied the soul once, why would such arbitrariness be not repeated in future too? If the actions or *karmas* of the soul itself have brought it here, then the *karmas* must have been done before also in a similar life, and necessarily then too, on the basis of present *karmas*, the future life is also assured. Thus we find that whatever be the cause or purpose of the present life, there is an equal probability for the life being extended to both ends, in the past and in the future.

Professor A. B. Keith represents the Indian

view of transmigration in his '*Indian Logic and Atomism*' in the following way: Why, however, is it that man is not released from misery at death, and why must he pursue a series of unhappy births? The answer is that he is compelled to transmigrate, and so accepted is the idea that it receives no formal proof. But considerations are adduced which point to proofs of varying weight. The self is eternal, as we have seen; it is also, in fact, known often to be embodied. It is inconceivable that *this should be uncaused* for we realise the endless chain of cause and effect as in the series of seed and shoot; nor can there be a single cause whether the absolute Brahman as in the Vedānta or the nature of the Sāṁkhya, for the effects are various, and so must be their causes. Nor can the cause be something visible, for men universally offer sacrifice to attain heaven, and this must presume an intervening stage of merit so acquired, since plainly the sacrifice cannot produce its distant effect without an intermediary. Nor does the desert reside in what is its fruit, for that is apportioned in each individual, and enjoyed by it. The body of man, therefore, must be the fruit of previous merit or demerit, and there is no ground on which we can conceive a break in the series of embodiments." Vātsyāyana has discussed all these points in details in his commentary on the Nyāya Sūtras.

The idea of transmigration of souls accounts for differences that we find in individuals in the animal world. Why has a soul been embodied as an ant, another as an elephant, the third as a lion, the fourth as a bird, and the fifth as a man. Amongst men too, a man is born in a rich family and the other in a poor cottage. Again, of the two brothers born in a rich family, one pursues the path of an ascetic life from the very beginning, whilst the other turns out to be a scoundrel. The one brother is intellectual from the very beginning, whilst the other is a block-headed one. How shall we account for these differences? Just as in the same soil and the same environments, when we see a seedling turning to beautiful rose, another to peas, the third to mango, and the fourth to a creeper, we say that the differences and distinctions were already existing in the seeds; similarly, when we see that of similar environments, creatures with so much difference are born, we assume that the souls themselves were different in some respect. In this world of action, we start with difference, our rate of progress is different and consequently, we die differently. Let us correlate the difference at the death with the difference at the birth. With our individual capacities and capabilities, we leave this life at a particular stage and in the next life, we

start afresh from that stage and thus try to be a perfect human.

Study a new-born child. In the Nyāya Sūtras, (III, i, 19-29) a few arguments have been advanced to show the existence of pre-births. A new-born child from the very first day begins to suckle milk. Who teaches it the process? How does it become conscious that on such and such occasion, milk should be taken in such a way? If you mark the baby suckling milk, you will feel that it is already conversant with the process. It cannot be the mother to teach it the process, because a baby of one day who has not yet even opened its eyes in the real sense, and who possesses almost no capacity of perception, is not expected to learn anything yet from without. Gautama says, that the self in the baby-body possesses some memory of the previous birth where it was already conversant with the relation of eating and drinking to hunger and thirst. [1]

If one notices a new-born baby for the first few weeks, he is sure to find an interesting phenomenon. While asleep, the baby sometimes begins to smile and sometimes becomes morose as if it be experiencing some terror or fear. This dreamy smile or dreamy moroseness is very characteristic of a

1. प्रेत्याहाराभ्यासकृतात् स्तन्याभिलाषात् ॥ २२ ॥

new-born child; it only persists for a few days, and if you observe it closely, you will find that there is a peculiar seriousness in it. This sort of smile or moroseness is not visible afterwards in the baby when it grows old. The baby is certainly dreaming something,—it is pondering over some great problems. But dreams are in a way always based on the impressions of wakeful state. But in the present life, the baby has not yet learnt to receive any sensations from outside; it has hardly begun anything which we call thinking. Its sense-organs have not begun functioning. Then, how shall we account for these dreams full of serious impressions. They correspond to some pain and pleasure. Gautama here again says that the new baby has brought some memories from its previous birth and the recollections of the previous life are giving sometimes pleasure and sometimes pain [1].

All babies have their individual capabilities in matters of acquirement of knowledge. How does a baby apprehend the first lesson given to it? Who teaches it the coherence between facts and words? What do you mean in a baby by *understanding*? Does it not show that the baby is not starting its life on a clean slate? It has already brought with it something, which at every stage

1. पूर्वाभ्यस्तस्मृत्यनुबन्धात् जातस्य हर्षभयशोकसम्प्रतिपत्तेः ॥१६॥

differentiates it from other babies of the same environments? Do you not find that many of the babies go on grasping even the intricate problems at a tender age, as if the problems were not new to them—they are simply making a revision of the old ones. Where there are so many dullards in our country, there have been people of the type of Rāmānujan, the celebrated mathematician of the country who inspite of all odd environments could develop himself into a great personality. Those who believe that the future man is a function of environments cannot explain how such cases occur. Environments would have made Rāmānujan a mere clerk, or the Great Buddha a mere prince of the ordinary type, or Dayānanda a mere householder. The great seeds do not germinate according to environments in which they have been placed, they seek their own sphere, they face all adversities and in spite of circumstances, they raise themselves very above the normal. They do not succumb to circumstances, rather they make circumstances their own.

Is our life with purpose or without? Those who maintain that this is the first and the last life, cannot explain the life at all. If I were to feel that I shall be mortal with the body, then why shall I care for living even this life? Why shall we then not end our

life with a little of cyanide poisoning? Why shall we then insist on so many ethical principles—right, justice, chastity, truthfulness, sacrifice, fellow-feeling and so on. Similarly, those who maintain that beyond this life, there is no other life,--it is either a perpetual heaven or a perpetual hell,—they also do not treat us with justice. When we have all been born with inequalities, and varying capacities, all of us in one and the same life cannot equally acquire those essentials which will entitle us to be in heaven. Some are slow in progress and some fast. How great injustice would it be then if on the basis of one life alone, some would have to live in the eternal hell? I do not like to dilate on such matters because these contentions are not rigorously philosophic. There is a good deal of blind following in them.

THE JAIN AND BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF RE-BIRTH

According to Jainism, every *jīva* is a composite of body and soul, of which the soul is active partner, whereas the body is the inactive passive one. "*Karmic* matter itself through its own essential nature brings about its own changes." *Jīva* too in the same way, through its own impure states of thought that are conditioned by *karma*, brings about its own thought changes. (*Pañchāstikāyasamayasāra*). Radhakrishnan writes,

"The two form two independent series, self-sufficient and complete. To the question, as to why the *jīva* should suffer the fruits of *karma*, if the two are independent, a sort of pre-established harmony is suggested. In the world we have material bodies, large and small, of which some are *karmic* matter, with a tendency to be attracted by the *jīvas*. By their coexistence, *jīva* and *karmic* material molecules are brought together. The settling of *karmic* matter in *jīva* is due to this contiguous coexistence.........The two self-determining agencies somehow get harmoniously blended. Since direct causal relation between the two series is rejected, no better explanation than a mysterious harmony is possible." Another peculiar contention of Jainism is that the soul is said to have such dimensions which expand and contract along with the body. It is maintained, that the soul cannot be smaller than the physical body, for then it will not be able to feel the bodily affections as its own. Śankara has rightly criticised the hypothesis of the soul having the same size as its body because from its being limited by the body, it would follow that the soul, like the body, is also impermanent, and if impermanent, it will have no final release.

Dayānanda has criticised this theory of *karma* in his *Satyārthaprakāśa*. He says

that *karma* alone cannot be the cause of re-births. The *karma* by itself is not *chetana*, it cannot bind round a thief and send to prison. Moreover, there is a causal relation between *karma* and the fruit also. God without *karma* does not give fruit to the soul and *karma* without God is helpless to affect the soul in any way. God is the *sākṣi*. He is the Lord of Justice and He alone moulds the destiny of souls according to their own doings. A soul is free so far as the action is concerned, whilst for reaping fruits, it is bound by the law of God. Dayānanda does not agree with the Jain doctrine of the expansion and contraction of souls according to their bodies. The soul is a dimensionless unity, ever unchanging and unmodified, while the body is changing at every instant.

The Mādhyamika school of Buddhism believes in the every-instant-change in the soul. "There is no such thing in Buddhism as the migration of the soul or the passage of an individual from life to life. When a man dies, his physical organism, which is the basis of his psychical dissolves, and so the psychical life comes to an end. *It is not the dead man who comes to re-birth but another.* There is no soul to migrate. *It is the character that continues.* Buddhism does not explain the mechanism by which the

continuity of *karma* is maintained between two lives separated by the phenomenon of death. It simply assumes it. We are told that the successive lives are linked by a chain of natural causation. The resulting character builds up *a new individuality which gravitates automatically to the state of life for which it is fitted.* It is said that owing to the strength of *karma*, the consciousness of a dying man begets or begins a series of states of consciousness coupled with a subtle organism, the last of which takes up its abode in some matrix. The decisive element is generally looked upon as the last thought which becomes the essence of the moral and intellectual life of the dying man. *It is the force which remains as a desire for new life when death occurs.* There must not only be this *karma* or force resulting from actions, but also *upādāna*, or clinging to existence. Since life is a combination, if the separated elements do not come together, there would be no life. *There must be a force at work* which tends to recombine the scattered elements. Under the pressure of this force of attraction called *upādāna*, a new combination results. *Karma* could do nothing without it. *Karma* is an informing principle waiting for its material." (Radhakrishnan).

I have quoted this passage at length to

show the background of the doctrine of *karma* as believed in Buddhism. It will be clear from this, that the Vedic or Aryan idea of eschatology is fundamentally different from that of the Buddhists. Those who contend that the idea of eschatology was borrowed by the Aryan Philosophy from Buddhism are mistaken. What appears to me to be natural is that the Vedic idea of eschatology has been somehow made to fit in the Buddhism which goes to explain the cycle of life and death without believing in God. Does this character which is believed to be continuing during transmigration exist independent of the soul? Is it an attribute or a substratum; if it is a substratum, how does it differ from the soul? If an attribute, how can it migrate without a soul or a substratum? If it is another man who takes birth, and not the one who died, why should the one suffer for the actions of the other. If you say that the other one has evolved out of the first one, then what does this *evolution* exactly mean? Is there nothing which persisted between the two stages, even just as cause persists in the effect? If nothing persisted, it cannot be an evolution. Is the persisting element also changeable? We are faced with a number of such difficult questions.

DAYĀNANDA'S ESCHATOLOGICAL DOCTRINE

I shall quote in details Dayānanda's own words in this connection from the ninth chapter of the *Satyārthaprakāśa* :

"God always desires justice and acts justly, and therefore, it is that He is great and worthy of our homage and adoration. He would not be God if He acted unjustly. A gardener who plants trees aimlessly on promenades or other places, cuts down trees that do not require cutting, multiplies those that are not fit to be multiplied, and does not multiply those that are suitable for multiplying, is worthy of blame. In like manner would God be blameable, were He to act without a reasonable cause. It is absolutely necessary for God to act justly, because he is pure and just by nature. Should He act like a mad man ? He would even be beneath a good judge of this world, and would no longer be honoured. Does not a judge in this world, who punishes the innocent and awards honour to those who have done nothing to deserve it, merit blame and forefeit his honour ? God never does anything that is unjust. He, therefore, fears none.

"His determination is always in accordance with the actions of the soul. Should

it be otherwise, He would be unjust and guilty.

"Only the ignorant can believe that all are equally happy or miserable......Behold the difference between the happiness and misery of different people. One soul comes into the womb of the queen of the great righteous and learned king, whilst another in that of the wife of a poor miserable grass-cutter. One is happy and well cared for in every way since the day of its conception, whilst the other suffers in a hundred different ways. When one is born, it is bathed with pure fragrant water, and its cord is cut with care. It is properly fed and cared for. When it is hungry, it is given milk mixed with sugar and other necessary ingredients in proper proportions. There are servants to wait upon it, toys for it to play with, conveyances to take it out to pretty and healthy places. It is well loved and it is happy. The other is born in a jungle where not even water is to be had to wash it. When it is hungry and wants milk, it is slapped on the face instead, cries most pitifully, but no one attends to it and so on.

"The infliction of suffering or the awarding of happiness to souls, without their having previously done acts—sinful or

virtuous—to deserve it, would disgrace God. Besides, if wesuffer or enjoy here in this world without having previously done anything—sinful or virtuous—our going to hell or heaven after death ought not be dependent on our deeds in this life, because *just as God has given us pleasure or pain here without our having previously done sinful or virtuous deeds, so would he send some of us to Hell and others to Heaven just according to His pleasure. Why should men then practise virtue ?* All would become wicked and sinful lives; because it is doubtful if virtue will bear any fruit. It all rests with God. He would do just as it pleases Him. No one will thus fear sin which will consequently multiply, whilst virtue will decay. *It follows therefore that the present birth of the soul is in accordance with its deeds, sinful or virtuous in the past whilst the future will be determined by its present and past modes of* life, righteous or unrighteous.

'*Q*—Are the souls in the bodies of men and animals of the same nature or different ?

A.—They are all of the same nature but are pure or impure according as they are virtuous or sinful.

Q.—Do the souls of men go into the

bodies of animals and *vice-versa* and do the souls of men go into the souls of women and *vice-versa* ?

A.—Yes, they do. When sin predominates over virtue in a man, his soul goes into the bodies of lower animals and the like. When virtue predominates over sin in a soul, it is born as a good and learned person. When sin and virtue are equal, the soul is born as an ordinary man. Sin and virtue being of three different grades, superior, medium and inferior—men can be divided into three classes according as they are possessed of superior, medium and inferior kind of material (*i.e.*, bodies, bodily powers, mental capacities and talents). When sin preponderates over virtue, the soul suffers the consequences of its sin in the bodies of lower animals and the like, till its sins and virtues are equalised when it is invested with a human body. Similarly, when it has enjoyed the excess of virtue over sin, it is born as an ordinary man."

Thus we see that Dayānanda has outlined the broad principle on which depends the varieties of lives.

MEMORY OF THE PAST LIFE

Some people insist upon that if a soul

could recollect the happenings of a previous life, they would agree to the existence of such a life, otherwise not. They say that they want a *positive* proof. The sort of memory as one feels to be existing in a new-born baby, we have already discussed while referring to the arguments advanced by Gautama. Regarding the further memory, we have seen in our previous chapter that when the Yogin attains the stage of *aparigraha* (II,39), he can have an idea of previous lives. But for one who is neither a Yogin nor a new-born babe, it is not possible to have a recollection of the past life. A number of exceptional cases have been reported where a child of a few years gives accounts of its previous associations. But these cases have seldom received scientific attention of psychologists. Probably, if not all, the most of them, at least are usually frauds*.

Dayānanda puts his view-point regarding this question as follows :

"The soul is finite in knowledge and powers. It is not the seer of the three

*Yāska says in the Nirukta जातश्च वायुना स्पृष्टो न स्मरति जन्ममरणे, अन्ते च शुभाशुभं कर्म (14,6). The soul just at the time of birth as soon as it comes in contact with air, does not remember births and deaths, so much so, that in the end it forgets also its virtuous and non-virtuous deeds done previously.

periods of time, the past, the present and the future; *it cannot therefore recall its past.* Besides, the *manas*, the principle of thought and attention, by means of which the soul knows cannot have two ideas, *i. e.*, of the past aswell as the present at one and the same time. Let alone things that happened in the previous life of the soul, can a man remember all that happens in this very life of the soul; can a man remember all that happens in this very life from the time of conception till say the age of five? We see and hear so many different things while we are awake, and dream of so many different things while in slumber, why can we not recall all those things when we are in deep sleep? You could never tell, if you were asked, for example, what you were doing on the ninth day of the fifth month of the thirteenth year of your life exactly at ten in the morning; which way you were looking; what the position of your head and hands was; whether your mouth was open or shut; and what were you then thinking of? *When such is the case even in this* life, how absurd then would it be to question the validity of the previous existence of the soul simply because it cannot recall what happened in that life? *It is a good thing too that the soul cannot remember its past otherwise there would have been no happiness for it. It*

would have died of sheer pain and mental anguish brought on by brooding over the terrible sufferings and sorrows of its past lives. No man can ever know what happened in his past lives even if he were to try to do so; because the soul's power and knowledge is limited. God alone can know that."

In fact, had an ordinary soul known about previous lives, the very purpose of the rebirth would not have been served. It is very desirable that the past associations should be left over, and one should try to evolve himself to his best in the new environments provided to him. When one dies, he takes with him the essence of his present life to the other one. The essence is known as *saṁskāra* while the unnecessary details are all left over here. The value of details lies not in the details themselves, but in the formation of particular *saṁskāras*. These *saṁskāras* go along with the soul to the next life, and on the basis of them, the soul builds up its future career. It is no good remembering all details, because they would be a burden to the soul. Details can be accumulated at any time, when the principles or *saṁskāras* have been transmitted along with the soul. And thus we find that for Śankara to be a profound philosopher in his life, it did not take much time. In the heart of Buddha and Dayānanda, it took no

time to germinate the seed of asceticism or abstraction from the worldly life. What one achieves is not an achievement of one life alone.

Chapter XII

Immortality or the Final Release

MAITREYI, the spiritual disciple and wife of Yājñavalkya, very rightly said, "What shall I do with all that which does not lead me to immortality. And therefore, Sir, if you know any way (for immortality), please tell me[1]". (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, II, iv. 3). When the Prince Buddha came to know for the first time that the end of life is death, which inevitably comes to everybody, he became anxious to find out if by any means, he can be freed from the clutches of death. When Dayānanda saw his sister and uncle dying, he thought, he should make the goal of future life to find out how to conquer death.

ORIGIN OF PAIN

God is regarded as the fountain-head of all bliss. It is from Him alone that one can get *ānanda* or the real happiness. The soul in its nature is also pure, knowing, and immortal. It is the ignorance that binds it in the mortal body. The ignorance with it is not of a permanent nature. It is the acquired one, for, though the soul is pure and

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1. येनाहं नामृता स्यां किमहं तेन कुर्यां यदेव भगवान्वेद तदेव मे ब्रूहीति ।

knowing by nature, yet it has its limitations. It has got the *free will*, which when exercised, leads it sometimes to *prakṛti* and sometimes to Brahman. When it leads to *prakṛti*, the bondage begins, and with it begins the cycle of pain and pleasure, the cycle of life and death. This freedom to act, this eternal individuality in the soul, and its finite limitations take it round the whole circle of bondage and freedom.

There is no *Satan* existing beyond the limitations of the soul itself. Nobody can question why the soul has all the finitude. We can only say that it is with it from eternity. It is the very essence of the soul. Pain has not been brought into the world by simply opening Pindora's box. Nor was it the *Satan* other than the soul itself, which deluded it to taste the fruit of the tree of sins. The soul being a thinking entity, encircled with limitations is quite free to taste the fruit of sin or righteousness. Its own limitations delude it. Freedom always means the non-restriction of path, and in that case, for one who is not all-knowing, there is an equal probability of being deluded on a wrong path as of following the right one. For the soul, the two courses are open, the one leading to *prakṛti* and the other to the cause of bliss.

Kapila, the author of the Sāmkhya,

regards the bondage of the soul to be a temporary phase. The soul by nature is not in bondage, because otherwise, it would have been impossible for its ever being released from the bondage. Dayānanda has also repeatedly mentioned the same thing. While reviewing Jainism, Dayānanda writes that "just as a white cloth gets soiled with dirt, and can be brought again to the original pure colour by washing, but it can be again soiled, similarly, by untruthfulness and other reasons, on the basis of attachment, aversion and others, the soul becomes a doer and enjoyer. By appropriate knowledge again, the soul becomes pure. Just as by *nimittas* or especial reasons or efforts, the soul becomes pure even after once being impure, similarly, by *nimittas* alone, a pure soul can be soiled again". Dayānanda by all this means that the soul by nature is pure, otherwise it could never be released. But just as by special reasons, it can be made pure again, it is equally possible that after sometime, it may become impure. Thus if one can become free from bondage, he can again be brought into the bondage from the emancipated state. Kapila describes the essential nature of the soul[1] to be (*i*) eternal (*ii*) pure, (*iii*) knowing and (*iv*) free (*mukta*) (I, 19).

Thus, the soul is not eternally in bondage;

1. न नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावस्य तद्योगस्तद्योगादृते ।

bondage is a temporary phase, though by *nimittas*, this bondage may be repeated any number of times. But the soul can always get emancipation and revert to its original pure unbound form. Neither time [1] (I, 12), nor space[2] (I, 13), nor the bodily stages[3] (I, 14), nor the actions[4] (I, 16), nor the *prakṛti*[5] (I, 18) and nor ignorance[6] (I, 20) can keep it bound for eternity, as has been pointed out by Kapila in the Sāmkhya.

Max Müller has represented the Sāmkhya view thus: "It would seem extraordinary, and wholly unworthy of a great philosopher, if Kapila had had eyes for the ordinary sufferings only which are entailed on all the sons of men. He must have known that there is happiness also for them, and something between suffering and happiness, the even tenure of a man's life. Kapila meant something else by pain. He seems to have felt what Schelling felt, that sadness cleaves to all finite life, but that is very different from always being intent on getting rid of

1. न कालयोगतो व्यापिनो नित्यस्य सर्वसम्बन्धात् ।
2. न देशयोगतोऽप्यस्मात् ।
3. नावस्थातो देहधर्मत्वात्तस्याः ।
4. न कर्मणाऽन्यधर्मत्वादतिप्रसक्तेश्च ।
5. प्रकृतिनिबन्धनाच्चेन्न तस्या अपि पारतन्त्र्यम् ।
6. नाविद्यातोऽप्यवस्तुना बन्धायोगात् ।

the sufferings inherent in life on earth. Kapila evidently meant by *duḥkha* or pain something more than physical or even mental suffering, namely *the consciousness of being conditioned, limited or fettered*, which is inseparable from this life. By whatever suffering he may have meant, the method suggested by him for its removal is certainly bold and decided. All this suffering, he tells us, is not, as we imagine, our suffering. Like the whole evolution of *prakṛti*, this suffering also belongs to *prakṛti*, and not to ourselves, not to the *puruṣas*." (*The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, 297). Thus when the soul directs itself towards *prakṛti*, it is entangled into bondage and consequently undergoes suffering. To be relieved from all the three types of pains, the physical, mental and accidental, is the final goal of life.

The great Buddha ultimately attained four truths: (*i*) there is suffering, (*ii*) that it has a cause, (*iii*) that it can be suppressed and (*iv*) that there is a way to accomplish it—*duḥkha*, *samudāya*, *nirodha* and *mārga*. According to Buddha, there is nothing in the world which is not subject to death or decay, there is nothing which is not impermanent, and there is nothing which can be called the self. Everything is *anattā* or not-self. 'Everything is', this is one extreme; 'everything is not', this is another extreme. The

truth is the middle,—the path of the Golden Mean. Ignorance is the main cause out of which false desire springs. When knowledge is attained, suffering is at an end.

There is no denying that suffering exists in the world, whether the world be pleasant or unpleasant. Mere pleasure is not happiness. But Dayānanda does not emphasise suffering so much as has been done by Buddha. The greatest suffering is bondage,—the life of mortality.

THE CONCEPT OF IMMORTALITY

It is right to say that the eternal is bliss whilst the transient is painful,—*Yo vai bhūmā tad amṛtam anyad ārtam*. All the Upaniṣads and even the Vedas are one in this respect, that if one has known that He, he has attained immortality. If He has not been known, it is no good knowing anything else. If one has known Him, he has known the Truth, but without knowing Him, it is all a calamity[1] (*Kena Upaniṣad*). Having known Him alone, the one becomes immortal. But what is this immortality?

Professor Rānāde, who professes to stand for no dogma in particular, finds that "there is a systematic evolution that can be traced

1. इह चेदवेदीदथ सत्यमस्ति न चेदिहावेदीन्महती विनष्टिः। (२, ५)

through them (the Upaniṣads) of the ideas that were held on the subject of immortality. (*i*) We are told in a passage of the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad that the best kind of eternal life that may be conceived for anybody is that he should be 'lifted to the region of deity' whom he has loved and worshipped during life, that he should partake of all the happiness that is possible in that region [1] (*Chhāndogya*, II, xx, 2). (*ii*) Another passage from the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad[2] (III, ii, 6) tells us that the best kind of eternal life should be regarded rather as the 'companionship' of the highest God with whom the soul should be liberated at the time of the great end (*parāntakāla*). (*iii*) Not satisfied with a mere companionship, another passage declares that eternal life consists in attaining to an absolute 'likeness' to God and enjoying life of personal immortality, a view which plays so large part in the theology of Rāmānuja[3] (*Muṇḍaka*, III, i, 3). (*iv*) On the other hand, Śankarāchārya would be satisfied with nothing short of an 'absorption in divinity' and a life of impersonal immortality. As rivers which flow into the sea disappear in the mighty

1. स य एवमेतद्राजनं देवतासु प्रोतं वेदैतासामेव देवतानां सलोकतां सार्ष्टितां सायुज्यं गच्छति ।
2. ते ब्रह्मलोकेषु परान्तकाले परामृताः परिमुच्यन्ति सर्वे ।
3. तदा विद्वान्पुण्यपापे विधूय निरञ्जनः परमं साम्यमुपैति ।

waters and lose their name and form, even so does the wise soul become absorbed in the transcendent person and lose its name and form. As when honey is prepared by the collection of various juices, the juices cannot discriminate from which tree they came, even so when the souls are merged in the real, they cannot discriminate from which bodies they came. This is nothing short of a doctrine of impersonal immortality.[1] (*Chhāndogya*, VI, ix; x, 1). (*v*) Finally, an important passage from the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad tells us that the soul of a man who comes to self-consciousness becomes mingled after death with the whole universe[2] (III, ii, 5)."

It is right to say that different interpreters have derived meanings differently from these passages, but we can see from them the divergency of the views regarding the concepts of immortality. Dayānanda favours the first three views involving the 'personal immortality.' He agrees with the

1. यथा सोम्य मधु मधुकृतो निस्तिष्ठन्ति नानात्ययानां वृक्षाणाꣳ रसान्समवहारमेकताꣳ रसं गमयन्ति ॥ ६ । ९ । १ ॥ इमाः सोम्य नद्यः पुरस्तात् प्राच्यः स्यन्दन्ते पश्चात्प्रतीच्यस्ताः समुद्रात्समुद्रमेवापियन्ति समुद्र एव भवति ता यथा तत्र न विदुरियमहमस्मीति ॥ ६ । १० । १ ॥
2. ते सर्वगं सर्वतः प्राप्य धीरा युक्तात्मानः सर्वमेवाविशन्ति ।

author of the Muṇḍaka, that the companionship of the emancipated soul with Brahman is not for an eternal period. The soul returns back after a *parānta kāla* or 'at the time of the great end'.

THE EMANCIPATED SOUL

According to Dayānanda, the emancipated soul retains its innate power, activity and attributes but no physical body. He supports his view from the following passage in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*[1] (chapter XIV): "An emancipated soul has no physical body or bodily organs but it retains its pure natural attributes and powers. By virtue of its innate powers, an emancipated soul has the *principle of hearing* when it wants to hear, the *principle of touch* when it wants to feel, the *principle of sight* when it wishes to see, the *principle of taste* when it desires to taste, the *principle of smell* when it wants to smell, the *principle of* thought for thinking, the principle of judgment for ascertaining truth, the principle of memory for remembering, the principle of individuality for feeling its individuality. It can possess this so-called body, composed of the

1. शृण्वन् श्रोत्रं भवति, स्पर्शयन् त्वग्भवति, पश्यन् चक्षुर्भवति, रसयन् रसना भवति, जिघ्रन् घ्राणं भवति, मन्वानो मनो भवति, बोधयन् बुद्धिर्भवति । चेतयंश्चित्तम्भवत्यहंकुर्वाणोऽहङ्कारो भवति ।

principles of sensation and *thought* etc.,—at its will. Just as the soul when embodied depends upon its physical body and bodily organs to carry out its will, so does it enjoy the bliss of emancipation through the use of its innate power."

Dayānanda further says that this innate power is really one but according to functions, it is of twenty-four varieties,—strength, energy, attraction, suggestion, motion, intimidation etc. By the help of these powers, the soul attains and enjoys happiness even in emancipation. "If the soul, when emancipated were to be absorbed into Brahman, who would then enjoy the bliss of emancipation! Those who regard the dissolution of soul as emancipation are no doubt immersed in ignorance, because the emancipation of the soul consists in *its exemption from all sin and suffering and in the enjoyment of perfect bliss in* the All-pervading, All-blissful, Infinite, Omnipotent God."

According to Dayānanda, this is the view of the Vedānta Sūtras also. The last section of the fourth chapter of the Vedānta deals with emancipated souls and there it is very clearly mentioned that the soul when emancipated lives in the Brahman and enjoys all the bliss. Dayānanda says:

"According to Bādari, the soul as well as

the mind, exist in emancipation. That is, according to Parāśara, mind and soul are not absorbed in the emancipated state." The only thing that is non-existing is the body and sense-organs[1] (IV, iv, 10). Commenting on this *sūtra*, Rāmānuja writes :

"A doubt arises whether the released has a body and sense-organs or not; or whether he has them or not just as he pleases. The teacher Bādari holds that body and sense organs are absent ; since the text declares it. The text—" as long as he is embodied, there is no freedom from pleasure and pain ; but when he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him[2] (*Chhāndogya*, VIII, xii, 1)—declares that pleasure and pain are necessarily connected with embodiedness." The same Upaniṣad further says that the emancipated soul enjoys with divine eyes and mind, seeing and feeling.[3]

Dayānanda further says, " Similarly, the great teacher Jaimini holds that an emancipated soul possesses along with the mind, the abstract body, sense-organs and abstract breath[4] (IV, iv, 11). But Vyāsa believes

1. अभावं बादरिराह ह्येवम् ।
2. प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्त्यशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः ॥
3. दैवेन चक्षुषा मनसैतान् कामान् पश्यन् रमते ॥ ८, १२, ५ ॥
4. भावं जैमिनिर्विकल्पामननात् ।

in the existence and the non-existence both[1] (IV, iv, 12) that is, the soul exists in its pure and potent form in the emancipated state also, and what is non-existent is the impurity, sinfulness, pain and ignorance."

On this *sūtra*, Rāmānuja comments as follows in his *Śrī Bhāṣya*,

"For this reason, *i. e.*, for the reason that the text refers to the wish of the Released, the Reverend Bādarāyaṇa is of opinion that the released may, at his liking, be with or without a body. This satisfies both kinds of texts. The case is analogous to that of the twelve days' sacrifice which on the basis of twofold texts—'Those desirous of prosperity are to celebrate the *dvādaśāha*' and 'The priest is to offer the *dvādaśāha* for him who desires offspring'—belongs, according to difference of wish, either to the *sattra* or the *ahīna* class of sacrifices."

There are other *sūtras* in the same section of the Vedānta which show that the soul does not lose identity in its emancipated state. The first *sūtra*[2] runs thus:

"(On the soul's) having approached (the

1. द्वादशाहवदुभयविधं बादरायणोऽतः
2. सम्पद्याऽऽविर्भावः स्वेन शब्दात् ।

highest light), there is manifestation; (as we infer) from the word 'own'." The word 'Own' refers to a passage in the *Chhāndogya* (VIII, xii, 3). "*Svena rūpeṇābhiniṣpadyate.*" This simply means that the soul manifests its own natural character. It does not assume any new form, be it of a *deva* or of even Brahman. The original character is, as I have referred to previously, the pure unbound knowing state. Not only is there cessation of pain in this stage, the soul also enjoys the supreme bliss.

While commenting on the following *sūtra*,[1] Rāmānuja writes, "When, therefore, he concludes 'that serene being, *i.e.*, the soul having risen from this body and having approached the highest light accomplishes itself in its true form,' we understand that such accomplishment means the final release, *i.e.*, the cessation of all bondage which is gained by the soul, previously connected with *karman* as soon as it approaches the highest light."

The fourth *sūtra*[2] runs thus: "In non-division, because that is seen." This *sūtra* becomes clear when read along with the

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1. मुक्तः प्रतिज्ञानात् ।
2. अविभागेनैव दृष्टत्वात् ।

twenty-first.[1] "*And on account of the indication of the equality of enjoyment.*" In the emancipated state, the soul is one with Brahman, undivided so far as the enjoyment of the bliss is concerned. It shares with Him in His bliss. It is the enjoyer of the bliss but it does not lose its identity. On the latter *sūtra*, Rāmānuja writes:

"The previous conclusion is confirmed by the further fact that the text directly teaches the released soul to be equal to Brahman in so far as enjoying direct insight into the true nature of Brahman. 'He reaches all objects of desire, together with the all-knowing Brahman[2] (*Taitt. Up.*, II, i, 1)".

In the Upaniṣadic Text, the words '*saha Brahmaṇā*' with Brahman are significant. They do not mean that the soul loses its existence, it simply shares with Brahman in the enjoyment of bliss.

Dayānanda strengthens his view-point by quoting a few Upaniṣadic texts which we shall reproduce now.

1. भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गाच्च ।
2. सोऽश्नुते सर्वान् कामान् सह ब्रह्मणा विपश्चितेति ।

In Kaṭhopaniṣad, the following passage[1] (II, vi, 10) occurs:

The condition of the soul in which it possesses a pure *manas*, the abstract five senses and the abstract intellect is called the supreme state of emancipation. Mind and all the sense-organs get centred in God and the intellect also does not go against in this state.

A passage in the *Chhāndogya*[2] (VIII, vii, 1) runs thus:

That Supreme Spirit, Who is free from sin, decay and death, pain and sorrow, hunger and thirst, whose thoughts and desires are the very essence of truth, should be sought after. It is by contact with the Divine Spirit that an emancipated soul attains all the conditions it wishes for, and realises all its desires, and it is through the knowledge of the Supreme Soul that it learns the means of salvation, and the ways of self-purification.

A further passage in the same Upaniṣad[3] (VIII, xii, 5, 6) is thus:

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1. यदा पञ्चावतिष्ठन्ते ज्ञानानि मनसा सह ।
बुद्धिश्च न विचेष्टति तामाहुः परमां गतिम् ॥

2. य आत्मापहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युर्विशोकोऽविजिघत्सोऽपिपासः सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः स सर्वांश्च लोकानाप्नोति सर्वांश्च कामान्यस्तमात्मानमनुविद्य विजानातीति ह प्रजापतिरुवाच ॥

3. य एते ब्रह्मलोके तं वा एतं देवा आत्मानमुपासते तस्मात्तेषाꣳ सर्वे च लोका आत्ताः सर्वे च कामाः स सर्वांꣳश्च लोकानाप्नोति सर्वांꣳश्च कामान्यस्तमात्मानमनुविद्य विजानातीति ह प्रजापतिरुवाच ॥ ६ ॥

So this emancipated soul sees all through pure, spiritual or divine eyes and a pure *manas*, and thereby enjoys all bliss. The soul that rests in the all-glorious, Supreme Being, the omnipresent, omniscient spirit, the inward controller of all, whom all men of learning, imbued with piety and desirous of obtaining salvation, worship and adore, enjoys the beatitude of emancipation. Verily it obtains all its heart's desires and whatsoever, worlds and states it desires to attain to. The emancipated soul leaves off its mortal coil and roams about in space in All-pervading God by the help of the *samkalpamaya* body (in the body of its own entity).

Thus an emancipated soul, according to Dayānanda's conception as supported by the scriptures too, is released from the bodily bondage and it reverts to its original pure form. It is not absorbed or annihilated in Brahman, but in the enjoyment of the Supreme bliss it shares with Him. It does not lose its identity and freedom. We shall see further, that it is quite free also to come back to the worldly state, rather it is so conditioned, that it has to come back to the embodied state afterwards too. But still, the period of immortality is so great that for the time being it does not revert to the state of mortality.

RE-INCARNATION OR RETURN FROM EMANCIPATION

We hear from Paurāṇikas that the absolute Brahman can come down to a mortal

form and take re-incarnation. If it be so, then there is nothing strange that the emancipated souls can also be re-born as human mortals. We shall consider this subject more seriously here. There are a number of concepts prevalent in this connection amongst great thinkers. Some believe that once a soul is emancipated, it never comes again into bondage. Others maintain that whenever a soul desires, it can manifest itself in a *divya śarīra* or the spiritual body possessed by spiritual organs and the moment it likes, it can again revert to the abstract form. There is another school which maintains that the emancipated soul can only be born as a *jīvan-mukta* or the one embodied without bondage. There is, lastly, the school to which Dayānanda belongs which maintains that just as there is a cycle of death and life, similarly, there is a wider cycle of bondage and emancipation. This school believes that between two emancipations, there is a bondage and between two bondages there is an emancipation and this cycle has been going on since eternity.

The simplest and yet the most authoritative reasoning in support of Dayānanda would be as follows. Either the soul has been migrating in the cycle of life and death since eternity, or the cycle began at a particular period. If we believe that the

cycle has been running on since eternity, it means that the bondage is the natural characteristic of the soul and therefore, it cannot be emancipated. Anything which is positive in nature but is without beginning will certainly have no end. Therefore, we shall have to adhere to the second alternative, that is, the cycle started at some finite time. Was then the soul emancipated before this specified time or was it in bondage? Certainly, it can be emancipated only. So we have seen, that the soul which is at present in bondage and which at any time in the future, would be emancipated, must have been also existing as emancipated before the present cycle of birth and death started. So we have shown that the present bondage is existing between two emancipations. If from the first emancipated state, the soul could come into bondage, there is no reason why from the forth-coming emancipation, the soul would not come again into bondage. So we find that between two emancipations is one bondage. This cycle goes on for ever.

Even those monists who believe that the emancipated soul would be completely absorbed in God would have to also agree that there is every probability of the emancipated soul coming again into bondage. This fragment, the present embodied soul, existed in the absorbed condition before it

separated from the Lord and followed the birth and death cycle. So it is clear, that the one homogeneous whole could once give out a particular fragment,—whatever be the reason for separation. If it could be once given out, why not during the eternal time at our disposal, it would be given out for the second time. Thus there is a probability for an emancipated soul to be born again as embodied. A contention that though ignorance has been existing in the soul since *eternity*, yet can be done away with within any *finite* time is unrealisable. Either an embodied soul can be emancipated or it can not be. If it can be emancipated, it can again come in bondage just as it existed in bondage before emancipation. And if the embodied soul cannot be emancipated, there arises no question whatsoever of its coming back from the emancipation. Our this argument is independent of our conceptions regarding bondage and emancipation.

Finite reward of finite actions: According to the doctrine of *karma* or actions, emancipation is also a reward of the particular actions accomplished by the soul just as the re-birth is. In a finite body and in a finite time, the soul of finite and limited capacities can only accomplish finite actions and therefore, justice requires that the reward for the finite action should also be of finite

duration. To use Dayānanda's words, "when the powers of the soul, its instruments (such as body and bodily organs), and its means are all *finite,* how could the reward extend over an infinite period?" He further writes, "If God were to give the soul unlimited happiness as the fruit of its actions that are limited (finite), His justice would be destroyed."

A finite soul cannot enjoy an infinite bliss:

We have said that the soul is a dimensionless unit. But God is the all-pervading, omniscient, all-potent unity. God being infinite in all respects is capable of being all-bliss for all times. But the soul would, after all, be able to enjoy bliss to its own limitations; the soul is neither omnipotent nor omniscient. It can never be the source of knowledge or the source of creation as God is. On account of these limitations, a soul is incapable of enjoying bliss for an infinite period. Dayānanda says, "It would not be right for God to load the soul, possessed of finite power and finite knowledge, with everlasting happiness." He at another place says, "The soul does not possess infinite means and infinite capacity to enjoy infinite bliss, how could it then enjoy the everlasting happiness?"

Emancipation does not mean barring of all limitations :

What debars a man from attaining happiness so long as he is in the embodied state? The ignorance. But what is this ignorance? The ignorance consists in that the embodied soul begins to feel that it can derive happiness from the products of *prakṛti*. This is all that a soul is expected to get rid of. Its attention is to be directed towards the right source. An emancipated soul differs from the embodied soul only in this respect. The emancipated one knows where to derive happiness from. It knows that the real happiness comes from God alone. It shares with Him in the enjoyment of bliss as the Vedānta says. It becomes one with God only in this respect that now it enjoys what really God enjoys, but certainly, the soul enjoys to its finite extent. The soul is still a soul, it has still the limitations of a soul, it has in a way attained a companionship with God. It is now conscious of God, sometimes so absorbed in God, or rather in the bliss of God, that it forgets its own identity. So even in the emancipated state, limitations are there in the soul, but only those limitations which are intrinsic. These limitations bring it again into bondage. Wherever it is said in

scriptures[1] that the emancipated soul does not come again into the world, it is meant that it does not come as the ordinary embodied soul after a usual death. The cycle of birth and death is held in abeyance for a certain period wherein the soul enjoys the emancipated life.

Rāmānuja maintains that though it is difficult to overcome the *karman* accumulated in the infinite progress of time, the Supreme Being as if overcome by devotion of a worthy soul allows it to remain with Him for an everlasting period. I shall use Rāmānuja's own words in this connection: "And with equal certainty, we know from Scripture that this Supreme Lord, *when pleased by the faithful* worship of his Devotees—which worship consists in daily repeated meditation on Him, assisted by performance of all the practices prescribed for each caste and *āśrama*—*frees* them from the influence of Nescience which consists of *karman accumulated in the infinite progress of time* and hence *hard to overcome*; *allows* them to attain to that supreme bliss which consists in the direct intuition of His own true nature; and after that does *not* return them back into the miseries of

1. न च पुनरावर्त्तते न च पुनरावर्त्तते (छान्दोग्य ८, १५)
अनावृत्तिः शब्दादनावृत्तिःशब्दात् (वेदान्त ४, ४, २२)
न मुक्तस्य पुनर्बन्धयोगोऽप्यनावृत्तिश्रुतेः (सांख्य ६, १७)

saṁsāra". (Commentary on the last Vedānta Sūtra, IV, iv, 22). This takes us to the distant region of devotion, where no argument can be advanced, and hence, I shall also not discuss the validity of it. It is difficult to see how something that persisted through all period of eternity would disappear ever all at once. Dayānanda makes us believe that neither the soul is in bondage since an infinite period, nor would the forthcoming emancipation last to the other extreme of infinity. Each bondage is followed by an emancipation and each emancipation by a bondage, and this cycle goes on for ever, day after night, and night after day, the life after death and death after life. Ours is a continuous everlasting life.

Chapter XIII

Attitude Towards Life

"IT is interesting, however," writes Prof. Max Müller, "to observe the unanimity with which the principal systems of philosophy in India, nay some of their religious systems also, start from the conviction that the world is full of suffering, and that this suffering should be accounted for and removed. This seems to have been one of the principal impulses, if not the principal impulse to philosophical thought in India." The Sāmkhya philosophy begins with the recognition of the existence of three kinds of suffering and proclaims as its highest object the complete cessation of all pain. The Yoga philosophers after pointing out the way to *samādhi*, declare that this is the best means of escaping from all earthly troubles[1] (II, 2) and in the end of reaching *kaivalya* or perfect freedom. Even the Logic of Gautama aims at attaining *apavarga* which is obtained by the complete destruction of all pain [2] (I, i, 2). The Vaiśeṣika

1. समाधिभावनार्थः क्लेशतनूकरणार्थश्च ।

2. दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः ।

aims at attaining the knowledge of truth and through it the final cessation of all pain. Bādarāyaṇa teaches that the cause of all evils is *avidyā* or Nescience, and that it is the object of his philosophy to remove Nescience by science, and thus to bring out the true knowledge of Brahman, which is also the highest bliss.

SUFFERING AND PESSIMISM

Patañjali in the Yoga Sūtras, describe five types of pains[1] (II, 3) Nescience or *avidyā*, egotism or *asmitā*, attachment or *rāga*, aversion or *dveṣa* and death or *abhiniveśa*. Nescience consists in regarding non-eternal as eternal, impure as pure, pain as pleasure, and *anātma* as *ātmā* or non-living as living (II,5). Transferring of one's subjectiveness to internal organ or mind, which are mere instruments, is known as *asmitā* or egotism (II,6). The after-thought of pleasure is called attachment or *rāga* which makes one always anxious to enjoy pleasure (II,7). The after-thought of pain is *dveṣa* or aversion on which account, the one shows always a tendency to keep aloof from what has given him pain (II,8). Having experienced once the torture of Death, even a learned is always afraid of it, and he always wishes that he may not have to die. This is known as *abhiniveśa*,(II,9). These five

1. अविद्याऽस्मितारागद्वेषाऽभिनिवेशाः पञ्चक्लेशाः ।

kleśas or pains take man from one life to the other, and they provide him with *jāti* or species, *āyu* or age, and *bhoga* or enjoyment[1] (II,13); all these three are related to sin and righteousness and therefore, give pain and pleasure both[2] (II,14).

Even the worldly pleasures are mixed with pain. The very thing in which a man seeks pleasure after a limit becomes the cause of pain. The excessive sweetness becomes distasteful. Nothing in the world is such which will always give pleasure. This is known as *pariṇāma-duḥkha* or everything is pain-ending. Even if it not be so, the pleasure-giving thing is accompanied always with a non-pleasant idea. While enjoying pleasure, the man always remains anxious lest this pleasant thing be not taken away from him. This anxiety is equally painful. This is called *saṁskāra duḥkha* or pain-in-idea. And finally, after having enjoyed, the man always covets for the enjoyment; the memory of it, the attachment, the necessary effort and then the consequent disappointment or difficulty, all these lead to a series of pains known as *tāpa-duḥkha* or pain-in-efforts[3] (II,15). So we see that

1. सति मूले तद्विपाको जात्यायुर्भोगाः ।
2. ते ह्लादपरितापफलाः पुण्याऽपुण्यहेतुत्वात् ।
3. परिणामतापसंस्कारदुःखैर्गुणवृत्तिविरोधाच्च दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिनः ।

in this world, the best of the worldy pleasures also lead to pain and suffering. Whatever pain is in the present, one has to endure it, but the suffering which is to come afterwards must be done away with somehow[1] (II,16). The attachment of the Self with *prakṛti* is the pain[2] (II,17). Shall we ever get rid of this widely diffused pain all around us ? This sometimes leads us to pessimism.

But Indian philosophers never present a pessimistic outlook of life. They know that the suffering is not without utility or purpose. They realise that through suffering alone, one transcends suffering. Regarding pessimism, Max Müller writes : "All Indian philosophers have been charged with pessimism, and in same cases, such a charge may seem well-founded, but not in all. People who derived their name for good from a word which originally meant nothing but being or real, *sat*, are not likely to have looked upon what is as what ought not to be. Indian philosophers are by no means dwelling for ever on the miseries of life. *They are not always whining and protesting that life is not worth-living*. That is not their pessimism. They simply state that they received the

1. हेयं दुःखमनागतम् ।
2. द्रष्टृदृश्ययोः संयोगो हेयहेतुः ।

first impulse to philosophical reflection from the fact that there is suffering in the world. They evidently thought that in a perfect world, suffering had no place, that it is something anomalous, something that at all events to be accounted for, and if possible, overcome. Pain, certainly, seems to be an imperfection, and, as such, may well have caused the question why it existed, and how it could be annihilated. But this is not the disposition which we are accustomed to call pessimism. Indian philosophy contains *no outcry against divine injustice, and in no way encourages suicidal expedients*. They would, in fact, be of no avail because, according to Indian views, the same troubles and the same problems would have to be faced again and again in another life."

According to Dayānanda, there is not so much pain and suffering in this world as has been so often emphasised by many thinkers. After all, this world is the operation of a benign and benevolent Lord, who has bestowed upon the world more of pleasure than of pain. Dayānanda writes, "If the happiness and misery of this world were compared, it will be found that the happiness is many times greater than the misery." Whatsoever little pain is in this world, it has a benign purpose behind it. Pain has not

been provided in the world by a *Satan* who always opposes God. God provides us with pain with the same benevolence as with pleasure. On our accounts, it is through Him that we get pleasure and pain both. Pain, though it is only a little in the world, is very much pinching, but its being so prominent has some meaning behind it. For every thousand of moments of pleasure, the moments of suffering are only few. Then how can it lead to a pessimistic outlook of life ?

Nor is sin so much in the world because it is a creation of a righteous Being. A little of pain and a little of sin are so much conspicuous in our life that sometimes we are led to think that the world is full of sin and suffering. One must know that the world does not rest on untruth. It is the truth and truth alone which prevails. Even the little untruth appears to gain ground only then, when it garbs itself into the folds of truth. The very tendency that one wants to present untruth as truth shows that he is more convinced of truth than of untruth. Man is more truthful by nature than untruthful, and this one can statistically find out by having a thorough survey of all his actions. So we find in this world more of truth, more of righteousness, and more of pleasure.

SIGNIFICANCE OF PAIN

Whatever little untruth is in nature, why should that also not be uprooted? Why should we not be free of even this small amount of suffering which is so eminent? Why does even this much exist?

The purpose behind pleasure and pain is the same. Pleasure and pain are not the direct outcome of one's actions in the same way as cause is related to effect. The action does not by itself lead to pleasure and pain. The pleasure and pain are bestowed upon us by the other intelligent agency *by virtue* of our actions. Pain is given to us with the same mercy as pleasure. The underlying thought in both the cases is the same. The merciful God, as our elder brother, wants *to encourage in us our strong points and discourage whatever our weaknesses are.* The encouragement of strong points and the discouragement of our weakness both aim at the betterment of oneself. The discouragement comes from pain and the encouragement comes from pleasure. Both aim at one and the same object, and thus, in both is inherent the same mercy and the same benevolence. It is through pain that one discards his weakness and it is through pleasure, that he strengthens his goodness. Negation and position both lead to the right evolution.

The right attitude of life would be to apprehend the value of pleasure and pain both.

It is not the pain that we have to uproot, it is the weakness in ourselves for the discouragement of which pain is provided to us that needs be uprooted.

THE THORNY PATH

"The path that leads to salvation," says the *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, "is like the sharp edge of a razor, difficult to cross and hard to tread[1] (I, iii, 14)." It is only the rare that attain Him, "wonderful is a man who speaks of Him, it is only the efficient that attains Him, the wonderful is one who has known Him, how efficient is he who comprehends Him.[2]" (*Kaṭha* 1, ii, 7). The ultimate goal of life is not easily attained. It is not so easy to know Him or to be with Him as many of the theologists believe. Nescience is not going to be easily destroyed. A few chants and a few dances or a few rituals and rights performed cannot take one to the ultimate goal. The path is difficult. We have to pass through thorny hedges on the blades of a razor or sword, because the illusions in the world are not less powerful. Our weaknesses may lead us to anywhere, may throw us into any pit, and perhaps, by the time we open

1. क्षुरस्य धारा निशिता दुरत्यया दुर्गं पथस्तत् कवयो वदन्ति ।
2. आश्चर्यो वक्ता कुशलोऽस्य लब्धाश्चर्यो ज्ञाता कुशलानुशिष्टः ॥

our eyes, we may be thrown back to the point where we started. One has to tread on the path with caution and eyes opened.

The thorny hedge on both the sides of our path is meant to warn us from time to time and to save us from unknown bewilderments. God seated in our own heart leads us on this path of righteousness, but it is we who sometimes do not hear the voice within, and sometimes, hearing we hear it not. At each step in this world, we are guided through the mercy and kindness of our most benevolent Lord, but sometimes we are lost so much into the world, that we pay no heed to the guidings, and then alone, our life becomes a burden, the clouds of pessimism envelop us and we plunge ourselves into desperate darkness. It is we who make ourselves despondent.

THE WORLDLY LIFE

All of us are not equally placed in life Nescience cannot be destroyed by all within the same time. Whether one follows the wordly life or the life of asceticism, there is not much difference, provided the eyes are always directed towards the goal. As I have said in the second chapter, the Veda does not want us to discard the world and worldly achievements. Everybody will have to choose his own path because all of us are differently placed in this world. The

worldly life, which means accumulating physical strength, accumulating knowledge, accumulating wealth, and enjoying in family with wife and children and striving for honours in society, is a life of righteousness. The harmonious development of the physical body leads to mental equipment which further goes to build up our character. This character is put to a crucial test when one enters into the worldly life. The character thus strengthened leads to spiritual advancement.

The first lesson of selflessness, one reads in one's family. A husband forsakes his interests when he is attached to his wife. Wife and husband forsake their interests while bringing out children. In the advanced state, in the interests of the society, other individual interests are ignored. The petty social interests are also discarded in the higher interests of the nation. When the self evolves still higher, in the universal interests merge out all other interests. At each stage, one's own interestedness goes on widening, which is another name of diminishing. An ascetic, finally, has no interests of his own to look after. He lives and breathes for others. In him, manifests the interest of all. He abstracts himself from the concrete.

Dayānanda has given equal and appropriate values to the household and ascetic

lives both. When questioned, whether the order of householders is the highest or the lowest of the orders, he says that "each of the orders is noble in its own place." He attaches a high value to the household life too. He says that "All the concerns of life are, therefore, dependent on the order of householders. If this order did not exist, the human species would not be propagated, and consequently, the orders of *brahmacharya*, *vānaprastha*, and *sanyāsa* could not be called into existence. Whosoever speaks ill of this order is himself worthy of contempt, but whosoever speaks well of it deserves all praise."

To lead the worldly life is not an aim by itself. It ought to be so properly led that finally, it may lead to abstraction. When duty is performed from duty point of view, it does not cultivate attachment. A little attachment has a value because it tempts one towards the performance of duty, but so long as it is directed towards duty, it is not properly an attachment. But when the idea of duty is cast aside, enjoyment becomes the goal of life. It then causes viscious attachment. Attachment leads to sin and sin leads to pain.

Wherever a man is required to do some duty, God has so arranged that some pleasure is attached to it. This very pleasure

becomes an attachment when duty is ignored. The attachment finally leads to pain and bondage. The worldly life as such is quite welcome, but it becomes a menace when taken as an end of life.

The worldly life consists in attaining four things, *dharma* or the knowledge concerning righteousness along with character, *artha* or the wealth, *kāma* or the vigour and desire for progeny, and lastly, *mokṣa* or capacity for abstraction from all in the end. The same thing almost is known as *vitteṣaṇā* or desire for wealth, *putreṣaṇā* or desire for progeny and lastly, *lokeṣaṇā* or desire for name and fame. It is only a *sanyāsin* who is expected to be free from all these three.

The asceticism or the life of abstraction is meant for only a chosen few, who think that they can live unattached and selflessly and who have risen much higher above the normal human level. But the normal society would consist of majority of householders who are doing their duty as ordinary mortals. In our society, we welcome learned *Brāhmaṇas* of high character, brave *Kṣattriyas* with patriotic fervour, wealthy *Vaiśyas* with generous hearts and noble *Śūdras* with sincere faithfulness. We aspire for healthy cows and cattle, sturdy bulls, swift horses, and other useful animals. We want in

our society the blooming youths, both boys and girls, possessing beauty, health and character. The Vedic philosophy demands from us a harmonious growth of the society as of the individual. The Vedic philosophy wants us to form happy families consisting of parents and children. We equally welcome poets and philosophers, artisans and mathematicians and, in fact, people of all trades. The wordly life to the fullest extent is the life we aspire for. But along with the worldly life, we demand from our people the *theistic* attitude. This is the attitude which differentiates us from the materialists. We believe that one can be a materialist as well as a theist side by side. We do not want to ignore the vast treasures hidden within natural forces. We shall have this nature at our command, but we shall also not forget the Lord, the Almighty, ruling over all. This theistic attitude of life would keep us free from the idea of undue exploitation and self-aggrandizement at the cost of others, it would enrich us with the idea of fellow-feeling; and it would bind us with the ties of love and sacrifice. This attitude would prevent us from the golden rule of 'might is right.' 'Right would be our might' then.

ASCETICISM

Life of an ascestic is not obligatory but the most exemplary. Dayānanda writes

that a man can become an ascetic at any stage in life, but he realises that to be initiated to the life of an ascetic from an immature age is not always free from danger. Asceticism is known as the particular attitude of life. This attitude cannot be developed by force or compulsion. With the accumulated experience of many lives, one is able to become one renounced. On the basis of Upaniṣads, Dayānanda says, "But he whose character is low, who is not free from passions, is not a *yogin* and whose mind is not contended, can never know God and commune with Him, a *sanyāsin* though he be (*Kaṭha*[1], I, ii, 23)." Further he says, "Those *sanyāsins* who are fully convinced of the existence of God by the knowledge of the Vedic Mantras relating to Him, and live godly lives, whose intellects are pure by virtue of the renunciation of all worldly enjoyments, who are perfect *yogins* with thorough control over their senses and minds, enjoy immortality and resume the concatenation of births and deaths after a *parānta* cycle, *i. e.*, when the period of salvation expires." (*Muṇḍaka*[2] III, ii, 6).

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1. नाविरतो दुश्चरितान्नाशान्तो नासमाहितः ।
नाशान्तमानसो वापि प्रज्ञानेनैनमाप्नुयात् ॥

2. वेदान्तविज्ञानसुनिश्चितार्थाः सन्यासयोगाद्यतयः शुद्धसत्त्वाः ।
ते ब्रह्मलोकेषु परान्तकाले परामृताः परिमुच्यन्ति सर्वे ॥

Regarding asceticism in the Vedic period, Radhakrishnan writes, "There are also indications of an ascetic tendency. Indra is said to have conquered heaven by asceticism. But the dominant note is not one of asceticism. In the hymns we find a keen delight in the beauties of nature, its greatness, its splendour, and its pathos. The motive of the sacrifices is the love of good things of the world. We have yet the deep joy in life and the world untainted by any melancholy gloom." Radhakrishnan maintains that the first reference to the estatic condition of ascetic sages is in the Ṛgveda (X,136).

We have just said that asceticism in proper is a particular attitude of life. We are not concerned here with the renounced life as considered by Smṛtis, the life of the fourth *āśrama*. This particular temperament may go along with the household life too. Both Janaka and Yājñavalkya remained in the household life for long and yet were imbibed with ascetic temperament. The seed of asceticism is already present in the household life, but it is matured in the '*muni*' or *vānaprastha* life. Finally, the complete renunciation takes place in the fourth stage. The detailed description of the ascetic life is given in the *Śatapatha*

Brāhmaṇa[1] (IV,vii,2,25-26), where it is definitely mentioned that after accomplishing the celibate life, and having avowed for the life of penance, and faith, the one becomes a *muni* or ascetic to know God, and finally, he renounces the world also to realise further. The renounced people belong to the category of those learned who do not aspire for progeny. They say, what shall we be doing with the progeny. They think that this would not lead them to God. They having left the desires for progeny, wealth and the worldly name and fame, lead the life of one renounced.

The ascetic tendencies have been rightly emphasised in the Upaniṣads. "He who has no desires, who is beyond desires, whose desires are satisfied, whose self is satisfied, being even Brahman obtains Brahman. (*Bṛhadā.*[2] IV, iv, 6). After all, human love is a shadow of divine love. "In truth, not for the husband's sake is the husband dear, but for the sake of the *Ātman* is the husband

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1. ब्रह्मचर्येण तपसा श्रद्धया यज्ञेनानाशकेन चैतमेव विदित्वा मुनिर्भवत्येतमेव प्रव्राजिनो लोकमीप्सन्तः प्रव्रजन्ति । एतद्ध स्म वै तत्पूर्वे ब्राह्मणाः । अनूचाना विद्वांसः प्रजां न कामयन्ते किं प्रजया करिष्यामो येषां नोऽयमात्मायं लोक इति ते ह स्म पुत्रैषणायाश्च वित्तैषणायाश्च लोकैषणायाश्च व्युत्थायाथ भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्ति ।

2. योऽकामो निष्काम आप्तकाम आत्मकामो न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति ब्रह्मैव सन्ब्रह्माप्येति ॥

dear and so is the case with wife", says the Upaniṣad[1]. The same is the case with our attachments directed towards other worldly grandeurs. The abstraction is the finality of our life.

The goal of life being fixed, the worldly and ascetic lives become complementary. The real worldly life is one which finally leads to abstraction and renunciation.

1 न वा अरे पत्युः कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवत्यात्मनस्तु कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवति न वा अरे जायायै कामाय जाया प्रिया भवत्यात्मनस्तु कामाय जाया प्रिया भवति ।

बृहदा० ॥ ४, ५, ६ ॥

Chapter XIV

Ethics

AN intellectual being is apparently no more than a perfect type of machinery, which once set up would go on working so long as it is not disturbed. But under these circumstances, the machine cannot evolve itself. From one of an inferior type, it cannot become superior one. You must have heard of a number of such machines working in perfect harmony and organised way. They are so intelligent that they can add up, subtract, multiply and divide and also solve differential equations. But man is not a machinery of this type. He has to evolve from the lowest stage to the highest one. This he cannot do without knowing what morality is and without leading life unto it. For other machineries in the world, the question of morality does not arise. In this connection, I agree with Professor Rānāde, when he says, "If we take into account, however, the integrity of man's consciousness as a whole, it would seem absolutely impossible, in the interest of the highest development of which man's consciousness is capable, to sunder the intellectual from the moral, as the moral from

the mystical element. Intelligence without the moral backbone might only degenerate into the cleverest forms of chicanery, and a mystic without morality, if such a one were possible, might only be hideous creature who is a blot on the spiritual evolution of man."

THE BASIS OF MORALITY

According to evolutionists, the first stage of morality is heteronomy. In the primitive form, the elders or the leaders of the society form the standard of morality. Whatever they do becomes exemplary for others. But then as the man advances, heteronomy is substituted by theonomy, where the standard of morality becomes the dictates and wishes of God. What God likes or wishes us to do is an act of morality. But in the last stage of advancement, it is neither the society, nor the state and nor the wishes of God which provide us with the standard of morality. "This must spring entirely from within ourselves." The idea of morality lies centred deep within ourselves. It is the very essence of the self. Immorality shows weakness of human nature, while in morality, lies the strength.

In the practical life, everybody is not supposed to be accomplished enough to know which way to move. In the midst of difficulties, he may either get a solution

through heteronomy or theonomy. In the balanced life, one cannot ignore what others have been saying, but without autonomy, it is difficult to be heteronomous and theonomous also. All elders do not agree in matters of conduct of life, their ways of living are different from time to time, and so in the midst of conflicts, the choice of standard becomes as difficult as the choice of morals. To know what the wish of God is, is another controversial problem. The scriptures are not always explicit, generally they do not enter into details, and mostly, their interpretations are divergent, and therefore, without one's own decision, they are also not of much help. And therefore, to know which path to tread upon, one must solely rely on himself.

THE DICTATES OF CONSCIENCE

It is generally said that the conscience is "the candle of the Lord within us" (Rānāde). Dayānanda calls it as the direct voice of the Lord. Listen to the inner voice and you will know which way to follow. Morality cannot be judged on any standard better than this. But everybody does not hear the voice of conscience. The voice becomes feeble if it is not heard and followed. Undoubtedly, the voice is there, but we become deaf to it. When we say that the conscience has been killed, it is our power of

hearing it that is killed, and not the conscience. Conscience in matters cf morals gives clear-cut definite answer devoid of all ambiguity. it guides us always on the right path and can invariably be relied upon. Conscience casts aside minor utilitarian considerations in morals and it shows an absolute path.

FREEDOM

The value of morality lies in freedom. Undoubtedly, conscience always directs to the right path, but it does not force one to follow it. Man is not a machinery to go on doing according to the original set-up. There is no moral code prescribed for a machine. The value of life depends on the freedom imparted to the Self. In fact, the freedom is the natural characteristic of the Self. I do not agree with the doctrine of determinism in matters of moral life. If human conduct is unequivocally determined by antecedents, consisting of character and external circumstances, then the morality loses all its value and the very purpose of it is not served. The value lies in the three directional freedom: doing (*kartum*), not-doing (*akartum*) and contra-doing (*anyathā-kartum*). The objections against freedom of course are generally as follows, which we shall consider in brief:

(*a*) To deny the causal determination of

our acts by antecedents is to deny the presence of rational connection in the psychical sphere, and thus to pronounce not only psychology, but all the sciences which take physical events as their material and attempt to discover rational connections between them, in principle impossible. This argument is not valid. This freedom is the characteristic of the Self, and therefore, this question transcends the psychic domain. In the psychic realm, the rational connections would always persist but the concept of rationality has to be changed, if it has been restricted to mere antecedental relations.

(*b*) Another argument is: This is still more evident if we reflect that all science consists in the formulation of 'laws' or 'uniformities' and that the formulation of laws rests upon the principle that "the same result follows under same conditions"—*i.e.*, upon the principle of causal determination. This argument would be valid when one deals with 'material causes' and does not hold good in the case of the "First or the Efficient Cause." In fact, the efficient cause is efficient because it is free to act or at least free to will.

Somewhere, we have to ascribe freedom. We never maintain that freedom is being ascribed to the psychic realm. Freedom rests

in the Self itself. We always ascribe *motives* to the Self, and amongst number of motives, the Self is free to choose a particular one. We agree, that "if you know what '*motive*' *has been chosen freely* by the Self, then the prediction of its conduct is reduced to the purely mathematical form," but we do not agree with the determinist in that "if you know what are the '*motives*' *present to a man's choice*, and *the relative strength of each*, the prediction of the conduct is reduced to the purely mathematical problem of the solution of an equation or sets of equations." How will you decide the relative strength of each motive? The relative strength can be decided by considering the tendencies of the Self alone. The motives themselves would not decide the relative strength and for different Selves, the relative strengths would widely differ. And therefore, even then, the problem will be reduced to the freedom ascribed to the Self.

Thus we have seen that the value of morality lies in imparting freedom to the Self. In it alone lies its evolution and further betterment. If no freedom is imparted to it, it cannot be held responsible for any action. It cannot be an enjoyer of fruits, pleasure or pain. Without freedom, it is reduced to a machine and it no longer remains an efficient cause; it is no longer a

doer. Pāṇini says, "Doer is one who is free." Dayānanda always insists upon this fact. The Self is free to act, and for all actions, in which it is free to act, the question of morality arises.

THE VARIOUS ETHICAL DOCTRINES

We find in the world four types existing: the pleasant good, the unpleasant good, the pleasant evil and the unpleasant evil. Nobody would generally go to an unpleasant evil, while the right type of people, the '*Parokṣapriyāḥ*' choose the path of unpleasant good also. Nobody leaves the pleasant good too. So the whole conflict now centres round two types: the unpleasant good and the pleasant evil. We are generally led away by appearances, and therefore, it is so often that we adhere to a pleasant evil in preference to an unpleasant good.

But why is not all evil apparently always unpleasant and good always pleasant? If it were so, the question of free choice would not have arisen. There is a purpose behind the pleasant evil and unpleasant good. The strength of character is tested only on this occasion. By discriminating between the two paths, the Self evolves itself from impure state to the pure one.

It is not a place here to describe numerous theories, either eastern or western,

in connection with ethical attitude. I shall only refer to two attitudes,–firstly, the attitude of those who believe that morality is a social need in which the major interests of the majority are preserved; and the second is the theistic attitude which starts with the idea of living to eternity, and which believes that morality has a metaphysical background and it aims at the highest evolution of the Self, or rather, morality is the characteristic of the pure Self. Morality according to the first school is based upon two suppositions: (*i*) that in the main and on the whole, the world is so ordered that our moral struggle for fuller and stronger individuality of life is successful; that by living moral life, our individual character does become richer in coherent interest and more completely unified; (*ii*) that the gain thus won by our private struggles does not perish with our disappearance from this mortal scene but *is handed on to the successors* who replace us in the life of the social order to which we belong.

The theistic attitude of the second school does not deny the contentions of the first, but above all, it maintains that there can be no disappearance from the mortal scene, because the cycle of life and death continues. Morality is the natural characteristic of the Self and any act immoral

takes the Self down in the series. It believes that the major good of the majority would *always be* in adoption of the perfect ethical principles. The social good is secondary but a necessary outcome of individualistic ideals of morality. Even the apparent good of the society should be ignored at the cost of the moral principle, because the break once would set up a wrong ideal in the society, which will create havocs now and then and thereby, the good of the society would be badly affected.

We shall not discuss here anything like the two schools, the Cynics or the Cyrenaics which followed Socrates with ascetic and Hedonistic tendencies, nor shall we discuss the utilitarian doctrines on the one hand and the modern idealism on the other.

PATAÑJALI'S SYSTEM OF ETHICS

Indian philosophers have not discussed the theory of etnics. The ethical principles being the natural characteristics of man, they never thought it worthwhile in hairsplitting the foundations on which they are based. Nor did they regard the individualistic good separate from the social good, nor *vice versa*. Patañjali regards the practice of ethical principles as absolutely necessary in adopting ***yoga***.

We have already seen how he has classified *yama* and *niyama* which form the first two components of the *yogic aṣṭānga*. The five *yamas* or abstentions are non-violence or tolerance, truthfulness, honesty, celibacy and non-attachment. The five observances for these are purity, contentment, austerity, self-study and devotion to God.

DAYĀNANDA'S OUTLINE OF ETHICS

Dayānanda has not treated the subject of ethics in a philosophical way, because perhaps like other thinkers of the East,- he also regards truth behind the ethical principles to be self-evident. Even the most unethical being believes in the ethical principles so far as the theory is concerned. When applied in practice, he still wants to pose as an ethical being. One who is untruthful believes also in truthfulness; he invariably represents his untruthfulness as a truth. He knows that untruthfulness as untruthfulness can bring him no good. The most intolerent also believes in tolerence because he expects that others should be tolerent towards him. The most atrocious one is also kind towards those whom he loves. His atrocity is an imposed thing, whilst by nature, he is also kind. Anger, passion, hatred, lack of confidence and the like vices are merely temporary phases of human conduct. A man is sober by nature, and it is only on

circumstances that he becomes hot and out of his way. Thus, we have seen that ethical principles do not require ordinarily any discussion.

Dayānanda has followed Manu regarding various ethical principles. Undoubtedly, Manu has dealt with everything by keeping in view the social point, but the principles are equally valid from the individual point also. We shall outline a few of them here.

Imposters :

Manu deals with ten forms of imposters : (*i*) *dharmadhvaji* or those who do not practise any virtue but defraud others in the name of virtue, (*ii*) *sadālubdha* or a covetous wretch, (*iii*) *chhadmika* or a deceitful person, (*iv*) *lokadambhaka* or one who brags of his greatness before others, (*v*) *hinsra* or one who injures others, (*vi*) *sarvābhisandhaka* or one who mixes with all kinds of men, (*vii*) *adhodṛṣṭī* or one who looks down in order to be considered a very virtuous man, (*viii*) *naiṣkṛtika* or one who is cruel and of vindicative nature, (*ix*) *svārthasādhanatatpara* or one who looks only to his own good, and (*x*) *śaṭha* who persists in the obstinacy even when he knows that he is in the wrong, and (*xi*) *mithyāvinīta* or the one with false modesty. (*Manu*, IV, 195, 196).

The ten principles:

In the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*[1] (14, 4), are mentioned the right attitudes of mind with regard to the ethical principles; I shall quote them with simple definitions of Dayānanda) *Ṛgvedādibhāṣyabhūmikā*, '*Vedoktadharma*' chapter):

(*i*) *Kāma* is the name of desire for goodness.

(*ii*) *Saṃkalpa* is the name of desire for attainment of that good.

(*iii*) *Vichikitsā* is the name of raising doubts in order to arrive at a decision regarding methods of attainment.

(*iv*) *Śrāddhā* is the name of profound faith or confidence in God, truthfulness and other virtues.

(*v*) *Aśraddhā* is the name of aversion from atheistic tendencies mal-argumentations and non-virtues.

(*vi*) *Dhṛtiḥ* is the name of reliance over God and righteousness, in the moments of pleasure and pain.

(*vii*) *Adhṛtiḥ* is the name of non-persistency in matters of non-righteousness.

(*viii*) *Hrīḥ* is the name of hesitation in

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1. कामः सङ्कल्पो विचिकित्सा श्रद्धाऽश्रद्धा धृतिरधृतिर्ह्रीर्धीर्भीरित्येतत्सर्वं मन एव तस्मादपि पृष्ठत उपस्पृष्टो मनसा विजानाति ।

not adopting what is truth and adopting what is not truth.

(*ix*) *Dhīḥ* is the name of attitude of immediately adopting virtues.

(*x*) *Bhīḥ* is the name of fear which one entertains while doing anything against the commandments of God, or doing a sinful act because he sees the omnipresent God overhead.

These are the right ethical tendencies which lead man to the moral path in the course of life.

Effort and reliance over God :

Dayānanda says that "*Nāpuruṣārthinam manuṣyamīśvaronugṛhṇati*", that is, God is not kind to one who can do no efforts. He further says that one should lay confidence in God and pray to Him while always actively exerting to do his duty. The prayer alone will not be responded. God helps those who help themselves.

The five great virtues :

In the *Taittirīya Śākhā*, the five great virtues to be followed by a student and in fact, by all, are :

(*i*) *Ṛta* or the exact knowledge.

(*ii*) *Satya* or truth.

(*iii*) *Tapas* or austerity for the attainment of knowledge and virtues.

(*iv*) *Dama* or distracting the sensualities from non-virtuous acts and diverting sense-organs towards virtue.

(*v*) *Śama* or always inclining towards the performance of virtuous deeds.

In the same passage of the *Taittirīya* (I, 9), it is mentioned that besides the above five great virtues, the other duties, which are to be accomplished by a man in general are to offer ceremonial as well as the daily oblations to fire (performance of *yajñas* from *agnihotra* to *aśvamedha*), to receive guests with hospitality, to practise humanity (*mānuṣam*) and to increase and multiply. The burden of discourse throughout this passage is the study and teaching of the Sacred Scriptures[1]. Along with all above virtues and duties, study and teaching should be continued.

Which of the above virtues is uppermost?

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1. ऋतं च स्वाध्यायप्रवचने च । सत्यं च० । तपश्च० । दमश्च० । शमश्च० । अग्नयश्च० । अग्निहोत्रं च० । अतिथयश्च० । मानुषं च० ।प्रजा च० । प्रजनश्च० । प्रजातिश्च० ।

सत्यमिति सत्यवचा राथीतरः । तप इति तपोनित्यः पौरुशिष्टिः । स्वाध्यायप्रवचन एवेति नाको मौद्गल्यः । तद्धि तपस्तद्धि तपः ।

Three opinions are given in that passage. The sage Satyavachas Rāthītara lays stress on the virtue of *Truth*. The other moralist, Taponiṣṭa Pauruśiṣṭi says that *austerity* is the uppermost virtue, whilst the sage Nāka Maudgalya favours "Svādhyāya Pravachana" or *study* and *teaching* because he thinks that the other qualities as subsidiaries are directed to this end. This is, verily, the greatest austerity.

The nine types of Tapas or austerity:

The usual conception of austerity or *tapas* is penalising the body with severities. Attachment with flesh is supposed to be the greatest hindrance, and therefore, voluntarily, people impose upon themselves hardships and believe that thereby, they can be free from evil sensualities. But austerity according to the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*[1] (X, 8) is of the following nine types:

(*i*) *Ṛta* or the exact knowledge (or respect of Law) (*ii*) *Satya* or truthfulness (*iii*) *Śruta* or discourses, having and giving (*iv*) *Śānta* or peacefulness (*v*) *Damas* or self-control, (*vi*) *Śama* or tranquillity (*vii*) *Dāna* or charity (*viii*) *Yajña* or performing duties and (*ix*) devotion to God.

1. ऋतं तपः, सत्यं तपः, श्रुतं तपः, शान्तं तपो, दमस्तपः, शमस्तपो, दानं तपो, यज्ञस्तपो, भूर्भुवः सुवर्ब्रह्मैतदुपास्वैतत्तपः ।

Truth is the supreme virtue:

Dayānanda has quoted at length two passages from the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* (X, 62 and 63) to show that there is no virtue which can surpass truth. We shall give the purport of the passage here. Truth is great and great is Truth. By Truth alone, man does not fall down from paradise. What is good is Truth, and therefore, always be merged into Truth.[1]

"By Truth alone blows the wind, and by Truth alone, the sun shines in the sky, the value of the words lies in Truth, everything is sustained by Truth, and therefore, Truth alone is regarded as the supreme virtue[2]."

Other virtues as knowledge, austerity, self-control, peace and tranquillity, and also performing other duties are regarded only as next to Truth.

Muṇḍakopaniṣad says[3]: "Truth alone

1. सत्यं परं परꣳसत्यꣳ सत्येन न सुवर्गाल्लोकाच्च्यवन्ते कदाचन, सताꣳहि सत्यं, तस्मात्सत्ये रमन्ते ।
2. सत्येन वायुरावाति, सत्येनादित्यो रोचते दिवि । सत्यं वाचः प्रतिष्ठा, सत्ये सर्वं प्रतिष्ठितं, तस्मात्सत्यं परमं वदन्ति ।
3. सत्यमेव जयते नानृतं सत्येन पन्था विततो देवयानः । येनाक्रमन्त्यृषयो ह्याप्तकामा यत्र तत्सत्यस्य परमं निधानम् ॥

becomes victorious, and not a lie; by Truth is paved the path of gods, by which travel the sages, and the *āptakāma* or those who are free from sensualities, to where lies the highest Repository of Truth. (III, i, 6)." Thus Truth alone takes one to Brahman, the ultimate goal of life. Dayānanda writes, "therefore, it is the duty of everybody to follow truth and leave untruth.[1]" (*Ṛgvedādibhāṣyabhūmikā*, '*Vedoktadharma*' chapter).

WHAT IS GOOD?

It is generally regarded that something is good when it is pleasure-giving. We compare two things with respect to their goodness by comparing of them as sources of pleasure. When good is to be considered in relation to pleasure, we naturally drift towards Hedonism. Shall we say with Hobbes that "whatsoever is the object of any man's desire, that it is which he for his part calleth Good, and the object of his aversion, Evil?" With such a definition of goodness, we have to consider what desire is? Is it not a fact that a man often desires what he knows is on the whole bad for him; the pleasure of drinking champagne, for example, even when he is sure that it is disagreeable and would do him harm in the long run? Shall we be the slaves of desires

1. अतएव सत्यधर्मानुष्ठानमधर्मत्यागश्च सर्वैः कर्त्तव्य इति ।

then or does the good lie in controlling them ? Is all desired desirable ? Perhaps, everybody would agree from experience that it is not so A patient under medical treatment desires to eat or drink such substances which positively do harm. Thus neither the pleasure looking is the source of good, nor what is desired is all good.

I agree with Green, "that there is a principle of *self-development* in man, independent of the excitement of new desires by those new imaginations which presuppose new experiences, of pleasure." What this self-development exactly means, we are not going to discuss here. But there is in us a tendency and also the capacity of changing ourselves towards betterment, or one may say, towards purification. But at times, we may be drifted away from this goal of life, and then instead of our evolution being in the right direction, it may take place in the wrong one. In this light, we can say that all that leads us to the *self-development*, self-purification or evolution in the right direction is for us the Good, and on contrary, all that which leads us to the self-deterioration, impurification or evolution in the wrong direction is the EVIL for us. Now at times, the GOOD would be pleasant to us and would be compatible with our desires, but at other

times, we, by our own weakness, would be regarding it to be bitter and against our desires. In such cases one has to restrain himself and transcend his pleasures. This idea of GOOD will not meet favour with Hedonists, who ignore the very view-point of life, that is, the drift towards self-purification or self-development.

GOD THE ETHICAL IDEAL

We have been treating so far in the previous pages God to be the efficient cause of creation. To us, God is a creator, sustainer and maintainer of the universe. We have also said that besides, God is the giver of rewards of our actions, good or bad, with an idea that we may attain purification. God has provided us with all requirements in order to reach this end, and in this way, He is merciful too. Dayānanda writes, "What happiness could the souls enjoy during the period of dissolution? If the happiness and misery of this world were compared, it will be found that the happiness is many times greater than the misery. Besides, many a pure soul that adopts the means of obtaining salvation attains final beatitude; whilst during the period of dissolution, the soul simply remains idle as in deep sleep. Moreover, had He not created this world, how could have He been able to award souls their deserts, and how

could have they reaped the fruits of their actions, good and evil, done in the previous cycle of creation ? The attributes of God, such as justice, mercy, the power of sustaining the world,can have significance only when He makes the world."

But then there is an ethical aspect of God. Can we have a positive conception of what the ultimate perfection of the human self would be ? Can we realise what its life would be when all its capabilities were fully realised ? We shall say as Green puts it, "We can no more do this than we can form a positive conception of what the nature of God in itself is." Our all the present notions about human excellences or virtues are more or less relative to present imperfections. It is difficult to find out within humanity a perfect ethical being. "No one is eager *enough* to know what is true or make what is beautiful ; no one ready *enough* to endure pain and forgo pleasure in the service of his fellows ; no one impartial *enough* in treating the claims of another exactly as his own." We have amongst us comparatively superior beings from the point of view of ethics and morality. But then there must be a standard before us so that we may be able to judge for ourselves, and then there must be an ideal, the ever distant one, which would be to us a guiding star. God is an embodiment of all

GOOD, so much so that GOD is GOOD and GOOD is GOD. From our point of view, He is the Highest Being of Morality, untouched by Vices. He is Truth, Mercy, Kindness, Justice, Fearlessness, Generosity, Chastity, Purity and in short, the Perfect Morality. He is the Ethical Ideal.

GOOD TO OTHERS

Why not let the world go on as such or why shall we be interfering with others, they will look after themselves and let us look after ourselves,—these are some of the notions of individualists. They say, you need not bother about affairs of others. They further say, everybody has his own truth, truth is not the monopoly of a few individuals and then, what is the guarantee that what you hold is truth, whilst what others hold on contrary is not truth. If it be so, then you should mind your own affairs. Others come forward with the notion, that truth, though one, has various aspects, all equally true, you do what you prefer to do and allow others to do what they prefer. Others say, that everybody is over-powered with his own *karma*, let him enjoy or suffer unto his own actions; leave him there uninterfered.

Is there anything like common good, and shall the area of common good be extended?

Is there anything like *duty*, that is, *due* or owed *to* some one? A few of the duties are self-evident, so much so that their performance adds nothing to credit, whilst if neglected, it will be a crime. Sidgwick says, "We should scarcely say that it was virtuous—under ordinary circumstances—to pay one's debts, or give one's children a decent education, or keep one's aged parents from starving; these being duties which most men perform, and only bad men neglect." He further says, "On the other hand, there are acts of high and noble virtue which we commonly regard as going beyond the strict duty of the agent; since, while we *praise their performance*, we do not *condemn their non-performance*."

In fact, each individual cannot be left alone. A father does not owe anything to the new-born child, and yet it becomes his duty to look after it. He derives pleasure in performance of his duty towards it. One may for the sake of argument say, that the father is deriving pleasure from the company of the baby, and therefore, he owes something to it and as such, he is duty-bound to look after it. But this would be too much ascribing a selfish motive to a parent, who knows in its heart of heart, that it is doing its duty so dutifully that the idea of duty does not arise even. It is not only human but all-animal instinct to let the weak be strong.

'Survival of the fittest' maxim is not so much prevalent and wide as 'helping the weak to prosper.' Two different communities or different species amongst animals might fight, and after the conflict, only the fittest may survive, —this is a different thing, but within one's own group or society or species, the weak always derives help from the strong. The strength of one lies not in inflicting tortures on the weak, but in protecting weak from devouring forces. This is not because man owes to the particular individual whom he is required to help, but because he owes to the particular grouping, the individuals of which helped him when he was still a weak entity. I am dutiful to my child as much as I owe something to my father. I owe to the society, because it helped me throughout. The individuals pass on, leaving behind them a healthy society. You can say that the individuality is being martyred for the sake of society. This martyrdom started in the hoary ages and will continue so long as any individual remains. It is the duty of everybody to see that when he leaves the society, it has moved a little ahead.

The knowledge of a learned is meant to be imparted to one who is ignorant. The wealth of a rich man is meant to be spent up in the cause of the poor. The strength of